In Praise of Light Forces

In a previous post I discussed the expansion of Nigeria’s forces, with an emphasis on creating not just additional forces but also a standing Reserve force.

I made the argument, that Nigeria’s security forces should be reorganised, expanded, standardised in order to barricade (amongst other duties) Nigeria’s  borders

This will be a costly and time consuming exercise across the board but can be done quicker and at lower cost if the expansion (in the Army at least) is initially focussed on creating light infantry.

The idea is that the basic and most numerous sub unit would be the Light Infantry Battalion.

These Battalions will form the nucleus of Battlegroups created out of their respective brigades acting either independently or with added manoeuvre units or enablers (N.B. while one is focusing on light infantry battalions, for them to be effective, logistics units will also be needed. These will need to be refined and reorganised in such a way to ensure these units can be kept fighting, this is well out of my fairly limited knowledge so I’ll leave out details of these and other enablers).

Why?

Terrain: the vast majority of Nigeria’s conflicts are wars amongst the people and/or fought in terrain that is difficult or impassable to most vehicles such as urban areas, forests, rainforest, swamps, highlands etc, thus the best way to access such terrain is either on foot or in light all terrain vehicles.

Weather: light forces can operate in all weather conditions. They do not need metalled roads (or even any roads at all) to manoeuvre or operate. Roads would be needed for logistics but due to the units smaller logistics needs, as much as possible can be transhipped by other means and they can be resupplied by air, water or with smaller land vehicles than armoured or mechanised units.

Cost: training and equipping troops is expensive. However Light infantry are relatively cheap to equip and maintain. Unlike armoured or mechanised units they can use virtually any training area and get there relatively easily. Supporting and sustaining these units is cheaper, as they have less vehicles of which most are simple converted civilian vehicles, maintenance will be less complex and spares easier to source. They use less fuel and lubricants and need less specialised technical specialists. If vehicle types are standardised further savings can be obtained via economies of scale

Logistics has always been the bane of Nigerian operations, however due to their limited operational range, these troops should always remain relatively close to their supply nodes and will be equipped such that they can sustain themselves ‘to the last mile’ as it were.

Flexibility: due to the fact that these units come with relatively few and relatively light vehicles, they are easy to deploy. They can be employed by water, air or land. Unlike armour or MRAPs they do not need special heavy vehicle transporters to move their vehicles but can move themselves and their equipment independently by road. They are easier to transport long distances, either by rail, sea or air. They can be used for offensive or defensive operations, peace keeping, peace support, COIN, Internal security etc without any change of role or equipment. They can be attached complete to any other unit without causing them any additional logistic or integration problems as their equipment will be compatible with every other units.

Mobility: Light infantry units are highly mobile and can manoeuvre in every single type of terrain. however they may lack the speed of mechanised units.

ISR: as they have less vehicles, their footprint is much smaller, with smaller vehicle parks, workshops etc, thus it is easier to camouflage and disguise these units, making them harder to find. In equal measure the units will be configured to ensure each force element should be able to conduct reconnaissance and surveillance with patrols, observation points, as well as UAVs and other sensors in order to gather intelligence about the enemy, ground, etc

Combat service support: if each battalion has a well designed service support element, capable of collecting, storing and transporting its own fuel, food, water and ammunition, from its higher formation and then distributing it efficiently to its deployed sub units using a variety of means (trucks, pick ups, quad bikes, motorcycles etc). Vehicles can be kept operating longer with an attached Light Mechanics Workshop and recovery vehicles. Medical cover can be provided by a dedicated Medical Platoon, with Ambulance attached to each Company Headquarters

Survivability:  with integral organic logistics, direct and indirect fire support and combat engineering, the units will have a greater chance of surviving in virtually all theatres or combat operations, except possibly mobile warfare against an armoured unit or assault upon heavily fortified positions supported by air and artillery. In the unlikely event Nigeria is engaged in this kind of warfare, there will be mechanised and armoured units that should be employed with light infantry supporting. But even if light infantry is tasked with such missions, appropriate equipment, training and tactics can still allow success

Firepower: a weakness of light infantry is a lack of firepower. This can be remedied by ensuring that there is an organic fire support element at all levels able to provide direct and indirect fire support (i.e., 60mm mortars and machine guns at platoon level, 81mm mortars & heavy machine guns at company level, 81mm mortars, heavy machine guns, snipers and Automatic Grenade Launchers (AGL) at battalion level). This aims to ensure that at all levels each unit element should be able to outgun its equivalent and by applying proper training and tactics should be able to defeat any unit of equal size. The fire support element will be enhanced by an integrated/ organic target acquisition function with each force element. Platoons having their own UAVs, Companies and Battalions having Recce units and UAVS as well as a sniper section. This would greatly increase the speed, accuracy and lethality of the fire support element. As each brigade will also have its own artillery, this can also be used to support the sub unit.

Protection: The other problem light infantry will face is their comparatively limited protection from mines, IEDs, direct and indirect fire. While soldiers will have personal protection from body armour and helmets, light infantry will mostly deploy in soft skin vehicles whilst motorised infantry will deploy with MRAPs. Again, as the light infantry are flexible, they can be mounted in (or on) APCS, IFVs, MRAPs etc but the main protection will be their use of manoeuvre, good training, tactics and protection and not being improperly used.

How?

As part of the reorganisation I mooted the creation of Joint Military Zones in which training, logistics, command, certain equipment and other resources could be pooled as well as the standardisation of units, equipment and basic training in order to support the expansion of the security forces.

If Light forces are considered the basis of this expansion then by standardising training, equipment and weapons, it becomes relatively easy to generate additional forces in times of crisis, allowing the Army to create several types of Light manoeuvre units; Regular full time units, Reserve Part time units, Mobilised Reserve Part time units, Emergency Regular units

Regular Full time Units: would be created in the same manner as before but with reorganised as will be covered later

Reserve Part Time units: consisting of a combination of demobilised soldiers and directly recruited part time soldiers. Reserve units should form combat service support function, each JMZ should have a Light Infantry Brigade. Former soldiers who were not infantry would simply need to undertake a refresher course while new entrants would complete basic and advanced training. These could be made modular in 2 or 4 week blocks or over weekends to fit in with normal work/ life patterns. None of this is revolutionary and is practiced in most countries.

Mobilised Reserve Part time units: will be reserve units that will be mobilised in order to conduct military operations. Under normal circumstances these units should only be mobilised to conduct operations within their JMZ (or Divisional AoR), acting as a local territorial defence unit, freeing up regular units for other operations. However there should also be an option for units to be deployed outside their AoR, either as volunteers or in the event of a total war during which the units will be mobilised for the duration becoming part of the Regular Army

Emergency Regular units: would be either individual replacements or company sized units generated from volunteers (or not) within the Army and other services, put through the a special infantry short course and formed into ad hoc light infantry units, for use in emergency situations. National Youth Corpers could be used to backfill some of these posts. For example if a clerk or driver is taken from the Air Force, a Youth Corper could be rapidly trained as their replacement and undertake their military administration or driving tasks while they are on operations, thus preventing a loss of capability and service

Operational Concept

The utility of these forces will be found as operations to secure the country develop. In order to defeat insurgents, trans national criminals and terrorists, smugglers, armed criminals and other threats to the security of the lives and property of Nigerians, it would be necessary to secure the borders, garrison recaptured territory, provide internal security/ police support, protect lines of communications, protect critical infrastructure, protect urban areas and isolated rural areas etc. Until such a time as the police force, NSCDC et al are properly resourced and orientated for these tasks they will remain a military (i.e. Army) operation.

It is important to note that when trying to allocate troops to task one takes into account not just the troops actually on the mission but the troops replacing them and having the flexibility to react or respond to any unforeseen event.

All told it could take several hundred thousand men under arms to adequately resource all these tasks which is not economic to maintain as a permanent standing force (bearing in mind we have not taken into account the combat support and service support troops these light infantry units will need).

Thus this force generation can be done by creating these additional light infantry forces (as well as engineering and logistics capabilities) and the effort sustained by Reserve or emergency units.

Reserve units can operate on a 2-4-6 model, i.e. the first year (in addition to weekly and monthly training) they attend a 2 week training period in which they undertake any extra courses or training needed to bring them up to scratch, with build up training in the weekends prior.

The next year they either undertake a 4 week training exercise or else a 4 week military task such as guarding CNI or operating in a relatively safe area. The 3^rd year they undertake an operational tour during which they are used in the same way as a Regular full time light infantry unit. Ideally these units should operate within their own AoR on a 6 month tour.

Emergency full time units can be generated at any point to fulfil an urgent operational gap, with consideration given as to how each service personnel’s actual job role will be covered in their absence. This concept could even be formalised with each non combat unit in all 3 services being required to form a composite light infantry unit (for example, each company forms a composite infantry platoon, each battalion forms a company, each brigade a battalion etc) by this method, the Emergency units can replicate the Reserve model and undertake regular light infantry training, weekly, monthly and annually, ensuring the officers and men are always ready to undertake these tasks and the actual process of identifying, motivating and training volunteers will be much easier.

Once internal peace and security is ensured in Nigeria, Regular units can be redeployed on peace keeping/ peace support operations across Africa and the world garnering valuable operational experience, diplomatic goodwill and also partly defraying the cost of maintaining an expanded standing army. The Army can still reduce in size through natural wastage, retirements and demobilisations (if necessary) while the skills of those still of military age will be preserved by a corresponding expansion of the Reserve who may no longer undertake operational duties but will increasingly undertake exercises alongside the Regular Army, while fulfilling a territorial defence role.

Conclusion

It is this authors opinion that the ability to generate trained light infantry for the wide range of internal security tasks in Nigeria will be critical to arresting the deteriorating security situation.

The lessons from Ukraine while incomplete have shown the utility of locally generated forces to add mass to a professional Army, free them from certain duties, provide crucial local knowledge, undertake defensive operations and form the nucleus of the new professional Army as casualties mount.

Likewise the experience of the UK, USA, France etc during the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan show many of the benefits (and limitations) of a well organised Reserve in allowing a military to be able to sustain operations. These countries have Reserve elements of all forces in their services, including artillery, air defence, logistics, medics, engineers etc and in many cases there are unseen benefits of having erstwhile civilians try and solve military problems. However the effect of extracting large numbers of people out of the economy for extended periods is something that must be planned, resourced and legislated for.

having these units locally based allows the local populace to have a sense of ownership of the forces and will help break down some of the barriers between the forces and the population they serve.

Most importantly though, light infantry are the easiest troops to generate and train and can be used for almost every other task. Beyond being used as infantry, they can be used as logisticians, or retrained as armour, artillery etc. the reverse activity of retraining and using skilled (and expensively) trained armour or artillery troops as infantrymen makes little economic sense.

It should be noted once again that this effort will completely fail without the proper training, logistic and combat support needed.

In the next instalment I will attempt to set out how I believe these units should be structured, which will hopefully explain why I believe a reorganised light infantry force with its own organic enablers will be battle winners.

Israel/ Hamas War: 5 initial lessons for Africa

Another Palestinian Israeli War.

But in this case the current Palestinian combatant, Hamas has initiated the attack with a complex, well coordinated, multi domain operation which has achieved almost complete surprise and success. The success of the operation was utterly shredded by the cruel (an utterly unnecessary) barbarism of murdering hundreds of unarmed defenceless civilians, which the Israelis are avenging with a siege and bombardment of Gaza

However beyond the tragedy and human suffering of Hamas attack and atrocities and the Israeli response, there are some initial lessons for African countries.

1. Its good to know your enemy, its better to understand them: self explanatory but a lesson that needs to be relearnt periodically. The current Israeli government has been pursuing an agenda targeting Iran and the West Bank, overlooking Hamas and Gaza. Hamas on the other hand not only knows the Israelis but clearly understood what its tactical, operational and strategic response would be. In Nigeria the government of President Jonathan assumed Boko Haram was a creation of the opposition, leading to electoral defeat, President Buhari took #EndSARS to be a political plot against him rather than a popular protest against police brutality, so brutally crushed them, birthing the Obidient movement which while electorally unsuccessful has created a situation in which the current President has so little legitimacy that his own governors challenge his foreign policy.

Lesson: The enemy you want to fight is not the enemy you will end up fighting, a genuine understanding of the operational environment is key to success

2. Adapt or die: the Israeli strategy of periodically ‘mowing the lawn’, taking out adversaries leaders, assets and facilities, has an added benefit for its adversaries. Everyone taking a leadership position in any of these groups understands they have a very limited shelf life, thus are extremely motivated and seek to perfect their tradecraft as much as possible to stay alive as long as possible. Likewise the multiple innovative ways Israel uses to seek and destroy these people and assets forces them to find new and inventive ways to hide their assets, personnel and activities, sometimes in plain sight. As the Syrian/ Ukrainian use of cheap UAVs has shown, asymmetry forces combatants to innovate in ways that the stronger power fails to catch onto, either due to arrogance, failing to recognise the significance or sheer inertia. Ironically Israeli innovation, fluidity in tactics, groupings and doctrine was what made them victorious in their earlier wars, taking on the tactical lessons of their parent armies, rather than the spit, polish, marching and flag waving, while most African armies are a poor imitation of the colonial armies that birthed from and have failed to evolve with the change in technology, education or tactics. Rather than adapt they simply rely on firepower & heavier armour.

Lesson: relying on firepower rather than innovative ways to defeat an enemy barely ever works, especially in wars among the people. A successful military must adapt to the terrain, culture, weapons, education of not just its own forces and people but its adversaries

3. Get the basics right: there were many intelligence and military/ operational and tactical failures by Israel in the initial attack, however the majority of the fightback in the early confusing hours was by small groups of soldiers, police & armed civilians, who organised hasty defences, counter attacks and rescue missions. It was these motivated, disparate individuals and groups who fought back and held the line while the military got itself together. The utility of a mass trained soldiers or units who are able to act on their own initiative to resolve issues in their local areas, was also one of the keys to Ukraine’s successful defence against Russia’s 2022 invasion. African countries have all caught the Special Forces bug, with almost every country creating ‘Special Forces’ many of who are basically light infantry with better pay, uniforms & weapons rather than elite soldiers able to undertake specialised tasks. Yet these units cannot be everywhere at once, while well trained, motivated and empowered locally based troops can.

Lesson: train, equip and treat all soldiers properly. A well trained, empowered reservist who is able to respond in 10 minutes is better than an SF unit that can’t respond in a day even if they are released from protecting the President’s son

4. Information is multiplication: Hamas information operations were both brilliant and disastrous. They had cameramen with their lead elements, pumping out well made, well edited footage almost as soon as each phase was complete. Videos from Israeli sources of roaming gunmen and other attacks were obviously to be expected and useful to create panic and an impression of a complete breakdown of control. Hamas didn’t wait until 6.00pm to issue a press release from a lectern, they kept releasing well made videos throughout the day not only showing the attacks but preparations and different weapon systems. Livestreamed videos from roaming elements were most likely also meant to buttress this impression of competence however, livestreaming the murder of the elderly, women and children didn’t just spread terror but also steeled resolve and cost Hamas valuable sympathy not just from Western audiences but also from audiences in the Arab/ Islamic/ 3^rd world. The clear narrative of planning, preparation, skill and competence of their earlier videos were all undone by the videos of atrocities. Israelis information management on Day 1 was (understandably) poor but since then has been relentless and on message showing Hamas’s atrocities. Nigeria’s recent threat to invade Niger Republic to remove the coupists was thwarted purely in the information space by a vicious campaign in Nigeria, Niger Republic, and cyber space, with even people who literally couldn’t find Nigeria on the map spreading insulting memes about the President and his intentions.

Lesson: info ops are a fundamental part of any operation, control of the info space is critical for any party to a conflict. It can be a force multiplier both in helping a combatant achieve their goals but also in completely undermining their narratives. The information space can never be a vacuum

Rulers make the rules: the rules based order around free trade, respect for the rule of law, humanitarian law etc has taken a serious pounding, since 2001. The responsibility to protect was used justifiably in Kosovo, Sierra Leone, Bosnia and then completely abused in Libya. This of course followed the invasion of Iraq on very specious grounds. It was no mistake that many of Putin’s excuses for invading Ukraine in 2022 mirrored many of the Iraq War talking points, but now Russia is criticising Israels strikes on Gaza as indiscriminate, ignoring their own strikes on umpteen Ukrainian cities, likewise the same nations that expressed outrage about the siege of Mariupol, ignore the siege of Gaza and the failure to exercise discrimination or proportionality. It is almost inevitable that whenever the next power decided to go to war they will quote word for word, Israeli or western politicians. North Korea will state it has an absolute right to defend itself as it shells Seoul to oblivion or China will claim to be seeking to protect the right of Mandarin speakers when it invades Taiwan. The reality of the past 20 years is that powerful nations still do what they want, when they want  

Lesson: the powerful make the rules, enforce them and break them. Don’t be weak

Rejoinder: War On Niger Republic Will Be War On Northern Nigeria, By Prof. Usman Yusuf

On 6^th August 2023, Sahara Reporters published a piece by respected public commentator Prof Usman Yusuf on the Niger Crisis, Prof Yusuf followed this piece with several media interviews.

In the face of the intense propaganda war (less war to be fair than one sided barrage) this is an opportunity to present some counter arguments to some of the more common narratives around this crisis. The author of the original article is well respected and unlike some of the more fervent commentators not motivated seemingly by a partisan or geopolitical agenda

War On Niger Republic Will Be War On Northern Nigeria, By Prof. Usman Yusuf

Let me dispense with any political correctness and say it loud and clearly that, any attempt to invade Niger Republic by a Nigerian led ECOWAS Army in the guise of “safeguarding democracy”, will be a declaration of war on northern Nigeria and its people because we are the ones that will bear the full brunt of this misguided war. We in the region will not support any act of unprovoked aggression against Niger Republic under any pretense.

I will challenge this on several grounds. There is no unprovoked aggression against Niger Republic. A group of military officers overthrew the democratically elected President, took him and his family hostage and declared themselves the new Government. Thus any intervention in Niger is neither unprovoked nor happening in a vacuum. More importantly there is no ‘aggression’ proposed against Niger Republic. There are a number of options being proposed to restore the democratically elected government of which one is a military option

We in the north are tired of wars, we have been at war with Boko Haram for 14 years and for 9 years with Bandits and kidnappers. Thousands of our people continue to be killed and kidnapped while millions have been displaced from their ancestral homes, including the 300,000 that have sought refuge as IDPs in Niger Republic. Our economy, education, infrastructure and social fabrique have all been devastated. How can we support any foreign war when our house is on fire? 

This is a valid point but overlooks the fact that all these crises originated from poor governance and injustice. Mishandling the Boko Haram and bandit crisis allowed them to metastise to where they are now. The unknown unknowns of ignoring the Niger coup will also reflect on Northern Nigeria. It is also pertinent to note that the war has an effect on all Nigerians. Nigerians of all regions bear the cost in blood and treasure

At a time when Nigeria is facing the worst insecurity of our lifetime with nauseating corruption, bad governance, youth unemployment and drug abuse, discontent of the citizenry, excruciating poverty brought about by chaotic economic policies, a military invasion of Niger Republic will be reckless with grave consequences beyond the subregion.

Instead of starting a new war, President Bola Ahmed Tinubu should channel all his energy on finding ways to stop the bloodshed in our land by ending the wars on Boko Haram and Banditry as soon as possible, reconcile warring communities, resettle all IDPs and rebuild our communities and the region’s economy.

I agree wholeheartedly with this but the effect of any further deterioration will impact Northern Nigeria

Niger Republic is a landlocked country with a total area of 1,267,000 km². Northern Nigeria shares with it a vast 1,100km long border stretching along Nigeria’s entire Northwesterly to the Northeasterly border. The seven northern states of Kebbi, Sokoto, Zamfara, Katsina, Jigawa, Yobe, and Borno share a common religious, cultural and ethnic (Zabarmawas, Hausas, Fulanis and Kanuris) heritage with their kinsmen in Niger. 

These are exactly the reasons Nigeria needs to be involved. Borno/ Yobe abut the Nigerien Sector 4 of the MNJTF. Zamfara, Katisna and Sokoto have all suffered the depredations of illegal miners, bandits, cattle rustlers and smugglers

The conditions that led to the recent pandemic of military coups in the ECOWAS subregion are unfortunately present in all 15 member countries. Military coups though unacceptable and retrogressive, will continue to be a looming danger to democratic governments in the region as long as the political class continue to ignore the sufferings of their people and keep on perpetuating corruption, bad governance, flawed electoral processes, impunity that push their people deeper into poverty, hopelessness and worsening insecurity. 

This is correct and is exactly the reason ECOWAS needs to take a stand against coups. Most coups in Africa have been disastrous and done nothing to improve the life of the people or circumstance of the country and the recent raft of coups are no different

The Coup in Niger resulted from ethnic and geopolitical power play. The ethnic dimension is that the Zabarmawas (Zarmas) who are the second largest ethnic group (22%) after the Hausas (53%), have always dominated the military and power since independence in 1960. Military coups mostly happen each time anyone from the other ethnic groups (Hausa, Fulani, Touareg or Arab) are in power. Mohammed Bazoum is an Arab ethnic group (0.4%).  

This is incorrect, Hammani Diori (Djerma) was overthrown by Seyni Kountché his fellow Djerma. Mahamane Ousmane (Hausa) was overthrown by Ibrahim Baré Maïnassara also Hausa. Daouda Malam Wanké who assassinated Maïnassara was also Hausa. Elected President Mamadou Tandja (Fulani/ Soninke) was overthrown by Captain Salou Djibo (Zarma).

As can be seen there is no ethnic pattern to coups in Niger Republic, in fact 3 out of the 5 of those overthrown were by their tribesmen. Ethnicity and tribe plays little role in Niger’s political travails

Resource control and proxy war between Russia and NATO are the geopolitical factors that are in play here.

This is incorrect. Niger signed a military cooperation agreement with Russia in 2017, yet also hosts US and French bases. Its forces work closely, training and operating in partnership with major NATO powers US and French forces solely focused on the transnational jihadi problem and illegal migration. There is no (up until this point) proxy war

Niger is the world’s seventh-biggest producer of uranium which is widely used for nuclear energy radiation, cancer therapy and in nuclear weapons. In spite of its rich mineral resources, Niger remains one of the poorest countries in the world, it has been plagued by recurrent droughts, worsening climate change and the presence of terrorist groups such as Boko Haram. France has been exploiting the country’s rich mineral resources with little or no benefit to the country or its people.

While the deals with French uranium mining company Orano (formerly Areva) in the past have been very unfavourable to Niger, with environmental and labour issues. In 2014 a new deal was agreed increasing the royalties Niger would get from the mines, increasing the number of Nigeriens employed in management and improving infrastructure around the mining area. While the details of the new deal (and how well it has been implemented) are not known, the tortuously renegotiated deal shows that the democratically elected Nigerien government was able to get a better deal for Niger than the decades of military rulers  

But France is not the only country mining Uranium. The China National Nuclear Corporation (CNNC) has operated a mine in the country since 2007, this mine stopped production in 2015 due to the low global uranium prices. However the Chinese are drilling and refining crude oil and building an export pipeline via Benin Republic. The central point is that Niger like most Francophone countries has suffered from unfair deals with France and the rest of the world but under the 5^th Republic it has begun to reassert itself, diversify its trade partners and negotiate better deals for itself

Another natural resource in play is Nigerian Gas which is to be transported through the Trans Sahara Gas pipeline from Warri, Nigeria, and end in Hassi R’Mel, Algeria, where it would connect to existing pipelines leading to Europe. Europe sees this project as a potential opportunity to diversify its gas sources as Russia’s war in Ukraine continues. 

This pipeline is nowhere close to being built. The Nigerian section is still under construction much less expanding it through the Sahel. This pipeline is not likely to be built (all things being equal) until at least 2030.

America and its NATO partners are unsettled by Russia’s inroad into Africa through the Wagner Group which is already deployed to African countries like Libya, Sudan, Mozambique, Madagascar, Central African Republic, and Mali, focusing principally on protecting the ruling elites and critical infrastructures. As payment, Wagner’s boss Prigozhin receives exclusive rights to mining minerals such as Gold.

The author unfortunately doesn’t specify how the US and its NATO partners being unsettled by Wagner provoked Gen Tchiani into overthrowing President Bazoum

The ECOWAS has literally declared war on Niger Republic by imposing biting economic sanctions on a country heavily dependent on foreign aid, it has ordered closure of borders with member states and imposed a no-flight zone hoping to curb the junta’s influence and hinder any potential allies from providing aerial support. The junta has also been given a week’s ultimatum starting from July 31, 2022 to vacate power or face military action. 

Sanctions are not a declaration of war literal or virtual. They are an accepted coercive measure in international relations,

All ECOWAS members are subject to the Supplementary Act A/SP.13/02/12 on Sanctions Against Member States that Fail to Honour their Obligations to ECOWAS.

These obligations are:

1. respect and protect human rights, the rule of law, democracy and constitutional order;
2. ratify ECOWAS Protocols and Conventions;
3. dismantle tariff and non-tariff barriers which hinder the free movement of persons, goods, the right of residence and establishment;
4. pay all financial obligations in general and in particular apply the texts in the Community Levy;
5. promptly apply texts adopting the integration policies, projects and programmes of the Community;
6. apply the mandatory texts described in Article 1 of this Supplementary Act;
7. prohibition of the adoption of measures or positions contrary to democratic governance and respect for the Rule of Law, or likely to constitute either a serious threat to regional security or gross and severe human rights abuses, or trigger a humanitarian disaster;
8. refrain from adopting and implementing all measures likely to subvert or compromise the strengthening the process of regional integration.

As can be seen, the junta violates Item 2 and 7 at the minimum.

And Niger Republic has not been singled out for special treatment.

ECOWAS first suspended Mali from all its decision-making bodies and imposed trade restrictions and border closures after the first coup in 2020. ECOWAS imposed additional sanctions on Mali in January 2022 following the failure of the junta to hold elections, these included the recalling ambassadors, closing land and air borders, suspending all commercial and financial transactions, freezing of Malian assets in ECOWAS central banks and the suspension of all financial assistance and transactions

In September 2021 ECOWAS suspended Guinea and sanctioned the Guinean coup leaders, sanctions were imposed on Burkina Faso in February 20223

Nigeria has unilaterally terminated the treaty between the 2 countries signed in the 60s for Nigeria to provide electricity to Niger in exchange that it will not obstruct the flow of water to the country’s hydroelectric Dams in Jebba, Kainji. This treaty has ensured that Nigeria supplied 70% Niger’s electricity. Today, Niamey, the capital city is in darkness.

Niger Republic has been building a dam at Kandadji since 2019, thus the treaty is already being violated by Niger (who also reportedly owe Nigeria N4bn for electricity used).

Cutting power to Niger Republic in these circumstances is in keeping with the ECOWAS sanctions (politically) and the outstanding debt (commercially)

While many leaders of African Francophone countries are severing ties with their colonial masters France, President Bola Ahmed Tinubu in his desperate desire to gain international legitimacy for his government, is blindly dragging Nigeria into the dangerous waters of the proxy war between Russia and NATO without consulting with or seeking the consent of the people or their elected representatives.

This passage mixes a legitimate comment, to whit the failure to consult and engage with the Nigerian people on this crisis even now that highly vocal opposition is coming from quarters he can’t dismiss as unhappy opposition with the unproven allegation of a proxy war. There is little Russian presence in this conflict beyond a relentless disinformation and misinformation campaign

SUGGESTIONS

1. ECOWAS should take off the table any threat of military action against Niger Republic because it will not achieve the desired goal. 

Taking your best card off the table in a negotiation especially in return for nothing is a guaranteed way not to get what you want

2. Embark on a sincere, well thought through diplomatic option.

This is ongoing

3. Nigeriens should be allowed and supported to decide what they want for themselves. 

That is what happened during the last election 

4. The Military Junta should be pressured to give clear time of transition back to democratic rule as soon as possible. 

Allowing them to form a transitional government simply rewards bad behaviour

5. Nigeria should restore electricity supply to Niger Republic in accordance with the bilateral agreement.

 At the minimum Niger Republic should clear its debts first and then electricity restored as part of confidence building measures

6. Foreign Aid which accounts for 40% of Niger’s annual budget should be restored to prevent it from falling into Russia’s embrace.

This is a curious request. The stated purpose is to ‘liberate Niger from colonial masters’ yet these same colonial masters are being required to fund 40% of Niger’s budget. If Russia wishes to replace the colonial masters this should be welcomed as part of the liberation process

7. The Trans Sahara Gas Pipeline Project should continue as contractually agreed. 

The Trans Sahara Gas Pipeline contract has not been awarded, the governments of Niger, Nigeria and Algeria were still discussing restarting it last year

8. ECOWAS should insist on good governance, reduction in corruption and the respect for constituted institutions among member nations.

 This is a position that all can agree on

7. Finally, I call on all men and women of goodwill particularly northern elders, traditional rulers, clerics, academics, the media, elected representatives, Labour organizations, businesses leaders, student unions, women organizations and civil society organizations to say no to Nigeria being dragged into this proxy war between Russia and NATO.

As yet there is no evidence that either the US or NATO are involved in this crisis beyond rhetorical support to either side.

Conclusion:

The purpose of this rejoinder is to use the points raised to present counter points as the discourse around this crisis is poor. There has been almost no communication with or orientation of the public as to why the government Is undertaking this action and the information space has been conceded to non Nigerian non state actors to spread misinformation and disinformation.

I believe what this crisis highlights above all is the crisis of legitimacy within ECOWAS, the current ECOWAS President is being challenged in court with media, civil society as well as his opponents presenting strong evidence of electoral malpractice. The Ivorian President amended the constitution and is on his third term, the Senegalese leader put his country through months of unrest leading to deaths and injuries over his attempt to run for a 3rd term.

Until ECOWAS updates its obligations to outlaw constitutional amendments to allow incumbents elongate their terms, until ECOWAS sets a basic minimum standard for election acceptance and imposes measures onto stated that fail to meet them, it is likely that all ECOWAS interventions will be viewed with suspicion

ISWAPS Out of Area Campaign 2022/23

Nigerian jihadi group Islamic State West Africa Province (ISWAP) has evolved significantly since splitting from Boko Haram.

In 2022 alone it has taken credit for 25% of Islamic State attacks worldwide, conducting 517 attacks in Nigeria out of 547 attacks in the Lake Chad region inflicting 1,589 deaths. Whilst the scale of these attacks is diminished such that towns and bases are no longer routinely captured, the scope has increased with a large number of attacks over a wider area.

Of interest in this instance are attacks that have taken place away from North East Nigeria (Borno, Yobe and Adamawa State), ISWAPs traditional area of operations.

We will seek to look at some of these attacks and other activities between March 2022 to March 2023 and develop an understanding.

Suspected ISWAP attacks in the Middle Belt, North West, South South and South West

Attacks in General –Situation:

There have been at least 25 attacks claimed by or attributed to ISWAP outside of North East Nigeria, with 2 main methods of attack; IEDs (33%) and small arms (67%). Geographically these attacks took place in 4 distinct areas of operations: Kogi State (including parts of Ondo and Edo), Jalingo in Taraba State, FCT area (encompassing FCT, Kaduna and Niger States) and Kano States.

Attacks in Detail– Key Factors and Deductions

Terrain Physical and Human: focus will be on Taraba State and the intersection between Kogi, Edo and Ondo States

Taraba State: lies on Nigeria’s eastern border with Cameroun, with Bauchi and Gombe States to the north west, Adamawa to the north east and east, Cameroun to the east and south, Benue to the south west and Plateau and Nasarawa to the west.

Terrain consists of mountains of up to 1,000m in the south and wooded, grassy savanna in the north. Numerous rivers cross the state including the River Benue flowing north east to south west.

Jalingo the capital in the north east corner of the state, is approximately 25km south of the River Benue on a flat savannah type terrain, bordered by the foothills of the Shebshi Mountains to the east and south with.

The town is bordered by/ bisected by the Mayo Gwoi and Lamurde Rivers to the west and north with the Ardo Kola LGA on the west bank of the river opposite Nukkai District which is on the western edge of Jalingo.

It is multi tribal with Fulanis, Mumuye, Mambila, Wurkuns, Jukun, Kuteb, Yandang, Ndola, Itcehn, Tigun and Jibu. Attacks in Taraba were all in Jalingo, mostly in the Ardo Kalo LGA, Kogi attacks were in Adavi, Okehi, Ajaokuta, Lokoja, Okene and Kabbah Bunu LGA

Thick bush on the roadside in Esanland, north Edo State

Edo, Ondo and Kogi State: Kogi State lies in Nigeria’s middle belt. there have been 13 attacks over a 12 month period in this area encompassing 3 states (Kogi, Edo and Ondo) within a roughly 40 km radius from Okene Town, Okene LGA, Kogi State with the exception of 2 attacks in the vicinity of Owo Town, Owo LGA, approximately 85km away. The population is mostly Egbira in Okene, Yoruba in Ondo, in Kabba, the local language is Owe a Yoruba dialect.

Terrain in Kogi State

Okene Town is situated in Ubo River valley surrounded by. It has good road connections north, south east and west, sitting at the intersection of roads to Lokoja, Kabba, Ikare, Ajaokuta, Anchi. Okene is an Egbira town. This tribe and its sub tribes can be found in Kogi (Adavi, Ajaokuta, Okehi and Okene LGAs), FCT Nasarawa State (Toto LGA) and Edo State (known as the Etuno/ Igarra in Akoko Edo LGA). Egbira’s mostly practice Islam with a significant Christian minority.

SO WHAT? Taraba’s proximity to the northeast (Gombe and Adamawa) makes contagion and the supply of equipment and expertise relatively easy. The terrain of Ondo, Edo and Kogi is interspersed with fast running rivers, forests, wooded hills and rocky hills making it ideal ground to conduct ambushes and withdraw rapidly as well as conceal camps with ample space for training and concealment. The area is also ethnically diverse allowing someone with local knowledge to conceal strangers relatively easily in built up areas. While Kogi Central is in Ebiraland, Akoko Edo is Esan and Owo is Yoruba, as is typical with such areas there is sufficient cross pollination around the area. It can be assumed that while the terrain of Ondo, Edo and Kogi is vast and difficult off road, for local people with local knowledge it will be relatively easy to traverse in the appropriate vehicle and also to blend into the ethnically diverse areas either to prepare, conduct attacks or recces or escape, while the security forces from the poorly equipped Federally recruited forces will be limited by low numbers, training and equipment to main roads and will not have knowledge of the language or area to spot someone out of place.

It is interesting that attacks in Taraba were concentrated around Jalingo. This would indicate that the cell was either based in or close to the city.

Targets: Majority of the attacks were on civilian targets (56%), with bars in Taraba and Kogi State as the main targets. The security forces (mainly police vehicle patrols and checkpoints, police stations) were the preferred targets. There were 3 deliberate large scale attacks against bespoke targets (train, prison, military holding facility)

SO WHAT? all the civilian target locations were areas where mass casualties could be inflicted and mostly utilized by people jihadis would be likely to target (Christians, alcohol drinkers etc). There doesn’t seem to have been a deliberate attempt to target or avoid particular tribes. It could be assumed the purpose of these attacks was to inflict mass casualties in order to frighten and intimidate the civilian population and influence other actors (the Government, local leaders, other jihadis etc). With two exceptions the security force targets were all small, low risk and isolated, that could be easily approached, isolated and attacked by larger forces. Police are most likely targeted due to the fact they are widely deployed, far dispersed with poor training and communications in relatively small size units which allows the enemy to use surprise and/or darkness to rapidly overwhelm them with relatively less resources. It could be assumed these targets were selected in order to, capture weapons, reduce the security bubble and intimidate and attrit the security forces.

The scene of the explosion in Jalingo, the Taraba State capital on 18/09/2022-channelstv.com

Victims: 55% of the attacks were targeted at innocent civilians, who bore the brunt of those killed, wounded and abducted. The rest of the attacks were against the security forces with the police as the main target. The nature of some targets such as churches and bars appear to deliberately target Christians or non observant Muslims but the attacks show very little discrimination in victims. Muslims are killed, abducted and ransomed without prejudice as well as Christians. The targets of the Kaduna-Abuja train attack were middle class Nigerians irrespective of tribe or religion. The victims were maltreated and ransomed irrespective of tribe, religion or class. However despite maltreatment, the kidnappers made effort to keep them alive and extract maximum ransom for each victim

SO WHAT? The nature, timing and targeting of these attacks shows very little interest or inclination to minimize civilian casualties. It is difficult to assess the demographics of their victims. However little attempt is made to preserve life during attacks. It can be assumed that victims of mass casualty attacks were selected to ensure most of them would be considered legitimate targets to their target audiences of fundamentalist jihadis (i.e. Christians, non observant Muslims (alcohol drinkers) or the security forces). Kidnap for ransom targets were targeted at middle class Nigerians and foreigners in order to extract maximum financial gain.

Method of attack: IED and small arms attacks were the key methods of attacks of which IEDs were used exclusively in 36% of the attacks. From the lethality and placement of the devices used it is likely they were handheld devices (devices captured in Taraba were contained in bottles), with the exception of the VBIED at the Palace in Okene. No information has been released about the explosives used by the authorities but one could assume they were either homemade or commercial explosives due to comparatively low casualties (this could also be due to some devices being used outdoors where the explosions would not be amplified by walls etc). IEDs were also used as part of small arms attacks against the Wawa Cantonment, Owo, Kuje, Kaduan-Abuja Train and other targets. These also appear to be handheld devices (VBIED use was not reported), although it would appear larger devices were used in Wawa and Kuje. Although the method of detonation is not known, they were possibly detonated by timer or remotely. IEDs used in small arms attacks were most likely detonated manually, with a fuse

Small arms were used in the majority of the attacks and caused the most casualties. While the type of weapons used are not known from pictures it can be surmised that automatic, long barreled military weapons (rifles/ light/ medium machine guns) were used.

Site of one of the Taraba IED attacks (note matted walls)- Channelstv.com

SO WHAT: with the exception of large scale deliberate attacks such as at Wawa and Kuje, the cells appear lightly armed with weapons that can be easily obtained, hidden, created and moved. While the forests and hills of Kogi especially are ideal for caching weapons, it would appear the enemy values their mobility and is either not willing, able or ready to use larger weapons or mount larger attacks. The VBIED used at the end of the year thus appears to be a major step up in capability but not necessarily capacity.

Types of attacks: The attacks included kidnap for ransom (2), deliberate attacks with small arms/ small arms and IEDs (15), deliberate attacks with IEDS (8), assassination (1) and prison breaks (2)

SO WHAT? While the cell has chosen relatively low risk targets for their small arms attacks, this method is still more risky then remotely detonated IEDs. It can be surmised that small arms are preferred as these attacks in order to capture weapons and allow new fighters to gain confidence and experience

Kaduna-Abuja Train after kidnap for ransom attack- Premium Times

Casualties: up to 100 people have been killed, 51 wounded and 171 abducted.

Most casualties were caused by small arms (approximately 77) with the most lethal attack taking place in Owo, Ondo State with 41 dead and 50 wounded. In terms of victims the most significant attack was that on the Kaduna- Abuja train, with up to 168 people taken hostage, up to 9 people were killed and several wounded. IEDs have been less lethal killing up to 13 and wounding up to 52 people. If the single Owo attack is discounted, 78% of the casualties were in the Kogi/Edo/ Ondo axis. Kogi State saw the highest number of civilian and security force casualties.

As is unfortunately typical in Nigeria, these figures are approximate as exact casualty figures seem to be difficult to compile, much less a breakdown of the victim’s identity.

SO WHAT? It can be presumed from the tempo, volume and lethality of operations in Kogi (particularly Kogi Central) and its surroundings, this area constitutes this cells geographical, cultural and operational centre of gravity despite this, these casualties represent 0.1% of total fatalities inflicted by ISWAP in 2022 indicating that ISWAPs centre of gravity remains in the North East of Nigeria/ Lake Chad Basin area.

Attribution: ISWAP claimed 15 attacks via their Telegram Channel, 6 were attributed to them by the security forces. 53% were claimed 24 hours after the attack, 27% in 48 hours and the rest in 72 hours. Claims were generally backed up with photographs and claims of friendly losses, no mention is made of enemy losses.

SO WHAT? It can be argued that information exploitation is a key component of ISWAPs battle drills. The speed of their dissemination, level of detail (location, number of casualties) and the quality of the pictures indicates that they either have a dedicated photographer with them or designate a fighter to take photos and conduct a rapid assessment of friendly casualties and captured equipment. The information (presented with ISWAP branding) is processed and passed on to another element for preparation and rapid upload, indicating a close relationship with ISWAP main

Of interest however are those not directly claimed by ISWAP such as the attack on the church in Owo. This was attributed by the authorities to ISWAP, fairly rapidly with no confirmation, comment or denial from ISWAP. If it was an ISWAP attack (for the purpose of this paper it is assumed it is) the failure to claim it could indicate that they realized the high casualty count, especially of women and children of which very graphic pictures circulated, would be harmful to their narrative or possibly provoke a backlash or retaliation that would disrupt their support network. It can be presumed that ISWAP rapidly exploits their attacks in order to dominate the information space, confirm their actions and influence their target audiences.

Kano Municipal Area

Kano: presents an interesting conundrum, as per the timeline below there have been 2 explosions and 2 interceptions of IED making materials followed by an assassination. There have been no claims of responsibility for these attacks or direct attribution of responsibility by the authorities. The first explosion in/ around a chemical shop in Sabon Gari on 17/05/2022 was declared an accident (first gas then chemical explosion) by the authorities, however 2 days later a car chased by police and then abandoned in Kumbotso LGA was found to contain weapons, IED and explosive making materials. 2 weeks later another shop exploded in Kumbotso LGA, about 2 months later another car was intercepted with IEDs and IED components in the same area. This curious sequence of events culminated with the assassination of an Igbo trader and his friend in Kano 2 months later (which was explicitly claimed by ISWAP who described him as a Nigerian Army spy)

SO WHAT? If one viewed all of these events through a particular angle one could suggest there is circumstancial evidence to assume that a campaign was planned for Kano. Whether this was meant to be a terror campaign targeting public spaces or the security forces or a deliberate attack on a facility such as a prison is not clear. But the cell would seem to have been based in or around the Sabon Gari/ Kumbotso LGA area.

One could speculate that the first explosion was an accident in an IED making facility and the subsequent interceptions could have been due to the cell seeking to replenish lost stores with finished IEDs and bomb making materials. The unusual efficiency shown by the police could have resulted from them exploiting intelligence materials found at the scene to intercept surviving cell members. The loss of material and expertise could have led to the accidental detonation of IEDs or IED making materials in the final explosion.

The police after denying the first explosion on 17/05/2022 stated that they had arrested 2 Boko Haram suspects. As is typical with arrests by the Nigerian police, nothing further has been heard about this case.

If the intention was to create mass casualty attacks; then Sabon Gari (Strangers Quarter) with its plethora of churches and non Muslims would be the ideal target as it was in the previous 2015 campaign. Interestingly the owner of chemical shop where the first explosion took place was from Kogi State, however there is no evidence to suggest he was anything other than an innocent victim. Likewise, the murder of the Igbo trader and his friend in Kano who was described by ISWAP as a Nigerian Army spy. Specifically claiming this attack is unusual. It serves no wider purpose unless ISWAP was planning a campaign of targeted assassinations against Igbos or to provoke a reprisal. However, if there had been a successful security operation or failed business deal, that thwarted their campaign and this trader was believed to have been integral to that, the assassination and announcement make more sense.

Distribution: the attacks took place across 8 states and 4 geopolitical zones (North West, South South, North Centre (Middle Belt), South West). Majority of these attacks took place in the Middle Belt (Kogi, Taraba, FCT, Niger) mainly in Kogi State, with a single attack in the other . Attacks were evenly distributed around Kogi State affecting Adavi, Okene, Okehi, Ajaokuta, Kabbah Bunu and Lokoja Local Government Areas

SO WHAT? the wide geographical spread would strongly suggest that there are organic cells in at least 5 states (Taraba, Kogi, Kano, Kaduna, Niger). The high incidence of attacks in Kogi suggests this cell is particularly well lead and organized. The presence of ISWAP in the northeast is expected, thus contagion into Taraba makes sense. Considering the vast rural areas in Taraba, where insurgents could, mass, train, hide and move in peace, the decision to focus on an urban terror campaign is unusual

Summary

If we consider that the insurgents campaign very roughly goes through the stages of Plan-Prepare- Shape-Decisive Attack- Exploit, we can safely assume that in Kogi Central the Planning and Preparation stages are over.

We can presume this is the Shaping Phase, in which the enemy is attempting to create the conditions for a Decisive Action, thus while the attacks have had relatively low casualties or spoils they have been advertised prominently on social media, with fighters having their own show reel during ISIS global loyalty pledge. It is likely that including to the messaging on social media there is an information campaign being undertaken locally in the local languages using WhatsApp, SMS, Telegram, word of mouth, leaflets, radical preachers etc.

Thus the attacks on bars and patrols are likely to be propaganda of the deed attacks, seeking to attract, radicalize or motivate local recruits but also advertise to ISWAP HQ and ISIS that the cell was fully operational and possibly attract additional resources.

It is possible that this was why the Owo attack was not claimed, as the mass casualties would have brought negative publicity locally and internationally, curiously in 2019 there was a news report of an alleged plan to attack Owo, with fairly specific details of a planned attack on a bank and roads on 01/11/2019 (this did not take place)

A key objective of different elements of this campaign has been resources, financial, human and material. As is usual weapons are captured in attacks but the Kaduna -Abuja train kidnap alone would have generated significant funds through ransoms as would the the Ajaokuta abductions. Human resources were extracted with the Kuje prison break, an attempt to replicate this led to a defeat for the insurgents.

From July to September, attacks followed each other in 2-5 day patterns, with similar tactics (small arms attacks against isolated vehicles, checkpoints or police stations). These could again be presumed to be providing training for new recruits as well as creating a security gap and capturing arms and ammunition. The rainy season would have also ensured the roadsides were overgrown, providing cover for ambushes.

The church attack in Lokoja was claimed by ISWAP unlike Owo but this had relatively low casualties (2 people). It could be surmised that this caused less revulsion locally, thus ISWAP felt comfortable claiming it.

It is possible the cell was quiet until December due to the floods or due to other operational reasons (security force pressure, rest and recuperation, deploying to other sectors) until another ‘standard’ small arms attack on a checkpoint in Lokoja followed by the VBIED attack in Okene.

The Taraba cell appears to have been effectively disrupted with the June 2022 arrests, however proximity to the north east and the failure to capture other suspects means this theatre could be reactivated.

The FCT attacks appear to be a spill over from operations in Niger and Kaduna State, with targeted raids into the FCT for specific operations. Logic would detect that ISWAP has support networks in the FCT.

Kano remains a mystery.

Conclusion

There is sufficient evidence to conclude that ISWAP has several well developed and resilient cells beyond its traditional north east/ Lake Chad Basin Area of Operations.

These cells appear to be led by people local to these area, who have gained some operational experience and training (possibly fighting in the North East, Sahel or beyond) and returned home.

The main area of operations is in Ebiraland in the centre of Kogi State. The high number of operations, tempo and variety of attacks indicates there is a competent, well resourced cell, embedded in the community, it is unlikely that these cells have been significantly disrupted.

There is likely to be an expansion of operations in the coming months

Timeline

March 2022

28/03/2022– at approximately 19.45 an unspecified number of gunmen attacked the AK9 6.00pm train from Idu, Abuja- Rigasa, Kaduna between Rijana and Katari, Kachia LGA, Kaduna State with explosives and small arms killing between 9 and 14 people, with 168 people initially reported missing. 62 were featured in subsequent videos. None of these videos were branded nor released through ISWAP channels. The last 23 hostages were released around 4.00pm on 05 October 2022

April 2022

19/04/2022: an IED detonated in a bar in a market in Iware, Ardo Kola LGA, Taraba State killing between 3-6 people and wounding 19. ISWAP claimed the attack the via Telegram 21/04/2022 claiming to have attacked a collection of ‘infidel Christians’ and inflicted 30 casualties

22/04/2022: an IED concealed in a polythene bag and allegedly hidden by a woman detonated in Nukkai District, Jalingo, Taraba State at a drinking place near the District Heads home wounding between 9 and 11 people. ISWAP claimed responsibility the next day 23/04/2022

23/04/2022: gunmen attacked the police station at Ogaminana, Adavi LGA, Kogi State around 2.00am with small arms killing 3 policemen, burning 2 vehicles and the police station. ISWAP claimed the attack on 24/04/2022 claiming that 5 were killed

May 2022

10/05/2022: an IED detonated at a bar in Jalingo, Taraba State by 6 Brigade, Nigeria Army HQ around 9.00pm. No casualties were recorded. ISWAP claimed the attack the next day claiming to have damaged the facility and a vehicle

11/05/2022: an IED detonated at a beer parlour at Lewu Junction, Kabba, Kabba/ Bunnu LGA, Kogi State around 9.45pm killing up to 3 people. ISWAP claimed the attack on 12/05/2022

17/05/2022: An explosion near a school in Sabon Gari, Kano City, Kano State killed 9 and wounded 27 people. The NPF originally claimed it was a gas explosion, despite locals claiming it was caused by a suicide bomber, pretending to be a mad man. Subsequently they stated the explosion was due to the accidental combustion of chemicals being illegally stored and sold in the shop, stating they had recovered 5 x bottles of acids, 1 x jerrycan of mixed chemicals, 6.5 cartons of snuff and 5 x drums of polymer. The owner of the store was named as Michael Adejo.

19/05/2022: The Kano State Police Command stated it had intercepted a vehicle loaded with explosives coming from Jigawa State in Bubbugaje Quarters, Kumbotso LGA, Kano State. The vehicle was abandoned after a pursuit and reportedly contained 2 x AK 47s, 4 x AK 47 magazines, 1,08 x rounds of ammunition, 2 x pistol magazines and ‘explosive device materials’

29/05/2022: an IED detonated at Omofemi Bar, a beer parlour in Okepadi Quarters, Kabba, Kabba/ Bunnu LGA around 9.15pm. there were no casualties, ISWAP claimed the attack 30/05/2022, stating 12 people were wounded

June 2022

02/06/2022: an IED detonated at the Echane Festival in the market in Idoji, Okene LGA, Kogi State killing at least 2 people and wounding 12. ISWAP claimed the attack on Saturday 04/06/2022 stating 20 people were killed

02/06/2022: An explosion in Sheka Kwarshen Kwalta, Kumbotso LGA, Kano State wounded 20 people, demolished one building and starting a fire

05/06/2022: Gunmen attacked St Francis Catholic Church, Owo, Owo LGA, Ondo State with small arms and IEDS killing up to 41 people and wounding up to 58. The Gunmen reportedly fled in a stolen car. The Federal Government blamed the attack on ISWAP on 09/06/2022

16/06/2022: the Taraba State Police Command paraded a man alleged to have been responsible for the bombing of the bar in Nukkai and outside 6 Brigade. The suspect was an alleged hired killer and kidnapper Bala Usman (37) from Kebbi State who lived in Mutum Biyu, Gassol LGA, Taraba State. The suspect claimed he had several accomplices in his cell Yusuf, Sale and Kabiru, led by Abubakar Lawal from Kano State and Adulahi Garba. He was reportedly captured with 206 rounds of ammunition, 20 x bottles of sodium, 27 x IEDs contained in bottles, cables, lighters and 2 x rifles

Items captured with suspected Taraba IED maker- Channelstv.com

23/06/2022: Gunmen attacked the Police Station at Eika-Ohizenyi, Okehi LGA, Kogi State with small arms and IEDs, around midnight killing 1 policeman and stealing 3 x AK 47s.                                   

July 2022

05/07/2022: Gunmen attacked Kuje Prison, Kuje, FCT with small arms and IEDs, killing 1 service person and 4 inmates and wounding 16 inmates. Approximately 879 out of 994 prisoners were freed. ISWAP claimed they carried out the attack in conjunction with Ansaru attack on 06/07/2023

21/07/2022: Kano State Police command intercepted a vehicle in Chiranchi Dorayi Quarters, Gwale LGA, Kano carrying 3 x AK 47s with 90 x rounds of ammunition, 3 x mobile phones and 4 x IEDs

25/07/2022: Gunmen ambushed a patrol from 7Bn, Guards Brigade on the outskirts of Bwari- Kubwa Road in the vicinity of Bwari Area Council, Abuja, FCT with small arms killing 8 and wounding 4. There is uncertainty as to whether the troops were ambushed in transit, whether this was a fighting patrol or a deliberate attack. The army claimed to have killed 30 enemy. There is no evidence for this claim

28/07/2022: Gunmen attacked an 102Bn checkpoint at Madalla, Suleja LGA, Niger State with small arms killing 2 soldiers. ISWAP claimed the attack on 30/07/2022

30/07/2022: Gunmen attacked a police unit in Ajaokuta, Ajaotuta LGA, Kogi State with small arms killing 8 people.

August 2022

01/08/2022: A joint DSS/ Army arrested suspects alleged to be ISWAP members who took part in the Owo attacks. Idris Abdulmalik Omeiza (aka Bin Malik) who was alleged to be the commander of the attack along with Momoh Otohu Abubakar, Aliyu Yusuf Itopa and Auwal Ishaq Onimisi. Omeiza was also accused of the attack on the police station the previous day in Adavi LGA

05/08/2022: Gunmen ambushed a bus carrying staff of West African Ceramics Ltd, Ajaokuta LGA, Kogi, State killing 2, drivers, 2 policemen and an Indian foreign worker. 3 Indians were also abducted and released 31/08/2022, there is no indication if a ransom was paid

09/08/2022: A joint DSS/ Army arrested 2 suspects alleged to be ISWAP members who took part in attacks on targets in Okene. Al Qasim Idris and Abdulhaleem Idris were arrested in Omialafara, Ose LGA, Ondo State.

September 2022

18/09/2022: an IED detonated near a bar at First Roundabout on the approach to Taraba State University, ATC, Ardo- Kola LGA, Jalingo around 8.30pm wounding up to 5 people

22/09/2022: Gunmen attacked a checkpoint on Ibillo- Igarra Road, in Akoko Edo LGA, Edo State with small arms destroying one vehicle and killing 1 person. ISWAP claimed the attack on 24/09/2022                                                                                             

23/09/2022: Gunmen attacked a police vehicle in Ipele, Owo LGA, Ondo State destroying a vehicle. ISWAP claimed it on 24/09/2022                                                                                               

24/09/2022: Gunmen murdered 2 x Igbo traders with small arms in their shop in Azubros Plaza, Sabon Gari, Kano Municipal LGA, Kano State. ISWAP claimed it 25/09/2022, claiming one of the traders Ifeanyi Elechukwu (a battery seller) was an Army spy.

October 2022

16/10/2022: Gunmen attacked a branch of the Celestial Church, Sarkin Numan, Felele, Lokoja, Kogi State, killing two persons and injuring several others. ISWAP claimed the attack on 18/10/2022

23/10/2022: The US, UK, Canada and Australia issued a warning of potential terror attacks in and around Abuja, 2 days later the US Government ordered the evacuation of non essential personnel from Nigeria .

29/10/2022: Gunmen attacked Wawa Cantonment, New Bussa, Borgu LGA, Niger State with small arms and IEDS around midnight losing 8 enemy killed and 3 wounded. In an apparent attempted prison break

December 2022

05/12/2022: ISWAP released a pledge of allegiance to the new ISIS leader from ISWAP Central Nigeria in a series of photographs as one of the 5 sub groups of ISWAP

21/12/2022: Gunmen attacked a police patrol along Agbaja Road, Lokoja, Lokoja LGA, Kogi State with small arms around 6.00am killing 2 policemen. ISWAP Claimed the attack 24/12/2023

29/12/2022: A VBIED detonated outside the Palace of the Ohinoyi of Ebiraland in Okene, Okene LGA, Kogi State around 9.00am killing 4 people. ISWAP claimed the attack on 02/01/2023 stating they were targeting President Buhari who was visiting the area.

January 2023

03/01/2023: The DSS stated they have arrested the commander of the ISWAP cell Abdulmumin Ibrahim Otaru (aka Abu Mikdad) and one other Saidu Suleiman that perpetrated the VBIED attack in Okene, attack on the Police Station in Eika Ohizenyi, Kuje Prison and abduction of Indians and murder of police men in Ajaokuta

February 2023

20/02/2023: Gunmen attacked the Local Government Administration in Okehi, Okehi LGA, Kogi State around 5.00pm, planting an explosive device which damaged the building (likely related to the elections)

In Praise of Light Forces (2): Proposed Light Infantry Battalion

In the previous article I gave my reasons for recommending the expansion of the Nigerian Army through the creation of additional light infantry units. My reasons included cost, logistics, flexibility, mobility and utility over different terrain etc.

I believe this argument necessary due to the penchant the Nigerian military has for fetishizing bright shiny kit, particularly heavy armour, self propelled artillery, MRAPs, APCs etc. All of which are fine for fighting a combined arms war of manoeuvre in the desert, savanna or north European plains but of increasingly questionable utility for defeating lightly armed gunmen mounted on trucks and motorcycles whose main activities are raids on civilian and security forces locations or convoys.

NAF Super Tucano- PR Nigeria

To defeat these adversaries as well as develop a capability that can also close with and defeat a conventional military in a combined arms manoeuvre type battle I would suggest a light infantry unit structured as below.

Caveat: I will hasten to add the that I have absolutely no training or experience in design of military units. I assume many of my suggestions will be nonsensical to the better military educated but I will beg their indulgence in that hopefully the general ideas I’m trying to get across will make sense.

Proposed Battalion Structure

I envisage a Light infantry Battalion will be about 1000 men, organised as below

• 3 x Rifle Companies
• 1 x Light Mounted Squadron
• Manoeuvre Support Company
• HQ Company

The Battalion consists of 4 manoeuvre elements, a manoeuvre support company and a Support Company

Let’s look at each in detail, starting with the manoeuvre elements

1) Light Infantry Rifle Company (approximately 184 men)

I would suggest the Rifle Company consists of

• 3 x Rifle platoons
• 1 x Manoeuvre Support Platoon
• Company HQ

a) Light Infantry Rifle Platoon (34 men)

I would suggest the Rifle Platoon consists of

Organisation	Transport	Equipment
8 men broken into 2 x 4 man Fire Teams Platoon Commander, Platoon Sergeant, a signaller, Mini UAV operator, a 2 man 60mm mortar team, 2 medium machine gunners, Platoon medic, Ammo carrier/ runner	No organic transport	Each Section: 6 x rifles 1 x RPG or MGL (1 RPG per platoon) 1 x light machine gun 1 x Marksman rifle HQ 8 x rifles 1 x 60mm mortar 2 x medium machine guns mUAS

WHY? The thinking behind this platoon is that it should have the ability engage and defeat any adversary (including armour in the right settings). The mix of weapons allows the platoon to engage an enemy and suppress it at range. 5 machine guns, 3 MGLs or RPGs and a 60mm mortar provide significant firepower. The UAV allows the unit to find targets and accurately direct fire on them. The size of the platoon means that at the maximum they would need 4 APCS or MRAPs if they were to require protected mobility

Manoeuvre: Each section consists of 8 men commanded by a Corporal, with a Lance Corporal as Second in command, each of whom command 2 x 4 man Fire Teams and should have 6 riflemen, of whom 1 rifleman should armed with a multiple grenade launcher (MGL) or rocket propelled grenade (RPG), 1 man with a light machine gun and the marksman with either a special weapon such as a Dragunov rifle or just the sections best marksman using the same weapon as everyone else with better sights.

Milkor 40mm MGL- Defenceweb

Thus each section is equipped to be able to undertake fire and manoeuvre independently. With 6 riflemen and a light machinegun each section should be able to independently suppress a1 or 2 man position or provide fire support to another section. The marksman weapon system will allow each section to engage high value targets up to 500m away, while the RPG allows them to defeat armour vehicles and MGLs to suppress enemy in depth or in dead ground.

In essence this means each section can effectively suppress a target 3-400m away with direct fire as well as engage point targets up to 500m.

Command and control: the HQ will provide command and control and a link to higher HQ and other assets. It is expected that each section commander (and preferably each section second in command will have a radio with which to communicate with the Platoon Commander, whilst the Platoon Signaller carries another radio to speak to HQ

Organic fire support: The HQ also provides further organic fire support to the platoon, with 2 x Medium machine guns (in both direct and tripod mounted sustained fire) and 1 x 60mm mortars.

ISR: the platoon can use its mUAS to provide overwatch, route recce, recce enemy or friendly positions, as well as direct the fire of its machine guns, mortar, sharpshooters or riflemen. The device should preferably have a range of up to 5km and be able to operate day and night

Ukrainian servicemen – Daily Telegraph

b) Manoeuvre Support Platoon (46 men)

Should consist of:

• Mortar Section
• Air/ Ground Support Section
• Anti Armour Section
• Machine Gun Section
• Assault Pioneer Section

I would suggest a Light Infantry Manoeuvre Support Platoon consists of

Organisation	Transport	Equipment
Mortar Team 8 men broken into 2 x Fire Teams Commander/ MFC and Second in command	2 x Quad Bikes	2 x 81mm mortars 1 x mUAS
Air/ Ground Support Team 8 men broken into 2 fire teams	2 x Quad bikes	2 x 12.7mm HMG and/ or 4 x MANPADS
Anti Armour (AA) Section 8 men broken down into 4 fire teams	2 x Quad bikes	4 x ATGMS/ 8 x Light Anti tank weapons
Assault Pioneer Section: 8 men broken down into 2 fire teams	2 x Quad bikes	Pioneer stores, personal weapons
Machine Gun Section: 8 men broken down into 3 x gun teams, a commander and second in command	2 x Quad bikes	3 x GPMG in sustained fire role
Platoon Headquarters:6 men) Platoon Commander, Platoon Sergeant, a signaller, 2 x Mini UAV operator, Platoon medic,	2 x Quad bikes	mUAS

WHY? The manoeuvre support platoons task is to allow the Company Commander deploy his platoons while protecting them from a variety of threats (air, ground, armour) in defensive and offensive roles. Their mobility and survivability will be enhanced by the Assault Pioneers.

British Army ATV- 2 MERCIANS Twitter

Manoeuvre: the Manoeuvre Support Platoon (MSP) provides the Company Commander with the ability to support the company with indirect fire against ground targets, direct fire against ground/ air targets and provide combat engineering/ mobility and counter mobility. Quad bikes allow the platoon to carry their heavier equipment/ ammo and weapons and more quickly to provide support. The mix of weapons allows the Company to engage enemy air, armour and infantry without calling in external assets

ISTAR: the platoons can use its mUAS can be used provide overwatch, route recce, recce enemy or friendly positions but mainly to find the enemy and direct the fire of its weapon systems

c) Company Headquarters (36 men)

Organisation	Transport	Equipment
Med Section 2 x medics	1 x Ambulance
Recce Section 8 men broken into 2 x Fire teams	2 x Quad bikes	mUAS 4 x rifles 2 x marksmen rifles 2 x machine guns 2 x MGL
Headquarters (16 men) Company Commander, Company second in command Company Sergeant Major, 4 x signallers Intelligence Det (1 x officer, 1 x NCO)	2 x Quad bikes 2 x Land rovers/ pick ups
Quartermaster CQMS 2 x drivers	2 x trucks + trailers/ towed tanks 2 x motorcycles
Transport SNCO and JNCO 6 x drivers 2 x fitters/ mechanics	6 x trucks 1 x Mechanics truck/ Landrover

Manoeuvre and ISTAR: are provided by the Recce Section, which will seek to operate to the front or flanks of the company at all times either through static or mobile patrols, providing the commander with early warning as well as information about enemy activity or providing targets for the company’s support weapons. Additional recce can also be undertaken by the rifle platoons

Support: the unit will be expected to be able to move its platoons and stores itself using its own trucks. Trailers and tankers will allow it to transport water and fuel. Quadbikes and motorcycles should allow the company to supply troops and extract casualties even if they are based in difficult hard to reach locations. The fitters/ mechanics should have the skills and parts to carry out basic repairs on all the vehicles and weapons systems

2) Light Mounted Squadron (144 men)

This subunit will exist to provide mobility and firepower to the Battalion, conducting long range recce, supporting an infantry attack, exploiting a breakthrough, acting as a counter attack force, screening, raiding or scouting force, or breaking through a weak enemy line.

As a relatively weak force it would not be expected to engage armour or much stronger forces unless it was in an exceptionally advantageous position, its main asset would be better training & mobility

I would suggest it consists of

• 3 x Light Mounted Troops
• 1 x Manoeuvre Support Troop
• Company HQ

a) Light Mounted Troop (20 men/ 6 vehicles)

Organisation	Transport	Equipment
12 men/ 4 vehicles: Broken into 2 Sections containing, 2 vehicle Each vehicle crewed by a driver, commander and gunner Troop Headquarters – 8 men/ 2 vehicles: Platoon Commander, driver, gunner and Mini UAV operator Platoon Sergeant, driver, gunner and medic	4 x Armed pickups       2 x armed pickups	Each vehicle should be equipped with a heavy machine gun (12.7-14.5mm) or an AGS on top and one by the commander’s side. mUAS 60mm mortar RPGs

Manoeuvre: the commander has the flexibility to operate his unit as 3 x 2 vehicle fire teams, 2 x 3 vehicle fire teams or 2 x 2 vehicle fire teams with Platoon headquarters detached.  This provides for mutual protection and ensures even if a vehicle is damaged or immobilised there are still enough weapons to engage the enemy and vehicles to pick up dismounted crews

The troop is able to engage from 2000 to 3000m, direct fire and 2000 – 4000m indirect fire.

Jackal MWMIK- Wikipedia

Command and control: the HQ will provide command and control and a link to higher HQ and other assets. It is expected that each vehicle will have some sort of radio

Organic fire support: The AGS and 60mm mortars can be used to provide indirect fire support.

ISR: the platoon can use its mUAS to provide overwatch, route recce, recce enemy or friendly positions, as well as direct the fire of its machine guns, AGS or mortar

b) Manoeuvre Support Troop (38 men)

Organisation	Transport	Equipment
Mortar Team 6 men broken into 2 x Fire Teams MFC and MUAs operator	2 x vehicles	2 x vehicle mounted 81mm mortars 1 x mUAS
Air/ Ground Support Team 6 men broken into 2 fire teams	2 x vehicles	2 x vehicle mounted 20/23mm cannon and/ or 4 x MANPADS
AT Section 8 men broken down into 4 fire teams	2 x vehicles	Vehicle mounted  ATGMS/ 8 x Light Anti tank weapons
Assault Pioneer Section: 8 men broken down into 2 fire teams	2 x vehicles	Pioneer stores, personal weapons Vehicle mounted HMG
Platoon Headquarters: 8 men Platoon Commander, Platoon Sergeant, 2 x Mini UAV operator, 2 x drivers, 2 x gunners/ Platoon medic,	2 x vehicles	mUAS vehicle mounted HMG

c) Light Mounted Squadron Headquarters (36 men)

Organisation	Transport	Equipment
Med Section (2 men) 2 x medics	1 x Ambulance
Recce Section (8 men) broken into 2 x Fire teams	2 x vehicles	Each vehicle should be equipped with a heavy machine gun (12.-14.5mm) or an AGS on top and one by the commander’s side. mUAS 60mm mortar RPGs
Headquarters (14 men) Company Commander, Company second in command Company Sergeant Major, Signals Senior NCO 4 x signallers Intelligence Det (1 x officer, 1 x NCO), 4 drivers	4 x vehicles mUAS
Quartermaster (6 men) CQMS 4 x drivers	2 x trucks + trailers/ tankers 2 x motorcycles
Mechanics Section SNCO and JNCO 4 x mechanics/ fitters	2 x vehicles (recovery and repair)

Manoeuvre: and ISR: are provided by the Recce Section, which will seek to operate to the front or flanks of the company at all times either through patrolling or observation posts, providing the commander with early warning as well as information about enemy activity. Additional recce can also be undertaken by the rifle platoons

3) Manoeuvre Support Company (155 men)

I would suggest the Manoeuvre Support Company consists of

• Fire support platoon
• Mortar Platoon
• Air Defence Platoon
• Assault Pioneer Platoon
• Anti Tank platoon

Let’s look at each in detail

a) Fire support platoon (30 men)

Organisation	Transport	Equipment
2 Sections  Each consist of 12 men mounted in teams of 2 x 2 vehicles (driver, gunner, commander per vehicle) Platoon Headquarters Platoon Commander (Captain), Platoon Sergeant, 1 x signaller, 1 x Mini UAV operator team, 2 x Drivers/ Platoon medic	10 x armed pick ups	5 x vehicle mounted HMG 5 x vehicle mounted AGL

b) Mortar Platoon (35 men)

Organisation	Transport	Equipment
4 x detachments  Each detachment consists of 2 mortar barrels with a 3 man crew each, with a Detachment Commander (NCO) Platoon Headquarters Platoon Commander (Captain), Platoon Sergeant, 1 x signaller, 2 x Mini UAV operators, 4 x Mortar Fire Controllers 2 x Drivers/ Platoon medic	6 x armed pick ups 4 x quad bikes	8 x 81mm mortars 2 x mUAS

c) Air Defence Platoon (30 men)

Organisation	Transport	Equipment
3 Sections  Each section consist of 8 men broken into 4 men fire teams Platoon Headquarters Platoon Commander (Captain), Platoon Sergeant, 1 x signaller, 1 x AD NCO, 2 x Drivers/ Platoon medic	6 x armed pick ups 1 x command pick up	6 x vehicle mounted HMG (14.5-23mm) 6 x MANPADs

d) Assault Pioneer Platoon (30 men)

Organisation	Transport	Equipment
Mobility Section 8 man section (infantry bridging, minor road/ bridge repairs, watermanship) Counter mobility Section 8 man section (mining, demolitions) Pioneer Section 8 man section (Bricklayer, carpenters, masons (all drivers) Platoon Headquarters Platoon Commander (Captain), Platoon Sergeant, 1 x signaller, 1 x Mini UAV operator team, 2 x Drivers/ Platoon medic	3 x trucks 1 x pick up	8 x assault boats Engineering stores

e) Anti Tank platoon (30 men)

Organisation	Transport	Equipment
3 Sections  Each consist of 8 men broken into 2 Firing posts manned by a 3 man crew, commanded by a JNCO with a driver Platoon Headquarters Platoon Commander (Captain), Platoon Sergeant, 1 x signaller, 1 x Mini UAV operator team, 2 x Drivers/ Platoon medic	5 x armed pick ups	5 x vehicle mounted HMG 5 x ATGM

4) HQ / Support Company (130 men)

I would suggest the HQ Company consists of

• Signals platoon
• Support Platoon
• ISTAR Platoon
• Medical Platoon

Let’s look at each in detail

a) Signals platoon (22 men)

Organisation	Transport
4 x Signal Detachments Each Detachment consists of 1 x JNCO and 3 x Signallers/ Drivers Platoon Headquarters Platoon Commander, Signal Sergeant Major, CQMS (Colour Sergeant), 1 x MT Sergeant, 2 x Command Vehicle Sergeants	2 x command vehicles 2 x pick ups 2 x quad bikes

b) Support Platoon (40 men): 4 sections

Organisation	Transport
Repair Section 8 x mechanic drivers Distribution Section 16 x drivers POL Section 4 x drivers/ operators Recovery Section 4 x drivers/ operators Arms and Ammunition Section 4 x drivers/ ammo storemen 2 x Armourers/ Artificers 2 x Ammo techs 2 x Ammo NCOs Catering Section 2 x water specialists 4 x chefs 2 x storemen/ drivers	2 x Repair trucks   8 x cargo trucks   1 x Fuel tankers/ fuel bladder 2 x Recovery Trucks   2 x Armourers truck           1 x mobile kitchen 1 x catering vehicle 1 x Water Tanker/ purification system

c) ISTAR Platoon (44 men)

Organisation	Transport	Equipment
Recce Multiples 2 x multiples of 12 men Each 12 man multiple is broken into 3 x 4 man Fire Teams ISTAR Section 2 x 2 man UAV Dets Intelligence SNCO, JNCO Sniper Section Broken into Heavy & Light Fire Teams Each Fire Team consists of 2 x 2 man Sniper pairs Platoon Headquarters Platoon Commander (Captain), Platoon Sergeant, 1 x signaller, 1 x Mini UAV operator, 2 man 60mm mortar team, 2 x Drivers/ Platoon medic	10 x armed pick ups 6 x quad bikes 6 x motorcycles	Each fireteam: 1 x rifles 1 x MGL 1 x light machine gun 1 x Marksman rifle 1 x mUAS per multiple ISTAR Section 6 x rifles 2 x UAVs Sniper Section Heavy – 2 x anti material rifles- 4 x rifles Light – 2 x sniper rifles, 4 x rifles HQ 8 x rifles 1 x 60mm mortar mUAS

d) Medical Platoon (24 men)

Organisation	Transport	Equipment
Medical Officer and SNCO 18 driver/ medics 4 drivers/ medical assistants	6 x Ambulances 1 x truck + trailer/ tank 1 x Landrover/ pick up

e) HQ (20 men)

Organisation	Transport	Equipment
Commanding Officer Second in Command Adjutant 9 x Staff officers RSM, 3 x clerks, 4 x drivers	6 x Land rovers/ pick up

Summary:

The proposed layout is a rough indicator of a unit that in Nigeria’s peculiar situation has the ability to fight, move (albeit slowly/ not very far), sustain and support itself.

Of course there are many rough edges, such as whether the support element is large enough to keep the battalion operating and for how long. What is the logistic requirement for such a unit etc.

Quad bikes (these could simply be modified 4 wheel Keke NAPEPs with strengthened suspension and a cargo platform instead of a passenger cab, give Company commanders the ability to transport ammo and other stores to forward deployed platoons and extract casualties or prisoners even over bad roads.

The widespread deployment of UAVs (especially if they are cheap off the shelf) not only allows the units to maintain situational awareness but to direct fire on enemies out of line of site.

Despite there being a limited air threat in Nigeria’s current conflict, it is important not to neglect this capability and in the interim Anti Air units can be used in a ground rule as additional machine gunners.

Integrated Assault pioneers are meant to increase the survivability of the unit by enhancing their field fortifications and giving them the ability to breach obstacles.

All in all, this proposed unit is not meant to be a panacea to Nigeria’s military problems but to (hopefully) allow people interested in these things to think beyond simply purchasing new shiny pieces of kit and think more about what exactly the men riding around in or using that kit will need to do.

Nigeria 2023: New National Security Plan

As an antidote to the incessant politicking in Nigeria I think it would be useful to reimagine how the country would seek to reform its security sector

Rather than reanalysing Nigeria’s myriad security problems, I think it will be more interesting to proceed from the point of identifying priorities and considering how Nigeria engages with the sub region, continent and wider world and how its military and security apparatus fits in this engagement.

Plan and Prepare

1. Understand: critical to any plan or strategy is to develop an in depth understanding of Nigeria’s security problems, this stage will be broken down into 3 distinct but complementary tasks, in order to provide a clear understanding of the country, its peoples and its problems that will form the basis of any long term solution.

Understand the security problems and their causes: combining desk and field research, undertake a review of the multitude of released and unreleased reports and white papers, Commissions of Enquiry into various crises across the country. This desk research should be buttressed by field trips to every ward, Local Government and state by the National Security Team.

Understand the security services: this requires developing an understanding of all the security and paramilitary services in the country. As important as understanding their numbers, organization, training, equipment, bases and structures will be understanding their culture.

Understand the country: it is oft commented that someone in Lagos will know more about New York than they do Sokoto. This lack of common understanding informs many of the tensions in the country, making it easier for disagreements to turn into conflicts and for fake news to proliferate. Utilising cultural, linguistic, historical, anthropological and other experts to conduct desk and field research and understanding of Nigeria’s land and people, local customs, economic and other issues.

Desired End State: a comprehensive set of products such as databases, reports, maps and charts etc forming a foundational piece of knowledge accessible to all security services, relevant government departments and accredited researchers which will be constantly updated and reviewed in order to provide both raw data and analysis of the country, security services and various insecurity crises.

2. Record: it can be argued that Nigeria’s atrocious collection and storage of basic demographic data contributes to the countries inability to deal with insecurity. While it will be hard to quickly get an accurate record of the country’s demographics, 3 key steps can be taken to remedy this.

Births, deaths, marriages, divorces: national standardized (and digital) birth and death certificate system should be created. Initially this will most likely only capture people who die or are born in hospitals or urban areas but a continuous exercise should also be undertaken where people can also be retrospectively be brought onto the system. Marriages and divorces (be they legal, customary or religious) should be recorded as well.

Data harmonization: all existing databases from BVN, NIN, passports, PVC, telephone subscribers, driving licenses etc. should be combined into a single National Population database, which will be continuously updated and cross referenced with birth, death and marriage records. A single National identity card will suffice in future to cover all these activities.

National Statistics: should be collected and published on a monthly basis, all information from road traffic accidents, average speeds, hospital admissions, school attendance, animal movements etc should be meticulously collected and recorded, even data that may seem irrelevant should be collected and stored and analysed. This data allows the security forces to understand the normal pattern of life around the country. Crime and insecurity are aberrations thus, unexplained changes in patterns of life can be an early indicator of problems, for example, if the attendance of boys in school suddenly starts dropping or there is an increase in fertiliser purchases in an area with no associated increase in farming activity etc

Desired End State: a National Population Database and single National ID card in order to provide a single accessible source of demographic data and single nationally recognised form of ID.

3. Demarcate: following on from the above, the country and its external and internal borders need to be accurately mapped and the results presented in an accessible digital and physical database. Borders with neighbouring countries as well as, between states and territories need to be mapped, marked and publicised. Land registry information should be digitized and made available in each state both online and in hard copy in Land Registry offices in each state capital.

Desired End State: combine land survey information data with land registry data in order to accurately record borders, land use and ownership

4. Plan: Strategic and operational planning from a National Security perspective must be institutionalized, with the Office of National Security coordinating all military, paramilitary, intelligence and security matters. The National Security strategy should cover defined time periods (5, years, 10 years, 15 years etc), with a National Security Plan for its implementation.

Once formulated each military and paramilitary service should then develop its own strategy and plans to support the National Security Strategy and Plan. While the National Security Plan will be a living document subject to update, it must have a central unifying mission and narrative to which all agencies and services must adhere.

Desired End State: a comprehensive National Security plan with milestones to which all security services and other stakeholders have contributed to, bought into and work towards in order to ensure all security activity is formally planned and organised.

Intelligence and Military: Reform and Organise

5. Minimise: Nigeria has multiple paramilitary and uniformed services with overlapping duties. This creates wastage in terms of overhead costs, administration and training for agencies doing the same or similar things with little by way of results to show for it. These need to be streamlined and either amalgamated or abolished.

For example, the Federal Road Safety Corps (FRSC) could be folded into the Nigerian Police Force, Immigrations (NIS) and Customs (NCS) united into a single Border Defence and Revenue Agency, Nigeria Security and Civil Defence Corps (NSCDC) folded into the NPF as a semi autonomous, Civil Defence, Transport and Infrastructure Protection Police Command. NDLEA, EFCC amalgamated as a Federal Investigation Agency (along the lines of the FBI) focusing on economic, transnational, firearms and narcotic crimes (including political corruption). NIMASA separated into a maritime regulatory body, and its security elements as a semi autonomous, Coast Guard, Naval Command.

Desired End State: reduced number of security services, in order to reduce duplication of effort, overhead costs and simplify command structures

6. Reorganise: each service will use the outcomes of the understand and minimise phase to review their own organisation, its purpose and mission and reorganise themselves to reflect their mission and strategy under the National Security Plan.

Security Zones: The country should be organised into security zones which (for example) could correspond to the informal geopolitical. The Army, Navy and Air Force will form Joint Military Zones (JMZ) under a single operational command for training, operational and administrative purposes. While each service retains its own organisation, organic logistics etc, the JMZ would act as a higher headquarters and supply node and allow better coordination of forces, streamline logistics and ensure that all units constantly work together in their roles developing synergy and familiarity.

In parallel, Joint Security Zones (JSZ), will unify all other security, domestic intelligence, paramilitary and police forces under a single command again providing a combined training, logistics and administrative support and operational coordination.

This reorganization will also allow the Military and Security commands to identify the primary security challenges in their areas of operation (AO) and develop the appropriate plans at a local level.

Each State will have a State Security Councils, chaired by Governors with Local Government Chairmen and local force commanders, providing oversight priorities and guidance. Both security zones will be overseen by a Zonal Security Council, consisting of the state Governors, relevant commissioners and force commanders which will provide oversight of the Security Forces and coordinate the activities of the security forces.

Within the states Local Government Chairmen will have their own LGA Security Councils, consisting of Councillors and local traditional rulers. These Councils retain operational control of the Security Zones under normal conditions allowing local political leaders to control and direct the security forces.

Security forces: each service will be reorganised and restructured to better reflect operational realities, training, the changing nature of warfare, capabilities of current weapon systems etc. For example, Army manoeuvre units Battalions, Brigades etc should be reorganised to ensure they are able to fight, support and sustain themselves. Within the Navy brown water, littoral and blue water capabilities and the ability to move and sustain expeditionary forces. The Air Force provides not just intelligence and surveillance, close air support, air defence and air superiority, airlift and deep strike but a ground force. These capabilities should be reorganised into strategic, operational and tactical groupings. This exercise should be replicated throughout all the services

Desired End State: decentralised operational command of the security services allowing local political leaders to make security decisions in response to specific local challenges quickly and with adequate support and logistics held close locally, reducing time needed for planning and execution of security operations in order to provide local control of the security forces.

Military and security forces reorganised in order to provide better efficiency and utility

7. Standardise: a programme of standardisation should be undertaken within and across all services for all equipment types. Every service should be expected to standardize, vehicles, equipment and weapon systems by a given date. For example, set the condition that within 2 years all Nigerian soldiers will use the same rifles, the same machine guns, pistol, mortars etc. The same should apply to vehicles, with a single standard light utility vehicle, type of APC, IFV, MRAP tank, self propelled gun etc decided upon and the entire force reequipped with it. This exercise will inevitably leave many variants of weapons surplus. Depending on numbers these can be concentrated in a single service, for example all Tavors go to the Navy, all FN FALS go to Customs and so on. The rest can be placed in storage.

A similar exercise can be run for training. If we presume training can be broken into 3 generic stages, (basic, advanced, trade/ branch training), then all members of the Armed Forces can utilize the same standardised Basic Training schools, similar to the NDA, upon completion of Basic training they then go to their specific services for advanced and trade training

By standardizing weapons, vehicles and other equipment that economy of scale can be achieved for defence procurement, with bigger discounts negotiated for new equipment as well as joint ventures set up and manufacturing or assembly done in Nigeria.

More importantly standardisation simplifies, training, maintenance and logistics. Having only one rifle or machine gun to train on ensures that more time can be spent on these specific weapons, maintenance is simplified as technicians only need to be trained on these specific equipment types and spare parts can be shared across all. It also means logistics on operations are simplified with standard equipment, common across a service, it means that there is less variety in stores, fuels, ammunitions types etc to transport Standardising some elements of basic training again brings cost savings in that Navy, Army or Air Force instructors can be used to train a batch of recruits, spare capacity in training establishments can be utilized and more importantly, having a common syllabus means troops from different services can operate together much more easily

Desired End State: each service to have common equipment as standard, in order to simplify procurement, training, maintenance and logistics

8. Expand: the security services need to be increased in size, capacity and capability.

Increased Police and Military: Expansion in size should be based on increasing annual recruitment cycles, expanded training facilities, changes in terms and conditions and the creation of a reserve force.

Recruiting cycles will be increased to run several times a year and new basic training facilities established as well as existing ones expanded and improved.

In addition to normal service contracts, terms and conditions will be amended to allow 2 or 4 year contracts in which the Serviceperson receives a higher annual wage in lieu of pension. In addition the NYSC should be expanded to include both graduates and non graduates (aged between 18 and 30), of whom a given percentage each batch will be incentivised to volunteer for military or police training, serving for a minimum of two years along with the short contract soldiers, they will be paid a one off lump sum as a bonus. At the expiration of their time they can either sign up for another 2 year or 4 year contract or leave.

Reserve Forces: This reserve force will be needed to ensure that after the military and police reach their optimum number, they still have the ability to scale up to meet any crises. These reserve units will be attached to existing formations, with a focus on particular niche skill sets such as light infantry, medical, media ops, cyber and logistics etc

This Reserve can be generated in multiple ways, such as direct recruitment as well as a requirement for all departing service personnel (including short contracts and NYSC) to join their local Reserve Unit etc.

Each Reserve force for each service will be appropriately structured to the needs of the service and trained and equipped to the same standard. Once formed Reserve units will be required to train one evening a week, 1 weekend a month and 2 weeks every year. This 2 week period could either be training or an actual operational deployment within the county Police Auxiliaries: the Police Auxiliary Force will consist of a combination of locally recruited auxiliaries and retired police officers serving in a reserve capacity (of which the first 2 years are compulsory and the following years voluntary) and NYSC draftees on a short term contract

Increased capacity would be obtained through improved and continuous training, mentoring and monitoring of forces..

Those drafted who do not join the military can be formed into a National Labour Corps and those with skills deployed around the country to work in the same manner as graduate Youth Corpers but in the skilled/ semi skilled sectors, whilst those without useable skills can be given training after orientation in a variety of skills and then deployed around the nation. Thus this method will serve to provide short term recruits for the military and police, a deployable labour force and an adult skills provision scheme. A Joint Military and Police Engineering Corps, which will be a combined NSCDC, Police, Military Civil, electrical and Mechanical engineering entity will be formed that can be used for projects in contested or challenging areas or on expeditionary operations. Led by military engineers but with a civilian workforce under contract, it will be designed to be a one stop shop that can design, plan and build engineering projects. Qualified military engineers will be seconded to the Corps as well as military engineer units on rotation.

Desired End State: an expanded military and police force and a military reserve and police auxiliary created in order to provide sufficient combat power and enable the rapid expansion of these services in times of crises

9. Barricade: a deliberate data driven operation should be undertaken to secure the Nigeria’s borders. This will should involve demarcating the land border with a network of outposts, sensors, barriers which are then patrolled on land, air and water along the entire 4,800km length of the border. Understandably this will be an extremely manpower and resource intensive exercise, however, the gains from plugging the economic losses from smuggling even in relatively benign areas like the south west to the physical and economic losses of smuggling of goods and  weapons in the North west and east and the south east borders, should help defray some of the costs. A similar exercise undertaken on the maritime borders by expanding the existing coastal surveillance network and using additional means such as picket ships along the coast with radar, as well as aerial and sea patrols

Desired End State: monitor Nigeria’s borders in order to reduce crime, smuggling, bunkering, illegal migration and movement of weapons and transnational armed actors across the border

10. Mobilise: in order to provide the security space in which to carry out these reforms, it will be necessary to generate sufficient combat power to hold the line, relieve troops and police already on operations for a long enough period until the new units become operational. This will be done by withdrawing all security forces assigned out as supplementary staff, administrative and ceremonial staff as well as streamlining operations in more benign parts of the country. All personnel selected through this trawl will be given pre deployment training and sent to support deployed force elements. This will provide the necessary buffer to relieve pressure on the security forces as the new forces are being trained and equipped

Desired End State: create additional combat power from existing forces in order to provide reserves and reinforcements during the expansion of the security forces

11. Inform: transparency and public education will form a key plank of all Nigerian security operations as well as the services day to day operations. Balanced against operational security requirements, as much information as possible must be shared with Nigerians. This will boost confidence and awareness and also take the information initiative away from adversarial groups and other hostile actors.

The Information campaign should support the overall security mission and narrative and must be inclusive of all Nigerians and avoid scapegoating or blaming specific tribal, religious or national groups. The information campaign should be holistic using every medium available, such as radio, TV, traditional, SMS, town criers, social media, posters, travelling information teams etc.

All members of government must understand and follow a common media template and plan and all information must be consistent with a common message or narrative, and guiding principles such as refusing to use partisan, tribal or religious language or scapegoating messages. Specific timelines should be set up for government response to incidents and multiple modes of two way conversation (SMS, WhatsApp, Social media, emails, phone calls, walk in centres, post boxes, media events, town halls etc should be created by every service at every level, manned, resourced and tracked for utility and responsiveness.

Desired End State: a better informed public, with improved trust in the security services and  the ability to communicate compliments, complaints, concerns or information directly.

12. Partner: the National Security Team should identify key foreign partners to domesticate the production of defence materials, develop a workable business plan and execute. Many countries with developed defence and security industries are in dire need of investment, partners and markets. Identifying certain key industries (UAVs, small arms, vehicles, ammunition, artillery, explosives, uniforms, tents, rucksacks etc) and work with these industries to set up JV factories and training centres in Nigeria. This not only saves money, but increases the country’s industrial base and generates earnings through the sale of these equipment.

Desired End State: develop Nigeria’s military industry, in order to reduce the costs and risks associated with importation of defence equipment and generate revenue from exports

13. Restore: the restoration of pride, professionalism, honesty and public respect for the police and military will be a key priority. This will involve creating a series of confidence building measures and public events and information campaign.

Terms and conditions: terms and conditions for the services will be reviewed and improved with additional benefits such as education, healthcare grants etc codified alongside public/ private sector cooperation for financial products as well as life and health insurance scheme.

Internal reform: Within the services; specialist teams will be set up to tackle indiscipline, corruption and abuse of public office, with stiffer sentences introduced, on an increasing scale of severity for seniority. Senior officers will be compelled to declare all assets every 12 months.

Improved working conditions: a comprehensive programme will be rolled out across the country to improve and harden police stations, checkpoints and ensure all of them are built to a minimum standard of comfort, with 24hour electricity provided by a combination of mains, generators or renewable sources To facilitate this, a task force on police, paramilitary and military service conditions, will be set up to improve accommodation, work and training facilities

Public events: a series of public events should be scheduled celebrating and/or promoting each service, with full participation by local schools, civil groups and all political parties. These days should be made to be non partisan, with private companies encouraged to offer discounts and special benefits to members of that service for the weekend closest to it

Public information: media programmes on the radio, TV, social media as well as films, reality TV shows and documentaries should be used to humanise and inform citizens about each of the services. Popular celebrities should be encouraged to ‘adopt’ different services and promote them. Each individual command of each service must invest in responsive two way communications ensuring that information is regularly passed to the public and complaints or concerns, quickly, compassionately and professionally addressed

Desired End State: restored pride and trust in the defence and security forces in order to improve civil military relations and boost security force operations

National Orientation

14. Discuss: Nigeria needs a discussion with itself, at every level, within schools, religious organisations friends, families, streets, wards, Local Governments, States, Regions and the nation as a whole.

This Conversation with Nigeria should take place periodically (5, 10 years etc) in which conversations begin at the lowest level and then the topics raised are discussed across the country. This should consist of a series of community meetings to discuss and give views on broad set of questions or topics as well as an opportunity to raise issues of concern to the participants.

The community meetings should take place at the street or compound level, ward level and then the conclusions discussed at the local government, then state, region and finally Federal level The issues identified as being of most concern to Nigerian should form the basis of an annual attitude survey conducted across the nation, to gain a clear understanding of the citizens views on a variety of issues be it infrastructure, the state of the economy, community relations etc and also annually track improvements or deterioration of attitudes. This should be a brief survey with states encouraged to conduct further attitude surveys on more detailed local issues.

The conversations should be carefully moderated to prevent problematic speech but allowed relative freedom particularly at the lower levels to ensure peoples voices are heard.

Desired End State: ensure that all Nigerians have some opportunity to express themselves and allow Nigerians to express desires and grievances with each other in order to improve community relations, deepen community understanding and release some of the tensions in the country

15. Educate: Nigerian sports, music, film and culture are powerful tools of soft power that Nigeria could utilise. In order to increase Nigerian influence home and abroad, an organisation similar to the British Council/ Confucius Institute should be set up. For the sake of this paper, it can be called the WAZOBIA institute. The institute will operate within and without Nigeria. Within Nigeria it will work to provide support. training and funding to Nigerian science clubs, sports clubs, athletes and sportsmen, writers, filmmakers/ actors, musicians and other creatives.

Special attention will be given to languages, history and anthropology, to accurately record and codify all Nigerian languages and history. Abroad these institutes will serve as centres to provide lessons on Nigerian languages, culture, cuisine and culture as well as organise cultural events for the diaspora and foreign audiences. Each African capital should have a WAZOBIA Institute Centre as well as major foreign capitals, with offshoots in local universities as well as foreign universities with a large Nigerian population and should be funded partially by events, government, sponsorships and donations.

Desired End State: provide a medium to nurture Nigerian arts, sports, science and culture at home and propagate it abroad in order to improve the knowledge and image of Nigeria

16. Broadcast: the Nigerian Television Authority and Federal Radio Cooperation should be amalgamated into a single media organisation, revamped and professionalised. An international element will be created broadcasting via the internet, satellite TV, cable TV and radio in a variety of languages (e.g. French, Portuguese, Arabic, English, Swahili, Fulfulde and Hausa). The revised national broadcasting organisation should seek to be an industry leader in entertainment and news, modelled like the BBC or al Jazeera.

Desired End State: a credible, engaging media organisation that is a trusted news source home and abroad.

Diplomatic

17. Cooperate: Nigeria’s security is intrinsically linked to the security of West and Central Africa and its coastline. In order better secure the sub region, Nigeria should lead an initiative within ECOWAS to form a coalition (like ECOMOG) but as a permanent military treaty organisation. This treaty organisation should have a permanent headquarters with all the staff branches with every member, asked to pledge units to it in the event of a crisis, needing military intervention. In order to ensure West African forces can react to crises and support each other, logistics hubs should be set up across West (And eventually Central Africa). Regular command post and field exercises should be held to ensure interoperability. Nigeria will show leadership by dedicating sufficient combat and logistic power to the organisation (for example at least Battlegroup) to make it militarily credible as well taking a lead on the AU Standby Brigades.

Using regular and reserve units Nigeria should ensure that it has a constant rotation of units on regional and international peace keeping operations. This will support peace and stability in Africa, give Nigeria credibility across the globe and also gives the police and military, additional operational experience and practice at operating in different environments and with different allies and partners.

Desired End State: Nigeria to lead and organise an African military and security organisation in order to support peace operations across west and central Africa and beyond.

18. Diplomacy: Nigeria’s diplomatic corps should be reformed to ensure it is once more professional with high quality personnel and facilities.

Nigerian embassies will required to set up local councils with members of the local Nigeria community and set up a Friends of the Embassy/ High Commission organisation, providing a structure for Nigerians in diaspora to work with the Embassy, either as volunteer staff, aiding in reception or with administration as well as providing assistance with maintenance and upkeep. There will be a review of diplomatic recruitment and training, an increase in the entry requirements to increase the quality of personnel. Independent inspection by Ministry Inspectors as well as constant feedback from users and stakeholders will be sought and used to improve user experience.

Diplomatic priorities will focus on securing the borders and coast, securing West Africa including the Sahel and Gulf of Guinea, securing Africa, championing Africa’s cause amongst the Great Powers, acting as a non aligned state within Great Power competition, working closely with emerging/ developing states on economic and technological relationships. Within West Africa the main diplomatic focus will be security, trade, transport and travel. Protecting democratic norms and peace making, support and keeping will be prioritised within Africa as well as forming and preferably leading an African P5 with leading states from West, East, Central, North and Southern Africa to drive the AU toward usefulness.

This should include leading to a unified set of AU policies on trade and relations with China and the Far East, Russia and Central Asia, South and Central America, the US and North America, France, UK, Portugal and the EU, the Middle East, Turkey. West Asia etc. By defining common AU principles, it will ensure nations all operate on a level playing field and also through collective bargaining should help eliminate harmful practices such as disproportionate tax waivers, dumping, unfair tariffs, importation of workforces etc

Desired End State: professional diplomatic service, engaged diaspora, fit for purpose diplomatic facilities, in order to project and prioritise Nigeria’s interests in Africa

Judicial

19. Adjudicate: Judicial reform will consist of several key reforms:

• Refurbish all existing courts
• Increase in the number of courts at all levels
• Recruit more judges and other court staff and review and improve training and support
• Improving administrative support
• Digitising court records as well as historic court records and the use of digital recording devices to speedup court processes.
• Set up Specialist Judicial Task Forces and Courts to clear the backlog of persons detained awaiting trial, persons unjustly convicted or convicted without legal representation.
• Set up Special Courts will be set up to deal with specific crimes; kidnapping and banditry, political corruption and economic crimes, extractive industry crimes (oil, mining etc), terrorism. These special courts will come with an appropriate number of judges, prosecutors, court appointed defenders, court detectives, clerks, admin, security interpreters and other necessary staff to ensure that trials can take place quickly.
• In conjunction with this all prisons will be reviewed and renovated and more prisons built to reduce overcrowding reform. Pay and welfare for court and prison staff will be improved with pay, skills and education improved

Desired End State: an expanded fit for purpose court and prison system in order to increase access to justice for Nigerians

Nigeria 2023- How will the candidates tackle Defence and Security (4)- Peter Obi LP

On 4 December 2022, the Presidential Candidate of the Labour Party (LP) Mr Peter Obi released his manifesto.

I will review the sections that pertain to national security, restructuring and foreign policy as I believe these all impact on defence and security.

There are 20 items in total of varying length and detail, I will be copying the relevant passages from the manifesto and review for any obvious policy takeaways.

To be clear, this will not seek to endorse the candidates’ proposals or nor comment on their candidacy, the purpose is to look at the proposed policies and consider their viability

To secure Nigeria, end banditry and insurgency, and unite our dear nation, to manage our diversity such that no one is left behind.

To secure Nigeria, we will:

1. I. Deal decisively with insecurity by putting a permanent end to the incessant banditry, insurgency, kidnaping and cross-border terrorism in our country today.

II. To achieve this, we shall take the following immediate actions:

 a. Activate all the necessary regional cooperation’s and arrangements for securing our borders with neighboring countries in west and central Africa, particularly Niger, Chad, and Cameroun;

b. Increase the personnel of our armed forces, police and other security agencies and optimally equip, train, and fund them to respond adequately to security threats;

c. Deploy state-of-the-art military technology to fight terrorists, bandits, insurgents and kidnappers;

d. Recreate community relations with security agencies in order to increase public trust and build human intelligence to restore law and order in the communities.

Comment: there are 4 key activities highlighted to achieve the aim of dealing decisively with insecurity: regional cooperation to secure the borders, increase the police and armed forces, use unspecified technology to tackle insecurity, improve civil/ security force relations. Collectively this can be defined as security sector reform

SO WHAT: these activities are commonsensical and common to almost all political manifestoes this season. However, in keeping with all these manifestoes, there is scant detail. The manifesto doesn’t specify what cooperation is needed and how it will be operationalised. Increasing the size of the security forces is while an easily identified fix, begs the obvious question of how this will be done, how it will be funded and in what time scale, while one wouldn’t expect a detailed operational timetable, certain detail would be useful.

It is unclear what technology will be used to tackle insecurity. One could suggest the use of remote sensors, mounted on UAVs, CCTVs etc, tracking of mobile phones and electronic devices etc, however these technologies already exist, the question is whether they are used appropriately. Rebuilding relationships between the public and the security forces is a useful aspiration and would aid in tackling insecurity.

Policy Take away: regional cooperation to protect the border, increase the size of the security forces, use of technology to tackle insecurity and improved community relations

• III. Pursue proactively and deliberately, policies that will implement the fundamental objectives and directive principles of state police in the constitution so as to create a secured society that reduces the social pressure for crimes and provides viable livelihood for the youths. This will be in fulfilment of the obligation of government to ensure the ‘security and welfare of the people’.

Comment: this appears to be an explicit intention to form state controlled police forces.

SO WHAT: decentralising policing would assist in ensuring law and order is more responsive to local needs as well as hopefully ensure the local population demands greater accountability from their political leadership. However, state police come fraught with a multiplicity of dangers such as the risk of misuse by local political leaders (something that is already rife with Nigerian politicians and big men), how will these forces be funded? Will they be used for patronage and simply crammed with political, religious or ethnic appointees of the current political leader? Will there be a federal equipment standard and training syllabus or will there be simply be patchwork of equipment and training? What will be the relationship with Federal police forces?

Whilst a populist (and popular) policy, this popularity is borne very much out of frustration with the Nigeria Police Force and its many problems. It is unclear whether having state police addresses these problems or simply recreates they 37 times

Policy Take away: there are  likely to be state police

IV. Engage, support, and partner, with national and sub-national institutions and governments and network them into an integrated and reinforced onslaught against insecurity. This requires decentralized and professional management of security institutions and the use of grant-in-aid to encourage efficient criminal justice administration at subnational levels, namely, state, local government and community security administration. To deal with cross-border crimes, we will also adjust security modalities to address gaps and vulnerabilities arising from our obligations under the ECOWAS Protocol on the Movement of Persons.

Comment: this is a multifaceted paragraph, dealing on one hand with local, state and community courts and conflict resolution mechanisms as well as once more raising the issue of policing the borderlands. The chosen method appears to be a decentralised approach to insecurity and criminal justice, promoting local solutions to local problems, with the Federal Government providing support and funding via grants in aid. Addressing gaps and vulnerabilities in the ECOWAS protocol could be interpreted as a specific response to the presence of foreign nationals in the farmer/ herder crisis’s

SO WHAT: devolving justice sector reform should give greater local accountability. The issue will of course be in oversight and quality control and ensuring that these local conflict resolution mechanisms are fair to all party’s and are constitutional. Dealing with transhumance by addressing the ECOWAS protocol is a reasonable start however the protocol does not guard the borders, thus irrespective of how the laws are rewritten or applied, there will still be a problem of actually physically securing the borders

Policy Take away: justice and conflict resolution mechanisms to be decentralised. ECOWAS Protocol on Movement of Persons to be reviewed

• V. Undertake institutional reforms to secure Nigerians, which consists of four initiatives pursued simultaneously:

a. Reforming the security sector, with particular emphasis on re-focusing the military on external threats and border protection, and the police on internal security threats and law enforcement;

b. Swift, firm and fair prosecution of criminals, bandits and terrorists to end impunity;

c. Enhanced coordination among security agencies to enhance operational efficiency,

d. Fair and transparent administration of justice hinged on the rule of law.

      Comment: this is another multifaceted paragraph, combining security sector reform and justice reform. Refocusing the military on external threats and border threats addresses a key issue on the misuse of the military on internal security tasks. Better coordination between agencies would obviously improve the security situation. Items (b) and (d) are essentially the same but one can interpret this as a focus on enforcing the law fairly and swiftly, which would require some form of judicial reform

SO WHAT: this is a fairly ambiguous passage with the exception of Item (a), the reorientation of the military to its core task would require a significant expansion and upskilling of the police, who would need to undertake crime prevention, law enforcement, internal security and counter insurgency taskings. Combined with the allusion to state police this would indicate a massive reorientation of the police force/ forces. At the same time placing the military on border protection tasks as opposed to having a dedicated border protection force is another diversion from their main task of protecting Nigeria from internal and external military threats.

Policy Take away: the military will be withdrawn from internal security duties, police will be expanded

• VI. Improve the functioning and effectiveness of our security agencies particularly the police, by strengthening their civilian oversight as well as increasing their size, equipment, funding, and enhancing their professional training.

VII. Strengthen the Ministry of Interior, the Ministry of Police Affairs, and other regulatory and supervisory agencies to provide robust and regulatory oversight and enhance coordination and performance of statutory mandates of the security services.

Comment: there is some overlap with previous policies, in terms of expanding the forces and improved equipment and training

SO WHAT: improved civilian oversight would be a positive but it is not specified what this would entail. Strengthening the Federal ministries controlling the internal security services is a fairly ambiguous statement. Further oversight could entail involving third sector bodies or encouraging parliamentary bodies to conduct a more robust regulatory role and force security force compliance

Policy Take away: improved civilian oversight of the internal security forces

• VIII. Ensure, in accordance with Section 33 of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria (1999 as Amended), that every Nigerian life is protected at all cost. The basic minimum of DEMOCRATIC CITIZENSHIP is that every Nigerian life is protected by the state. There shall be no more impunity. All criminals are equal and will be equally prosecuted and punished. No persecution; no privilege. The same law for the rich and the poor, the powerful and the powerless.

Comment: this is more a guiding principle than a policy, to focus on a human centred approach. Prioritising the safety and security of all Nigerians irrespective of rank or station and equality before the law

SO WHAT: this is a positive aspiration that if implemented and used a guiding, unified principle for all actions should see benefits for Nigerians

Policy Take away: a human centred approach to security, law and justice

Restructure the polity through effective legal and institutional reforms to entrench the rule of law, aggressively fight corruption, reduce cost of governance, and establish an honest and efficient civil service.

To achieve these:

• I. We will strengthen our federalism by critically reviewing the 68 items on the exclusive list of the Federal government and moving agreed items to the concurrent list, to ensure effective public action for growth and sustainable livelihood. Our drive towards restructuring of the federation shall follow a determined, functional, approach for efficiency, productivity, sustainability, and equity for a balanced national development where no component of the federation shall feel short-changed. We realise that nothing can be achieved in this area except we achieve a consensus. We understand that it is the responsibility of the leadership to help to stimulate and attain a genuine and enduring consensus on such matters.

Comment: while this is not a strictly security related issue, there are significant benefits to the security sector to restructuring and decentralising

SO WHAT: there are direct benefits of empowering state and local leaders to take control of security issues in terms of cost savings, a more effective response to local problems and the indirect benefits of a hopefully more accountable and responsive democracy, which should (again hopefully) reduce much of the agitation in Nigeria, as aggrieved parties and groups will be able to address concerns locally

Policy Take away: restructuring and decentralisation

• II. Our determination to reduce cost of governance in Nigeria will start with the immediate implementation of the Oronsaye Report which recommended the consolidation of agencies of government. This will be our top priority within the first year of our administration. We will review the recommendations of that, report while engaging with industry players to design the implementation of the proposed reforms. While we are focused on cost reduction and streamlining of government operations for efficiency and effectiveness, we will ensure that the implementation of the reforms is pursued in a way that protects the livelihood of our hardworking and efficient civil servants.

Comment: while the Oronsaye Report mentions the FRSC, ICPC and EFCC, the principal of reducing and consolidating various security agencies with overlapping duties could also be applied

SO WHAT: consolidating agencies will help with reducing expenditure, coordinating activities and reducing operational confusion

Policy Take away: reduce the number of public bodies

• III. Pursue robust and aggressive reforms of our paramilitary agencies with a view to improving their synergy and functional effectiveness. Key recommendations of all previous reports on police and security sector reforms will be implemented. For instance, the three-level policing – local, state, and federal – will be promptly pursued with detailed guidelines to check abuse.

Comment: reforming the paramilitary agencies will be a positive, however implementing the multiplicity of reports many of which have been sat of the shelf for decade would also require a new review of the agencies to see if what has changed and if proposed solutions are still fit for purpose

SO WHAT: security sector reforms are key but without a guiding principle underpinning this, there is a risk of implementing reports ad hoc from different eras. Thus several key questions and guiding principles should be defined such as whether the priority is cost saving or effective service delivery, what policing philosophy, how will training be conducted, what will equipment levels be etc

Policy Take away: reform of paramilitary forces

1. IV. Strengthen the supreme court of the federation by increasing the number of judges and equipping them with the capacity to clear the backlog of cases and enhance the speedy adjudication of cases.

Comment: there are backlogs at every court in Nigeria so specifying the Supreme Court is somewhat curious. One would like to assume the inference is to increase the number of judges at all levels  

SO WHAT: judicial delays in Nigeria are legendary thus addressing some of them even at the Supreme Court level would be a positive, however it will do little to alleviate the problems of those awaiting trial or seeking resolution for civil disputes

Policy Take away: increase the number of Supreme Court judges

1. VI. Pursue more inclusion of our customary laws (norms and values – with respect to their compatibility with our constitution) in the contents of our formal law and in the administration of justice. For instance, reforms will be pursued for our traditional laws/rulers to be properly integrated in the formal legal/governance system.

Comment: this could be an interesting conflict resolution mechanism, however the obvious pitfalls of a traditional or religious based system is its constitutionality and acceptance by all communities or even by an individual within those communities. There is also the risk of abuse by local/ traditional rulers

SO WHAT: using customary systems for conflict resolution and local justice would not only free up the law courts but give people an obvious and easy way to resolve disputes before they decide to use violence or illegality. Ensuring they are fair, consistent, constitutional with appropriate oversights and give people opportunities for appeal could free up the law courts, reducing pressure on the system

Policy Take away: increased use of customary conflict resolution mechanisms

1. VII. Pursue aggressive digitization of all judiciary, government and regulatory agencies to curb corruption and improve governance outcomes and service delivery.

Comment: increased digitisation of court, prison, police and other security related affairs would greatly aid record keeping, service delivery and accountability

SO WHAT: a comprehensive plan to digitise judicial and security force operations in Nigeria would require significant investment in infrastructure and training, as well as a cultural mindset change in the affected agencies.

Policy Take away: digitise government operations

1. VIII. Establish the Office of Special Counsel to investigate and prosecute every executive abuse of power and corrupt public practices that do not fall under the prosecutorial power of existing agencies or are bureaucratically concealed. We will seek constitutional amendment to exempt prosecution by the Special Counsel from the exercise of the power of Nolle Prosequi of the Attorney General of the Federation.

Comment: this is a fairly unique and interesting policy as it appears to create a specific body to hold the Presidency to account, that cannot be interfered with by political appointees such as the Attorney General

SO WHAT: implemented as described this could very well be a game changing initiative, that would tackle Executive abuses and corruption, stop the ‘orders from above’ and act as a check on Executive power (as the National Assembly doesn’t seem to understand this part of their duties). It would be one of the first attempts for the Executive in Nigeria to hold itself to account

Policy Take away: a Special Counsel to deal with the Executive abuses and corruption

Conduct an afro-centric diplomacy that protects the rights of Nigerian citizens abroad and advances the economic interests of Nigerians and Nigerian businesses in a changing world.

1. I. While Africa will remain the focus of our foreign policy, we will prioritize Nigeria’s economic interest through promoting Nigerian businesses and protecting our people across the globe. Trade and investment will remain core components of our African foreign policy. Our foreign policy will integrate ‘Citizen Diplomacy’ and ‘Economic Diplomacy’. We will be unrelenting in protecting the rights of Nigeria anywhere in the world, as well as pragmatically respond to changes in the global economic order in a manner that leverages diplomacy for economic development in Nigeria. We will end the days of ‘coctail diplomacy’. We will be developmentalist like South Korea and Japan under their reformist governments.

Comment: promoting Nigeria’s economic interests are a good policy but rest on the bed rock of first having good economic policies to promote and a favourable investment climate. The concepts of ‘Citizen Diplomacy‘ and ‘Economic Diplomacy’ are interesting and would have benefitted from being expanded upon further, the latter likely referring to the assertion in the passage to protect Nigerians around the globe

SO WHAT: Nigeria’s diplomats have underperformed like every aspect of Nigerian governance, having a clear foreign policy objective would be an improvement on what currently pertains however as mentioned, economic diplomacy depends on having an economy that people can trade and invest in as well as a diplomatic service that can aggressively seek out and exploit opportunities. This will require a significant culture change and reorientation amongst the country’s diplomatic corps, and an acceptance by the political class that using the foreign service for patronage has to end.

Policy Take away: amended foreign policy focussing on economic development

1. II. We will rebuild Nigeria’s military power, re-organise its security architecture and enhance its technological prowess to improve security at home and Nigeria’s diplomatic influence in sub-regional, regional, and global affairs via peacekeeping activities.

Comment: this passage has many lofty but ambiguous aspirations. Rebuilding and reorganising Nigeria’s military is a major undertaking. The manifesto doesn’t specify what the nature of this reorganisation will be. In terms of structure, equipment, training, doctrine? Technology is extremely popular with all parties however technology is only as good as the people trained to use it, how its used and how its maintained.

However, the more interesting point is about power projection through peace keeping deployments. This is a useful policy that would enhance Nigeria’s global standing and influence

SO WHAT: Military reform and reorganisation in the middle of a number of serious internal security challenges would severely tax the capacity of the already overstretched military and a heavily indebted treasury.

The deployment of forces to peace keeping operations can only happen when Nigeria has excess combat power not needed for current operations but this would be a useful tool by which to enhance Nigeria’s influence

Policy Take away: reform the military

1. III. We will proactively reassert Nigeria’s leadership role in African affairs through constructive engagement using existing sub-regional and regional fora, as well as bilateral platforms for dialogue on current and emerging challenges.

Comment: this is another ambiguous aspiration that is difficult to quantify as constructive engagements are not defined, however the intent is clear: to reassert Nigeria’s position as a regional and continental hegemon

SO WHAT: Nigeria’s position as a regional and continental hegemon was a major contributor to stability within the sub region and continent, Nigeria’s slow implosion starting in the Abacha years and accelerating throughout the 4^th Republic has coincided with the growth of transnational extremism. The intent to reassert Nigeria’s hegemonic role is positive, however the method is not clearly defined

Policy Take away: recreate Nigeria’s hegemonic role in Africa

1. IV. We shall creatively deploy Nigeria’s soft power in Africa and around the world through Nigeria’s leading role in entertainment – music and Nollywood – to enhance the effectiveness of our domestic economic growth strategies.

Comment: this is a positive policy that would make use of an organic and globally popular element of Nigerian culture to retell the Nigerian story and support the proposed economic diplomacy

SO WHAT: the popularity of Nigeria’s entertainment industry is one of the few success stories in Nigeria and has developed free of government interference, it will be a delicate balance to exploit this sector to promote a government policy but properly done would be a win

Policy Take away: use entertainment as a tool of soft power

1. V. We will pay special attention to the ECOWAS region in order to secure our borders and ensure the integrity of regional security and development architecture that promotes human security in Nigeria. Our strategic interest is peaceful and democratic West Africa as our primary sphere of influence.

Comment: Nigeria’s immediate security is tied up in West African security. As can be seen insecurity from Nigeria has affected its neighbours, as from Libyan insecurity affected Mali, Niger, Burkina Faso, and so on. +Thus, this is a logical reading on Nigerian strategic imperative

SO WHAT: West Africa is currently a heavily contested space, with great power competition between France and Russia, Turkey, China and other countries expanding influence, jihadis, coupists, transnational criminals and non state actors, thus multilateral organisations such as ECOWAS are useful to create the framework for national and regional physical and human security

Policy Take away: use ECOWAS as a vehicle to project power and secure Nigeria

1. VI. Despite obvious challenges posed by migration, we will respect ECOWAS Freedom of Movement Protocols as it relates to movement of persons and goods. We will work with our neighbours to secure our borders and fight crossborder crimes while strengthening our immigration to account for movement into the country.

Comment: this relates to Item 3 the passage alludes to securing the border and strengthening immigration but doesn’t specify how.

SO WHAT: there is no extra detail here beyond the declaration that there will be a multilateral approach to securing the borders

Policy Take away: ECOWAS Freedom of Movement Protocols to be respected, immigration to be strengthened

• VII. We will seek to restore credibility to Nigeria’s foreign policy through its adherence to and leadership on regional initiatives and programmes such as the African Continental Free Trade Agreement (AfCTA), the New Economic Partnership for African Development (NEPAD) and the African Peer Review Mechanism. We will also pursue the strengthening of our relationship with our development partners and adherence and commitment to global peace and security.

Comment: while this mainly focuses on economic initiatives, there is mention of strengthening relationship with development partners. It can be interpreted as another adjunct to the economic diplomacy policy

SO WHAT: Nigeria’s international reputation has been poor for a while and it appears that this policy focuses on improving this by active participation in regional and international initiatives, demonstrating to the continent and world that Nigeria is once again a serious actor.

Policy Take away: developing international credibility through adherence to international and regional initiatives and programmes

Conclusion

This manifesto was strongest in the sections relating to the economy (which are not reviewed here), conversely the elements relating to economic diplomacy were the easiest to decipher.

It is difficult to identify a coherent defence or security policy, with the main stand out policy being State police. This policy is very popular in Nigeria but will require substantial legislative and constitutional effort to implement alongside the thorny issues of command, control, equipping and training a decentralised force and the risk of misuses by local political or regional elements.

The other stand out policy was in the restructuring section and the appointment of a Special Counsel. This would be the first attempt by a Presidency to hold itself to account and prevent its own excesses, something which is frankly unheard of in Nigeria. It is a bold and positive policy, a recognition that power corrupts and that good intentions are not enough to prevent that corruption. It is one of the very few unique (and decidedly selfless policies) identified in this crop of manifestoes.

There is also a consistent theme of working with and through multinational bodies such as the AU and ECOWAS to advance Nigeria’s interests, with those interests defined very much through an economic lens. There is little indication as to how economic interest will be balanced against security interests.

Whilst the importance of national security to the campaign is clear as it is the first chapter in the manifesto, even the few policies mentioned such as expanding the police, returning the army to barracks, use of technology etc are not well defined.

The manifesto would have greatly benefitted from better editing, with topics about judicial reform and aspirations, diplomacy or military reform or policing grouped together. Repeating the same policies in differently worded sentences did not enhance the manifesto.

While it is accepted that this candidate’s comfort zone is the economy, we are left generally unclear as to how national security will be dealt with. The manifesto is somewhat rescued by two bold policies (state policing and Special Counsel) and the reorientation of internal security to police primacy but in contrast to the economic policy one would struggle to define specifically what an Obi/ Datti defence policy would be.

Nigeria 2023- How will the candidates tackle Defence and Security (3)- Atiku Abubakar PDP

We will review ‘My Covenant with Nigerians’  the manifesto of the Presidential Candidate of the People’s Democratic Party (PDP) Alhaji Abubakar Atiku

I will review the sections that pertain to national security, interior, justice and foreign policy as I believe these all impact on defence and security.

There are several items in total of varying length and detail, I will be copying the relevant passages from the manifesto and review for any obvious policy takeaways.

To be clear, this will not seek to endorse the candidates’ proposals or nor comment on their candidacy, the purpose is to look at the proposed policies and consider their viability

WHAT WE WILL DO

1. Re-activate meaningful registration at birth as a way to reduce crime and protect Nigerians

Conduct the next national population census as the basis for further development planning

Comment: these are sound policies, that speak to some of the root causes of many of the agitations in Nigeria. The foundation of any form of governance at its most basic is knowing who exactly it is you are governing, something which is sorely lacking in Nigeria

SO WHAT: a lack of accurate records of the Nigerian population, its distribution and other associated data creates additional problems for the security forces. The manifesto doesn’t clarify how birth registration will be used for crime reduction however, nor does it specify whether this will be done at the local, state or federal level.

Policy Take away: there will be a census and birth registration

• Dealing with insurgency using alternative approaches to conflict resolution, such as Diplomacy; Intelligence; Improved Border Control; Traditional Institutions; and Good neighbourliness

Comment: multiple approaches are a good starting point to conflict resolution

SO WHAT: non kinetic approaches are always a good basis for defeating internal security problems. Diplomacy and improved border control would of course be useful in dealing with trans national actors, intelligence should (normally) underpin all operations. Traditional Institutions are good alternatives by which to engage with populations. Good neighbourliness is a great concept, its unclear how that becomes a policy activity. In fact it is unclear how any of these activities will be implemented

Policy Take away: there will be non kinetic approaches to COIN

• Restructure and Decentralize Security Institutions

Comment: Nigeria’s military, police, intelligence and paramilitary forces do suffer from incoherent organisation and over centralised ‘Oga at the top’ type command and control

SO WHAT: the manifesto correctly identifies the high level problem of the security forces being incorrectly structured and overcentralised. It does not specify how this will be remedied

Policy Take away: the security forces will be restructured and decentralised

• Promote Regional Security Cooperation

Comment: the spill over of security problems from Mali into the wider Sahel, Nigeria into Niger, Cameroun, Chad and the Gulf of Guinea, are testament to the need for any security efforts to be regional

SO WHAT: the manifesto does not specify how regional security cooperation will be promoted, which region and the nature of the cooperation

Policy Take away: regional security cooperation will be promoted

• Resolve Militancy Issue in the Niger Delta

Comment: the manifesto correctly identifies there is militancy in the Niger Delta

SO WHAT: the manifesto has correctly identified a decades long security problem that it will resolve but not how it will be resolved

Policy Take away: militancy in the Niger Delta will be resolved

• Improve Civil-Military Relations

Comment: civil military relations in Nigeria are generally poor due to the misuse of the security forces, such as the army used for policing functions, police and intelligence used for partisan or personal aims. The fetishization of brutality combined with ill discipline and a lack of respect for civilians, human rights and impunity from the consequences of these actions all contribute to this problem

SO WHAT: the manifesto correctly identifies that civil military relations need to be improved

Policy Take away: civil-military relations will be improved

• Strengthen the National Security Council

Comment: the National Security Council (NSC) is meant to advise the President on security forces and agencies and matters relating to public safety. It is Chaired by the President with the Vice President as the Deputy and consists of the Chief of Defence Staff, Ministers of Internal Affairs, Defence, Foreign Affairs, National Security Adviser and Inspector General of Police as permanent members and any other person so decided by the President

SO WHAT: the NSC as it stands contains the key principals needed for strategic decision making, the lack of permanent representation from the Intelligence agencies can be questioned but it is likely they are to be routinely invited. The manifesto doesn’t specify what strengthening means

Policy Take away: the NSC will be strengthened

• Handle the North East Development Issues

Comment: there are many development issues in the North East of Nigeria. While many are a direct result of the conflict, many are a legacy of the remoteness of the region and decades of poor governance. Addressing developmental issues such as land use, water, agriculture, education, health care and transport will go a long way to alleviating the suffering of the region’s inhabitants

SO WHAT: the manifesto correctly identifies that there are developmental issues in the northeast. However, it doesn’t specify how or why these are worse than those in any other region in Nigeria, nor how they would be tackled nor how that will link to improved security.

Policy Take away: north east developmental issues will be handled

• Deal with Terrorism, Kidnapping and Other Crimes

Comment: terrorism, kidnapping and other unspecified crimes have been identified as priorities

SO WHAT: terrorism and kidnapping are serious crimes, how they are to be dealt with is not specified

Policy Take away: terrorism, kidnapping and other unspecified crimes are to be dealt with

WHERE WE WANT TO BE

1. Ensuring the security of lives, properties and the dignity of Nigerians by restructuring and enhancing the funding of our security agencies as well as the retraining of security personnel

Comment: the key points identified here are an ideal of securing the lives, properties and dignity of Nigerians, which could be interpreted as a human centred approach. With a focus on funding and retraining of the security forces

SO WHAT: a human centred approach (if that’s what’s implied) would be a change from the typical regime protection model used however the passage is not clear on what exactly is to be done beyond retraining and more funding.

Policy Take away: security forces to be retrained and funded

1. Restoring merit and professionalism in the process of recruitment, appointment and promotions as enshrined in the acts establishing the security outfits and their extant rules and regulations

Comment: this passage seems to look to reform the security forces by introducing a meritocratic system of recruitment, promotion and rewards

SO WHAT: a meritocratic system of recruitment and advancement should help address the corrosive effects of nepotism and favouritism, ensuring the most qualified personnel are recruited and promoted

Policy Take away: professionalism to be restored by a merit based system of recruitment and reward

1. Implementing a Special Presidential Welfare Initiative for our security personnel

Comment: it is not specified whether this Special Presidential Welfare Initiative will be used to provide for security personnel’s pay and allowances, accommodation, feeding or equipment

SO WHAT: it is unclear what this initiative is for or how it differs from normal budgetary allocations

Policy Take away: there will be a Special Presidential Welfare Initiative

1. Increasing the number of security personnel to meet the security needs of over 20m Nigerians. We shall conduct systematic and guided recruitment exercise of up to one million personnel into the police force, to combat current security challenges and meet the UN police to citizen ration of 1:450

Comment: the comparatively small size of the security forces is well known. The figure of 1 million personnel and 1:450 is oft sited, as ever the question of how these numbers will be recruited, trained, equipped, housed and deployed is skipped over

SO WHAT: increasing the police force would have a beneficial effect on the security situation

Policy Take away: Police force to be expanded

1. Employing the tools of strategic engagement with state and non state actors in theatres of conflict

Comment: it is unclear what tools of strategic engagement are being referred to here. One could link this to the non kinetic approach mentioned in Item 2

SO WHAT: strategic engagement with all actors is very important however, there is no indication as to what this is

Policy Take away: there will be some form of strategic engagement with state and non state actors in conflict areas

1. Promoting Police- Community relations to build mutual trust and confidence as a proactive strategy for crime prevention and control

Comment: this can be interpreted as a move towards community orientated police by consent rather than policing by force.

SO WHAT: distrust of the police by Nigerians is based solely on the negative experience of predation, corruption, brutality, unlawful detentions, killings, abductions and so on by the police and lack of accountability, dealing with these will go a long way to restoring trust

Policy Take away: civil police relations to be improved 

1. Streamlining the functions and operations of security outfits like the NSCDC, FRSC among others to foster synergy and intelligence sharing and make them more effective

Comment: it is unclear if streamlining means amalgamating agencies or prioritising tasks

SO WHAT: there are multiple overlapping duties and tasks in Nigeria’s security forces so streamlining would be useful

Policy Take away: security forces to be streamlined

INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

Comment: it is unclear what instruments are referred to here

SO WHAT: it is difficult to assess what is meant here

Policy Take away: Nigeria’s foreign policy instruments (whatever they are) to be retooled (whatever that means)

1. Re-activating the Presidential Advisory Council on Foreign Affairs

Comment: a Presidential Advisory Council on Foreign Affairs would provide a collegiate forum to provide strategic guidance to foreign policy professionals

SO WHAT: having a semi autonomous body to assess, analyse and guide foreign policy would be useful especially if made up of competent people with a staff of professional analysts, however it is unclear what this would change in terms of Nigerian policy or in how its implemented

Policy Take away: Nigeria’s Presidential Advisory Council on Foreign Affairs to be reactivated

1. Convening of an All-Nigerian Conference on Foreign Policy to promote national consensus on our national interest to guide foreign policy

Comment: this would be a useful policy, although much will depend on who the invited stakeholders were and what foreign policy direction is set by the government

SO WHAT: elite consensus is one of the crucial elements of a nation successfully implementing grand strategic plans, thus such a conference should aid developing, planning and implementing a coherent foreign policy that sustains despite partisan or domestic differences

Policy Take away: Nigeria’s foreign policy will be formed and guided by elite consensus

• Providing for a smooth and effective running of Nigeria’s diplomatic missions

Comment: Nigeria’s diplomatic missions like most government run facilities are embarrassing and badly run. This aspiration calls for provision to be made for their smooth and effective running. It is unclear what type of provision is to be made? Is it in terms of greater funding, improved training, improved oversight, investment in maintenance etc

SO WHAT: it is difficult to assess what is meant here by providing for the smooth and effective running of diplomatic missions so the take away would be that at least their poor condition has been identified

Policy Take away: unspecified provision will be made for the effective operation of diplomatic missions

• Implement the Diaspora Commission Act 2017

Comment: the Diaspora Commission Act is meant to provide the means to organise the diaspora and utilise their skills and knowledge as well as provide assistance to Nigerians abroad in need

SO WHAT: Nigeria’s diaspora is a greatly under tapped resource that has been ignored and marginalised by successive Nigerian governments. Whilst the Diaspora Commission may be an imperfect tool, correct implementation would allow Nigeria to reap some benefits from its far flung population.

Policy Take away: the Diaspora to be engaged via the Commission

• Strive to attain the level of economic success that should qualify Nigeria to join the group of major decision-makers on the direction of the global economy

Comment: this is an aspiration that is less a function of foreign policy than economic policy

SO WHAT: while this aspiration is difficult to analyse, it does allow one to discuss the case for economic warfare or more delicately exploiting ones dominant economic positions in general or in particular commercial sectors or geographic regions. If one assumes that Nigeria attains sufficient economic success, it can be assumed that it is the intent of this admin to use economic levers to influence global affairs.

Policy Take away: exploit Nigeria’s future economic strength for geopolitical goals

• Promote multilateral trade

Comment: this is an aspiration that is less a function of foreign policy than economic policy

SO WHAT: trade is a fundamental part of all nations foreign policies. Nigeria currently trades with all parts of the globe so its unclear whether this means opening up trade to more countries/ making it easier to trade? Promotion of multilateral trade should always be part of a trading states foreign policies so it’s unclear what this point entails precisely

Policy Take away: multilateral trade will be promoted

• Maximise gains of participating in ECOWAS

Enhance Nigeria’s visibility in the AU

Enhance Nigeria’s international visibility and improving its image

Securing Nigeria’s leadership in world affairs

Comment: I have grouped these items together as without any further detail, they can be summarised as pursuing Nigeria’s foreign policy goals via international organisations

SO WHAT: Nigeria’ withdrawal from not just active but activist participation in ECOWAS and the AU can be seen in the entrance of multiple external actors into various theatres, from Russia, France, jihadi groups, China, Turkey etc all of whom are pursuing their own foreign policies and competing with each other, with Africa, Africans and its resources as the backdrop. Whilst there is limited detail as to what these maximising and enhancing policies entail, one can extrapolate that this policy looks to once again reassert Nigeria as a critical actor within the sub region, continent and globe.

Policy Take away: reclaim Nigeria’s hegemonic position within Africa

• Curb the threat of illicit small arms and light weapons

Comment: the proliferation of small and light arms has increased the spread and lethality of even the smallest and localised of conflicts

SO WHAT: tracking, securing and identifying these weapons is an incredibly difficult, time consuming and expensive task. Addressing the threat would take a combination of diplomacy, intelligence, police work and other tasks

Policy Take away: Nigeria will seek to address the proliferation of small and light arms

• Get Nigerians in the diaspora involved in nation building

I believe this is the same as Item 21

Conclusion:

This was a difficult manifesto to review as it is exceptionally light on details.

Of the 3 sections looked at (National Security, The Law and International Relations) had barely any details. I ignored the Law section eventually as it simply had bullet points about corruption which while important, had no details worth commenting on that had a bearing on defence or security matters and were similarly vague.

If one can stretch to divine a theme, it appears to mainly be police reform, with expansion, retraining and reorientation to improve civil/ police relations

International relations similarly can at best be seen as a series of aspirations seeking to leverage economic success to promote trade and improved international relationships

The passages seem to be written with very little understanding of the nation’s problems. It attempts to break the write up into identifying the problem (Where we are), ways to address them (What we will do), and the desired end (Where we want to be) but the Means to achieve this is overlooked and even the parts covered are simply lines with no actual policy’s just vague aspirations.

The objective of these pieces is to present manifesto policies without being judgemental, but it would be remiss not to say that this is a very poor effort (highlighted by the fact that even the picture accompanying the National Security Section was of the Ghanaian Armed Forces), and one is left with no understanding of how PDP will seek to tackle insecurity. Hopefully more detail and effort would be put into the actual security problems

Nigeria 2023: The Manifestoes (2)- Rabiu Kwankwaso (NNPP)

On 1 November 2022, the Presidential Candidate of the New Nigeria Peoples Party (NNPP) Sen. Rabiu Musa Kwankwaso released his manifesto.

I will review the sections that pertain to national security, interior, justice and foreign policy as I believe these all impact on defence and security.

There are 11 items in total of varying length and detail, I will be copying the relevant passages from the manifesto and review for any obvious policy takeaways.

To be clear, this will not seek to endorse the candidates’ proposals or nor comment on their candidacy, the purpose is to look at the proposed policies and consider their viability

1. Size and Capacity of Security Institutions

We are in an unusually perilous situation. We need to take even more unusually bold actions to save and secure Nigerians. In our arrangement, we shall use the military and the police optimally to ensure that terrorism, banditry, kidnapping-for-ransom, militancy, insurgency, oil theft and bunkering, communal clashes, and all other forms of security breaches that are making our country unsafe are tackled head-on and brought to a permanent stop. Any breach of the peace will be summarily dealt with in accordance with the law of the land and we will secure every square meter of Nigeria’s territory. In this regard,

• The size of the Nigerian Armed Forces will be built to about One million active service men and women. This entails recruiting an addition of about 750 thousand more personnel into the armed forces.

• The size of the Nigerian Police will also be built to about One million active service men and women. This will bring the police to citizen ratio to 1:220 (much better than the UN recommended minimum of 1:450).
• The numbers can easily be obtained from the pool of able-bodied unemployed youth that are roaming our streets in all the 8,809 wards.

• Community Participation and Reorientation Committees (CPRC) will be involved together with the formal government structures in recruiting the police and soldiers to ensure that every person selected is not only known but also of good character in his/her community.

Comment: the comparatively small size of the security forces to its tasks is common knowledge, thus this a logical policy as is increasing the size of the army and police force with an eye to also reducing youth unemployment

SO WHAT: specifying a million personnel in the armed forces (i.e. Army, Navy, Air Force) and police respectively must be measured against the time scale to reach this number, how they will be trained, paid, equipped, housed and most importantly organised and employed

Policy Take away: the armed forces and police force will be expanded

• After the special operation that will bring to an end the menace of terrorism, violent extremism, kidnapping-for-ransom, banditry, farmers/herders clashes, and any such insurgency threats, bulk of the armed forces and the police will then be redeployed to other productive activities such as: engineering works, healthcare works, housing infrastructure works, agriculture services, and such other public interest works.
• We will deploy our forces to peacekeeping missions in West Africa, Africa and across the world whenever the need arises so as to continue contributing our quota towards sub-continental, continental and global peace and security;

Comment: while the nature and duration of the ‘special operation’ is not mentioned, the manifesto correctly identifies the problem of what to do with the massively expanded force when peace is restored

SO WHAT: deploying military personnel to public works can have a certain appeal and utility, however it is an imperfect solution, when this is not their primary role and there is a vast pool of unemployed and qualified people who could already do such jobs. Including the police in this plan is also curious as one of the reasons given for police force expansion was to improve on the police/ citizen ratio.

Deploying forces on peace keeping operations on the other hand is a good plan, that would not only aid in peace and security but ensure troops maintained operational experience.

Policy Take away: the expanded military and police forces will be retasked to public works and peace keeping operations following the end of insecurity

• To strengthen the armed forces and make them all-year functional especially during quiet/peace period,
  • the defense industry will be resuscitated, expanded with government investment and men of the Nigeria armed forces will be engaged in both military and non-military hardware production services.
  •  Direct partnerships with other countries will be built to support the military

Comment: developing a military industry complex will further improve Nigeria’s defence and security sector, however the paragraph seems to indicate that this will be a military operated (or owned) enterprise. While there are benefits to having the direct users involved in the design and production of military equipment, there are also disadvantages such as unqualified people being posted in, lack of innovation due to the hierarchical nature of military culture and so on.

SO WHAT: the quickest way to jump start military industry is through partnerships with existing manufacturers, thus joint ventures would be a good policy and husband resources as majority of the research, development and production issues should already have been dealt with

Policy Take away: defence cooperation to build a military industry complex

• The national security architecture will be made organic, practical, result-oriented, human-centred, integrated into the National Development Plan and measurable. Genuine and symbiotic cooperation amongst all security agencies (inter-agency synergy) will be enforced by our administration and discipline will be ensured.
• We shall reform the reward and recognition system in all our security agencies to ensure that discipline, commitment, honesty, gallantry, innovation and heroism are encouraged,
• The Defence Academy and the Police Academy and all other military and paramilitary training institutions will be reformed to ensure professionalism and specialization at all times
• Separate Inspectorate Departments shall be introduced for the Armed Forces and the Police to supervise all units and commands.
  • We will ensure professional accountability as well as fight against corruption in all its ramifications.
  • We will put in place an efficient feedback mechanism to monitor all activities and progress being made to ensure prudent deployment of resources and optimal performance of personnel and systems, in accordance with the rules of engagement.

Comment: these policies seek to reverse the effect of the security forces prioritising regime security for years over all else and address the corrosive effects this has had on them. Placing an emphasis on training, recognition for achievement will be for morale and aid in developing a meritocratic force.

SO WHAT: security sector reform focussed on personnel, with an emphasis on developing this through reformed training institutes and oversight through independent Inspections

Policy Take away: human focussed security sector reform

2. Security and Socio-economic Wellbeing of Citizens

Insecurities must be tackled together, comprehensively. Guided by the United Nations standard for human security, our plan is anchored around the necessity to ensure that all Nigerians enjoy the freedom to live in dignity, freedom from fear, and freedom from want. For people in crisis and extreme poverty, acting on single issues is not enough.

People must be made to feel safe in all aspects of their lives, have the income and opportunities to attain well-being, and know that their rights and dignity are fully respected. In this regards:

• Our administration will be guided, in all its actions, programmes and policies, by the onerous desire to improve the wellbeing of the citizens,
• Our Economic Revamping Strategy will support wealth creation and redistribution, correcting social dislocations, routing out hopelessness and despondency and creating jobs opportunities
• Our Agriculture Plan will ensure that Nigerians of all social strata conquer hunger and improve their income sources
• Our Education Plan will ensure access and quality as well as the opportunity for self-actualization for all is guaranteed
• Our Energy and Power strategy will ensure that more businesses sprout and more job opportunities are created, and the economy is expanded;
• All these will help in our fight against poverty and injustices thereby complimenting the fight against insecurity

Comment: insecurity has its roots in human insecurity thus using agriculture, the economy, education, energy programmes as tools to combat insecurity would be a good way to address and in some cases pre-empt legitimate grievances. The diversion of fighting age males to useful economic activities reduces the time and incentives for them to be involved in violence or agitation

SO WHAT: properly implemented, development plans should complement internal security operations, however there is little detail as to how these will work together

Policy Take away: development plans will be implemented alongside security operations

3. Sustaining the Peace, Ensuring Unity: Securing The Future

• Bandits and terrorists hideouts (and all ungoverned spaces) like Sambisa and Birnin Gwari forests will be dominated by the government and Integrated Farms and other public interest ventures will be created within and around them and be managed by the security agencies before eventual handover to appropriate owners;
• Similarly professional military border guards, forest guards and coastal guards will be introduced to secure all access points into our country with a view to countering illegal immigration, drugs trafficking, arms smuggling, and cross-border crimes;
  • We shall collaborate with our neighbouring countries and extend every possible support to appraise their security challenges;
  • Support them to overcome the challenges to avoid spill-over effect of crimes etc.
• We will optimize the use of technology and invest heavily in intelligence gathering, intelligence analysis and targeted dissemination and utilization (both inter and intra agency)
• Normally, bandits, terrorists and other men of the underworld operates in areas where the roads are bad, in deep forested areas with little or no presence of government, and in difficult-to-reach areas due to poor infrastructure. Our administration, in addition to military and police operation, shall:
  • Employ consortia of companies, support and empower them to invest in the reconstruction of all federal roads and the construction of new ones and thereafter get them to redeem their investment from toll collections over a fixed period of time,
  • Productively utilize forested areas for agriculture and such other public interest activities,
  • All inaccessible places will be opened up with the provision of roads and rails to be constructed by the military

Comment: using the security forces to set up viable businesses in ungoverned spaces linked by infrastructure projects that improve communications would be a good way to combine security and development. Public private partnerships are a quick way to get the projects off the ground, with financing through tolls easing the pressure on the Federal budget. Dominating the ungoverned land and maritime spaces with special units will be a positive however, there is the risk of once again creating multiple new units with overlapping responsibilities.

SO WHAT: this is a good, joined up policy, using the security forces to create a security bubble as well as economic and infrastructure opportunities. There is of course the risk of the security forces being sucked into commercial activities at the risk of their core mission. While the infrastructure projects could potentially be cost neutral due to the tolls, such projects will always come with a hefty risk premium due to insecurity, the difficult terrain and remoteness. Poor communications has always been overlooked as a driver of insecurity but the inability of peoples in the hinterland to easily transit has reduced their economic and educational opportunities and thus increased their susceptibility to radicalisation or intimidation, while at the same time making it difficult for the security forces to respond or patrol. Intelligence dissemination and utilisation is an area of focus but overcoming interagency rivalries will be difficult.

Policy Take away: joined up approach to security, transport and development in conflict areas

• At the beginning, we will be open to dialog. Any aggrieved group such as the Niger-Delta Agitators, IPOB, Boko Haram, Farmers/Herders, etc. will be listened to. We shall work sincerely towards addressing any genuine claim and resolve any lingering dispute, amicably. This is without prejudice to our administration’s firm decision to go to any length to ensure the safety and security of both life and properties of every citizen of the country.
• We will ensure justice and fairness in everything that our government does. Innocent victims of insecurity at homes, in hospitals, at IDP camps etc. will be catered for by our administration,
• Sociocultural, religious, and ethno-tribal sensibilities and sensitivities will be respected and be used as a source of strength for our country,
• The unity-in-diversity campaign shall be introduced and be used to build a community that is respectful, tolerant and supportive of one another,
• The security of your life and that of your properties shall be inviolable, and government shall go to any length to ensure that,
• We will ensure that the sovereignty and territorial integrity of our country shall be protected,
• Perpetrators of the heinous security breaches, their sponsors, their promoters and their apologies will be pursued and brought to justice
• We are not going to be distracted with the usual blame-games. We are focused and resolute about putting Nigeria back on track,
• Conscious of the fact that nation-building is a tedious, long-term multigenerational endeavour, we are committed to laying solid foundations for deep, far reaching, and sustainable reforms for the New Nigeria project.
• Consistent with the creed on the Nigerian Coat of Arms, we will ensure and assure that Nigeria’s Unity is deepened and sustained, with strong Faith and Peace, in order to guarantee Progress and prosperity

Comment: opening the door to dialogue with all actors is an important step in tackling insecurity. Underlining this with a commitment to equity and fairness as well as impartial application of justice is a good policy. Underpinning this however with the governments red lines prevents incentivising other actors from taking up arms in order to get concessions

SO WHAT: irrespective of their methods, ideological bent or origins, virtually every armed non state actor has a legitimate grievance underpinning it, thus engaging them, identifying common ground and most importantly showing government can be an honest actor could be an important step to reducing their propensity for violence. Balancing this with a robust, proportional counter insurgency approach along with fair prosecution of suspects could create the ideal conditions for the disparate violent groups to splinter, with the more extreme remaining violent, more moderate seeking rapprochement and those tired seeking to surrender to a government now seen as a more honest broker. As the JAS/ ISWAP schism has shown, these break ups can be skilfully exploited to neuter violent groups

Policy Take away: the administration will be open to negotiations

4. Enlistment

To support our Unity Project and build a strong base of loyal and patriotic citizenry, as well as stopping the bad influencers from misdirecting the energy of our youth, we intend to reform the National Youth Service Corp program and use the scheme as a base for enlisting Young Nigerians into the Armed Forces. In our plan,

• The one year mandatory National Service will be modified to include an optional additional one year military training for all interested graduates after their service year;
• At the end of the successful military training, an enlisted cadet will continue with career in the military;

Comment: the NYSC could be a good basis for inducting people into the military, however there are many issues already with the NYSC and introducing military service as an option without reforming other aspects could be problematic as well as making Youth Corpers more of a target than they already are

SO WHAT: the NYSC could be a potential source of recruits into the military however it is unclear what benefit it will be (to the youths or the military) for them to do a year’s NYSC and then start a military career, when they could just join the military directly

Policy Take away: NYSC will be used as a feeder programme into the military

Interior

Our Commitments to You

The situation of Nigeria’s internal security requires major overhaul. The RMK Administration has a clear Agenda that would restore Nigeria’s internal security to the desired level. A detailed proposal is presented in Chapter 4 of this Blueprint. However, to turnaround the fortune of the agencies under the Ministry of the Interior, we plan to:

5.  Nigerian Correctional Service

• Our Administration shall embark on comprehensive upgrade of all the infrastructure and facilities of the Correctional Service to ensure that the inmate are kept in decent and humane conditions,
• A vigorous action shall be taken by the RMK Administration to combat the perennial problem of prison congestion within the first six months:
• We will ensure that all correctional facilities in the country operate within the ambit of the law and in compliance with global best practices
• We will categorize the correctional facilities and ensure that the categorization is complied with
• Ensure that inmates in the facilities undergo real reforms including trainings, skills acquisition, entrepreneurship etc. so that they come out reformed, reskilled and useful to the society
• The Living Wage Policy for Prisoners (LWPP), shall be implemented by the RMK Administration to provide a rehabilitation capital for inmates upon discharge.
• Prisoners shall be made to acquire farming and other artisanal and soft skills while in prison as well as pursuing certifications such as diplomas and degrees –their labour shall no longer be limited to producing food for inmates, Warders and Prison Controllers, but shall be a source of savings for them, to be used after the jail sentence;
• Bearing in mind the recent cases of jail breaks, our administration will provide security fortification in and around all correctional service facilities in the country.

Comment: oft overlooked in Nigeria’s security sector is the dire state of the country’s prisons and the role they play in virtually every insurgency as a source of recruits but also as a place where imprisoned insurgents can recruit and radicalize people. Many of the policies espoused here are extremely generous even for developed countries and could contribute to reducing reoffending. Looking to increase the welfare of Correctional Staff should also improve the prison experience, attract better quality staff and make it more functional

SO WHAT: these policies reinforce the human centred principles referred to earlier and could be a good tool in combatting insecurity. By reforming prisons, reducing overcrowding and providing a pathway for convicts to develop new skills, earn an income and so on, there should a reduction in reoffending. A decrease in prison population would automatically lead to an improvement in prisoners’ conditions and reduce the likelihood of prison breaks as the population will be easier to control alongside the stated fortifications and improvements in facilities up to global standards

Policy Take away: reform the Correctional sector

6. Nigeria immigration Service, NIS

• With a land border of over 4,000km and a coastline of over 850km, migration management challenges occasioned by cross-border activities and crimes will obviously overwhelm the NIS, especially given the fact that the Service is grossly understaffed and still uses obsolete equipment. To overcome this, the RMK administration:
• Will ensure that the NIS works in collaboration with the new border force and coastal guard units of the Armed Forces to provide effective and efficient protection and surveillance of our borders and coastlines;
• Will pursue the completion of the International Security Framework on trans-border crimes with all our neighbouring countries;
• Will enforce the coordination and sharing of information within the Nigerian Security and Intelligence Community on international migration and cross-border crimes;
• Will monitor and ensure the successful completion and utilization of the result of the MoNIS (Modernizing Nigeria’s Immigration Service workforce) project;
• Ensure the deployment of modern tools and equipment as well as utilization of information and communication technology to improve efficiency and performance

Comment: the manifesto proposes a new Border Force and Coast Guard (will this be a reformed NIMASA or in addition to NIMASA?) and proposes modernisation, international cooperation and military cooperation for surveillance of the border.

SO WHAT: Nigeria’s insecure borders do require a fresh approach but increasing Nigeria’s security forces to include a Border Force (Along with NIS and Customs) as well as a Coast Guard, increase the multiplicity of forces Nigeria already has.

Policy Take away: there will be a new Border Force and Coast Guard and a modernised NIS

7. Federal Road Safety Commission

• We will reform the Corps and transform it into an efficient and effective commission for preventing and minimising accidents on the highways as well as educating drivers and all road users in the country;
• We will strengthen the commission through training and high-tech equipment provisioning to make it discharge all its responsibilities as stipulated in its establishment act
• Comment: there is very little to comment on here as there are no actual policies but identifying road safety as important and reducing accidents through education and accident prevention is a positive aspiration
• SO WHAT: Road safety as a form of human security makes its inclusion a good indicator of intent
• Policy Take away: FRSC to be improved

8. Nigerian Security & Civil Defense Corps

• Given the importance of the NSCDC, RMK administration shall ensure its comprehensive reform to reposition the Corps into a modern agency with all the wherewithal to meet all its obligations and responsibilities.
• Ensure that all technology is deployed by the Corps to monitor and protect all government facilities and installations.

Comment: NSCDC is a key component of Nigeria’s infrastructure, however very little detail has been given to its reform or utility

SO WHAT: there is a lack of detail as to what the reforms will entail beyond ‘deploying technology’

Policy Take away: NSCDC to be improved

9. Niger-Delta

I. To achieve social stability & accelerate the socio-economic development of the Niger Delta Region, we shall engage in:

• Focused reduction in poverty level in the region
• Focused reduction in social tensions and violence in the region
• Focused reduction in unemployment in the region
• Ensure social justice, equity and the respect of rule of law in the sharing of federally collected revenues.
• Continuous registration and coordination of all persons severely affected by oil production activities
• Job placement of all persons affected by oil production activities
• Increase the contribution of the private sector to the region’s economic growth and development

II. Sustaining the stability derived from the Amnesty Program Government will Coordinate and ensure that the corporate social responsibility of IOC’s continue to benefit the communities adversely affected by the oil and gas exploration activities while at the same time ensuring the full and expeditious implementation of the provision of the Petroleum Industry Act (PIA)

We shall create a database for all persons dislodged by oil production activities in the region as well as all the youth that have been trained under the Amnesty Program.

III. To protect and conserve the environment to ensure environmental best practices in the utilization of oil and gas resources in the area

• Matching economic goals with environmental conditions
• Review and enforce all environmental laws

IV. Reposition Niger Delta Development Commission, NDDC

As a former member of the NDDC, RMK has a first-hand knowledge of the operations, responsibilities as well as the challenges of the Commission. Our administration shall cause a comprehensive reform of the Commission and ensure that the staff, management and the Board of the Commission are aligned in the pursuit of the NDDC’s mandates as enunciated in the NDDC Act.

Comment: the manifestos Niger Delta policy can be summarised as stability through economic measures, ensuring that oil companies work with local communities, protect the environment and review (or reform) the Niger Delta Development Commission (NDDC)

SO WHAT: it is unclear what specifically will be done differently as these seem to be more aspirations than actual policies

Policy Take away: NDDC may be reformed, focus on Niger Deltas economy and environment

10. Nigeria and Global Governance: Foreign Relations

Our Administration has a clear agenda on foreign affairs and international relations:

• We shall make Nigeria’s foreign policy centred on security, governance, technology transfer, and economic diplomacy;
• We shall undertake a virile rehabilitation of the hard and soft infrastructure of the Nigerian Embassies and Missions spread across the globe;
• There shall be serious efforts to repatriate all funds stolen away from Nigeria – all relevant treaties and legal frameworks shall be put in place within the first six months of inception of the new Administration;
• The Government of NNPP shall be swift to improve the image of Nigerians across the globe – our youths shall be equipped to approach life with more seriousness through imbibing value-adding qualities and competences that would make them models for others.
• We shall improve our ability to participate in global governance by rebuilding our capacity and repositioning ourselves to play leadership role at sub-continental and continental levels.
• Our Administration shall maximize relations within the Region of West Africa, Africa, and the United Nations. We shall strengthen our relation with the member-states of the UNSC (China, France, Russia, UK, and USA) as well as with Germany, Japan, India, Indonesia, Saudi Arabia, Turkeye, Australia, and Brazil. Specifically,
• The Nigeria–West Africa partnership in economy, security cooperation and free trade will be enhanced
• Nigeria–African Union cooperation will be strengthened
• Nigeria–EU: we shall rebuild innovative, reinvigorated and interconnected mutual relations with the EU and EU member-states.
• A partnership on mutual trust, inclusiveness and cooperation with the GCC member states, Middle-East and Asia will be enhanced.
• Nigeria–BRICS relation will be built around cooperation in technology acquisition and transfer, trade & investment, as well as education and training.
• The NNPP Administration shall carefully conduct technical exposure analysis of all such MoUs and Agreements to ensure that they are indeed, beneficial to Nigeria, prior execution. Our Administration shall track and monitor the MoUs or Agreements to assess their relevance, on a continuous basis.
• As one of our foreign policy objectives, our Administration shall pursue the lingering issue of reforming the United Nation Security Council with a view to expanding its permanent membership to include Nigeria.

Comment: the manifesto sets out several clear foreign policy goals and directions. Of note is the focus on security, governance, technology transfer, and economic diplomatic efforts with West Africa, the UNSC member countries, BRICS, the EU as well as other developing and developed countries. UNSC reform and Nigerian membership is also mentioned. These strategic goals are buttressed by a desire to restore Nigeria’s image and recover stolen funds

SO WHAT: the manifesto identifies diplomatic priorities and the nations/ blocs it best believes serve Nigeria’s interests. Interestingly none of the P5 are mentioned beyond as members of the UNSC. Considering Nigeria’s relationships with each of these states it is to be asked whether future relationships will be mainly through the prism of their UNSC membership or in addition to that? Free trade within West Africa as well as security cooperation are mentioned but not in the context of ECOWAS. AU cooperation to be strengthened but how and in what spheres is not specified. Looking at MoUs closely and providing a mechanism for monitoring performance would be an interesting position.

Policy Take away: renewed diplomatic focus via international organisations

11. Promote the Rule of Law & the Rule of Virtue

Upholding the rule of law

• First, the supremacy of the constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria will be upheld. In the same vein, we shall pursue a speedy amendment of the Constitution to accommodate all critical issues of national importance;
• Noting that citizens are the primary actors in advancing the rule of law, we will integrate: representing the people’s interests; reflecting their wishes and aspirations; protecting their rights; and improving their wellbeing, into the entire process of our law-based governance;
• We will uphold the principle that all are equal before the law. And ensure that all organizations and individuals respect the authority of the Constitution and law; and exercise powers, enjoy rights, perform duties, and fulfil obligations in accordance with the Constitution and law. Whoever violates the Constitution or law must face punishment. Under no circumstances can any individual, under any pretext or in any way, be allowed to arbitrarily override the law, place their power above the authority of the law, or bend the law for their personal gain;
• We will integrate the rule of law with the rule of virtue. Laws are ethics that have been codified, while ethics are laws that we follow in our heart. Both function to regulate social behaviour and maintain social order. In running our country, we will lay emphasis on both – ensuring that both the role of the law in regulating behaviour and the role of ethics in shaping the mind complement one another. In essence we will ensure that law and virtue promote and enhance each other;
• In our efforts to advance and enforce the rule of law, we will base all our reforms on the prevailing conditions in our country and in line with our determination to build a New Nigeria. In this regard, we can neither afford to disregard the prevailing conditions in our country nor can we simply stick to old ways and guard old conventions. In essence we will lay emphasis on what is practical, what is contemporary, and what is inherently Nigerian;
• We will ensure that the Rule of Law becomes the compass of all actions of government, individuals, organizations, firms and institutions in Nigeria and/or in any dealings with Nigeria.

Judicial System Reform

For the NNPP, judicial justice concerns the citizens’ immediate interests, fairness and justice, as well as the implementation of the rule of law. We shall address the major problems and key issues that are affecting the judiciary and restricting judicial capacity and making reforms pertinent and effective. First step is to work in sync with all the arms of government to ensure that:

• We reform the judiciary for the citizens, through the citizens, and to the benefit of the citizens as well as ensuring the protection of the independence of the judiciary;
• The credibility of the judiciary is improved by minimizing the factors that led to the present state of the judiciary. Such factors include: perceived miscarriages of justice, perceived unjust and misjudged cases, alleged judicial corruption, and cases allegedly manipulated by money, power, and personal favours etc.;
• We develop and improve the judicial system to ensure fairness and justice in all cases for all citizens in all courtrooms and at every level;
• Special attention is paid to judicial accountability. All judges and prosecutors must work in courts and take lifelong responsibility for all the cases they handle.

Additionally, our Administration shall ensure that:

• The Office of the Attorney General of the Federation is decoupled from that of the Federal Minister of Justice;
• Corruption is prevented and where it occurs, shall be fought with absolute neutrality and unfettered disclosure.

Comment: again, the importance of the topic to the manifesto authors can be evinced by the length of the submission however very few actual policies can be gleaned from it. The stated aspiration is to make the judiciary revolve around the citizen, which is laudable. Specific policies seem to be separating the Attorney General of the Federation (AGF) from being the Minister of Justice, which is a good policy, allowing the AGF to be impartial and thus increasing trust in the judicial system.

SO WHAT: the submission follows the trend of the manifesto in having a human centred approach. How exactly this will manifest is unclear. The AGF no longer being a Minister should hopefully open the door to having qualified, apolitical Attorney Generals who defend the law and constitution even if its to the detriment of the ruling party

Policy Take away: the AGF will be longer be the Minister for Justice

Conclusion:

This was a difficult manifesto to review as it is exceptionally verbose with many aspirations and principles but with few actual policies and where there are, it used many passages to describe fairly straightforward policy proposals.

It is instructive that one of the longest and more detailed passages reviewed was on prison reform, a topic much ignored and overlooked. Not only is the state of prisons a serious blight on the country but a security threat as prison breaks are a major feature of almost every insurgency in the country.

However, what this manifesto does have is a unifying narrative that flows in the desire to place the Nigerian citizen at the centre of all policy decisions.

This is a positive ideal and one which if properly implemented should help guide the many (many) aspirations in the manifesto

Nigeria 2023- The Manifestoes- All Progressives Congress (APC)

On 21 October 2022, the Presidential Candidate of the All Progressives Congress (APC) released his manifesto.

I will review the sections that pertain to national security, justice and foreign policy as I believe these all impact on defence and security.

There are 20 items in total of varying length and detail, I will be copying the relevant passages from the manifesto and review for any obvious policy takeaways.

To be clear, this will not seek to endorse the candidates’ proposals or nor comment on their candidacy, the purpose is to look at the proposed policies and consider their viability

Security

1. Bolster Our Security Forces: Our administration will accelerate the reforms commenced under the present administration in building a more robust, re-energised armed forces. As such, we shall recruit, train and better equip additional military, police, paramilitary and intelligence personnel.

Comment: the need for security sector reform is correctly identified as well as the need to recruit more security personnel.

SO WHAT: the lack of manpower for the security forces is a fairly obvious problem, with a fairly obvious solution that has long been identified. Some of the legitimate questions that surround this such as the increased capital costs of recruiting, training and equipping new service members as well as operational cost of salaries, feeding, accommodation and legacy costs such as pensions are not mentioned.

Policy Take away: it is proposed that security force numbers will be increased

• Redefine Military Doctrine and Practice
• Anti-Terrorist Battalions: highly trained and disciplined anti-terrorist battalions (ABATTS) with special forces units will be created. Their objective shall be to seize the strategic and tactical initiative, giving terrorists, kidnappers and bandits no respite.

Comment: It is unclear what this actually refers to. Is the proposal to create these ABATTS in the Army or Police? If so how will they fit into the existing orbats? The paragraph states special forces units will be created in the ABATTS so these units will not be Special Forces? Will they then be Specialist Forces, Specialised Forces or Special Operations Forces?

SO WHAT: there is definitely a role for specialist units within the police or military to tackle bandits and insurgents, however a plethora of ‘Special Forces’ have been created over the past 10 years with limited improvement to the operational or strategic situation. Without a coherent strategy Special or Specialists units are wasted

Policy Take away: more Special Forces to be created

• Upgrade Tactical Communications and Transportation: Military units will be better equipped with tactical communications gear and new vehicles to give them a greater communications and mobility advantage over criminals, bandits and terrorists.

Comment: this is again a properly identified problem that affects the Nigerian security forces, poor communications and mobility.

SO WHAT: the paragraph mentions tactical communications and new vehicles. Nigeria has already spent billions of dollars on a wide variety of new vehicles from MBTs to MRAPS to motorcycles. It is unclear as to whether this mean the new vehicles are going to be bought to replace them or to supplement them?

Policy Take away: more defence procurement

• Upgrade Weapons Systems: We will further modernise our Armed Forces by ensuring that our weapons systems (land, sea and air) are capable of addressing current and anticipated security threats in the modern world. This shall also mean the recruitment of people who possess the technical skills required for today’s military. We shall reduce our dependence on imported foreign military equipment by ramping up domestic production of basic and essential military hardware and equipment, including small arms and ammunition.

Comment: while ‘modernising military equipment’ can be left open to interpretation, and questions can be asked as to whether weapons systems as opposed to support systems, infrastructure, maintenance etc are a higher priority, domesticating military industry would be a useful policy. Recruiting people with the right technical skills is again an open ended statement, that could mean having a specific recruitment stream or campaign for certain skills or changing standards for selection and training to favour people with certain skills. What skills are being referred to? Cyber, engineering, medicine, UAV operations? Is the Nigerian military struggling to find suitably qualified people?

SO WHAT: Creating (or expanding) the military industrial sector, will be a benefit to Nigeria despite the extremely high entry costs to such industries in general and the high costs of manufacturing in Nigeria in particular.

Policy Take away: more defence procurement

• Exploit Aerial and Technological Superiority: We shall focus our efforts on taking greater advantage of our aerial superiority to both deter as well as swiftly respond to attacks by terrorists, kidnappers and bandits.

Comment: air power is definitely a force multiplier. Air power gives forces the power to move, strike, find, pursue adversaries. However possessing aerial and technical superiority do not guarantee success as guerrilla armies from Algeria, Vietnam, Afghanistan (Mujahadeen but even more so the Taliban) have demonstrated. The paragraph is sufficiently ambiguous to not clarify whether the focus will be on quality or quantity

SO WHAT: Nigeria already has many manned and unmanned platforms to perform these functions. The issue being how they are used, do we have the right types in the right functions? The key issue is a need for a change in doctrine, procedure and training, which will lead to a change in tactics and better operational effect

Policy Take away: it is unclear what policy will emanate from this, maybe more defence procurement

• Improve Salaries and Welfare: We will address the welfare concerns of frontline military and security personnel. Improved special individual and family allowances, better compensation and guaranteed medical care for those injured in the line of duty will be provided. A special program providing housing, scholarships, stipends, and health insurance for the families of our fallen heroes will be created.

Comment: another perennial problem identified, as military housing, salaries, treatment of the fallen is beyond woeful in Nigeria. However there are already many policies, pronouncements and committees already looking into military welfare

SO WHAT: the treatment of serving soldiers is shockingly poor, the treatment of retired soldier and the families of the deceased is an utter disgrace and it is beyond shameful that this has persisted during the administration of a former General. The proposals here would go along way to righting that wrong. However improving the terms, conditions, welfare, housing and compensation for service personnel without reforming the system that steals and predates of them, will simply lead to more of the same

Policy Take away: improved terms and conditions for service personnel and compensation for the fallen

• Win Hearts and Minds: Using targeted economic assistance programs and in close collaboration with State Governments, we will expand emergency and economic support offered to local communities distressed by terrorist and other violent groups. Strengthening the civilian assistance and outreach arm of our armed forces, the military will be integrated into these assistance programs:
  • Rehabilitation of the Lake Chad Basin ecosystem and other subnational economic systems affected by violent groups.
  • Accelerate the environmental clean-up and re-establishment of fisheries and other profitable aquacultural activities in the Niger-Delta region.

Restoring economic hope and vitality to these regions while at the same time creating a more active and present military/law enforcement deterrent to violent disorder, will drastically reduce the number of disaffected youths who join these extreme groups out of the despair and alienation that poverty can bring. By defeating poverty, we go far in defeating all forms of extremist ideology.

Comment: this is a good policy. Using soft power and economic development will go a long way to tackling many of the root causes of insecurity in Nigeria. The policy only specifies the Lake Chad Basin and Niger Delta, however exactly the same applies in the Middle Belt, North West, South East and South West

SO WHAT: a well structured targeted programme that targets some of the root causes of insurgency such as poverty, unemployment and environmental degradation will drain the pool of recruits for insurgents and provide a viable alternative to using violence as a for of employment. However improperly implemented like the numerous Niger Delta amnesties, bandit amnesties and Ogoni clean up will lead to more financial loss to the country and greater disenchantment and incentive to violence. Even if comparatively well managed but poorly communicated like Operation Safe Corridor, there could be unforeseen consequences. Another possible issue is that militarising these programmes takes away the agency and responsibility from the State and Local Governments who are meant to be delivering development, it is also unclear what the military will bring to Lake Chad rehabilitation or Niger Delta clean up, beyond possibly logistics or planning

Policy Take away: use of development and economic support as a security tool

• Secure Critical National Infrastructure

Attacks on vital national infrastructure and installations have serious implications for our economy and the overall public welfare. Our government will implement measures to eliminate attacks on vital national infrastructure. This will be known as our (Critical Infrastructure Protection) CIP Plan. Integral to this effort shall be the deployment of modern technologies, tools and equipment to end crude oil theft, prevent vandalization of national assets, and reduce, to the barest minimum, environmental pollution of the Niger Delta. We shall combine increased aerial surveillance over land and sea with other cutting edge technology that will provide instant notification of intrusions or disruptions of oil pipelines and related installations. Such technology will also be deployed to monitor power stations, transmission and distribution networks, sea and airports, rail transportation, telecommunications and other vital infrastructure.

Comment: a lot of money has been expended on purchasing sea, air and land platforms to protect oil infrastructure, contracts have been given to ex militants, yet theft of crude oil and illegal refineries proliferate, some even with urban areas. In a country such as Nigeria with vast landmass, poor power supply, relatively poor mobile phone coverage in rural areas it is unclear what technical solutions will be proposed that are effective and value for money in terms of protecting power lines, pipelines, dams, roads, bridges, railways, mobile phone masts, fibre optic cables, power stations etc. Just as relevant is that even if ‘technology’ is successfully used to monitor CNI, responding to threats and attacks requires an investment in people and a willingness to conduct thorough investigations prosecuting anyone caught vandalising CNI as well as their customers, middlemen and anyone providing support or protection

SO WHAT: technology is only useful when it is in a system that it can be properly utilised. Technology can be used to provide timely warning of faults or attempts to interfere with systems, however it then needs people to be able to respond to the alert in a timely manner, with the right skills and equipment to resolve the issue, be it criminal or technical. That is not an issue of technology but having trained manpower with the resources to respond. Likewise if this technology is not used to gather evidence to support prosecutions of everyone in the CNI vandalization chain, from the most junior to the most senior it is an exercise in futility.

Policy Take away: more defence procurement

• Peaceful Communities, Secure Borders, Safe Forests:
• Communities: Our government will work in close collaboration with State Governments and the National Assembly, to enact measures necessary to secure and protect communities from criminal violence, particularly kidnapping and terrorism. These measures will be flexible and adaptive in order to fit local realities and challenges. Some instances may call for establishment or enhancement of civilian neighbourhood watch groups. Others may require the establishment of more formal locally-based law enforcement institutions.

Comment: this statement appears to hint at the oft called State police without committing itself to anything in particular

SO WHAT: the law and constitution definitely require reform to ensure our security forces are fit for purpose, however this statement is so vague and unambiguous it is not clear what the desired end state is here

Policy Take away: maybe more state police, maybe more committees to talk about state police. It is unclear

• Borders: Customs and Immigration Services ability to patrol and monitor our borders will be strengthened. This includes the use of aerial and ground-based technology mechanisms as well as more mobile patrol units.

Comment: securing the borders is an important element of Nigeria’s security problems.

SO WHAT: Isolating Nigeria’s transnational criminal gangs and cutting cross border smuggling and transit routes would be effective in draining the criminal networks of funds, weapons and money. Again the devil is in the detail, but a combination of mobile patrols supported by ground and air based sensors are a positive solution

Policy Take away: better equipment (and reorganised) Customs and Immigration

• Forest Regions: To prevent violent groups from using our forests and other public lands as hideouts, we shall revitalise Ranger or Forest Guard force, giving it the core mandate to monitor, identify, and track the use of our forests by any violent or criminal groups.

Comment: the lack of policing of the forests and rural spaces of Nigeria is a huge gap in the security architecture, thus this is a good idea

SO WHAT: the creation of a Forest Guard Force would not only provide oversight of this difficult terrain but provide local employment and government structures in isolated places. However it must be noted that these spaces are currently highly contested by heavily armed non state actors thus any force going in needs to be equally well armed and trained or to deploy under a security bubble provided by the military

Policy Take away: a Forest Guard service will be formed to regain government control of the forests

• Integrated Identity Database In line with global best practice, our administration will sustain the current efforts on integration of all existing data and expand the database and other such assets as useful tools for security and safety of citizens.

Comment: this would be a valuable crime fighting tool, done properly would reduce costs and address the absurdity of registering biometrically (and paying) for NIN, BVN. Passports, phones etc.

SO WHAT: With a single integrated ID, citizens could access all services without having to pay and register multiple times. Such a database if available to the security forces also creates a useful tool for identifying suspects

Policy Take away: Identification cards to be integrated into a national identity database

• International Collaboration

Our government will prioritise collaborations with key neighbouring countries, international partners, and allies to ensure the safety of Nigerians. We will continue to empower and, where necessary, seek to expand the operations of the Multinational Joint Task Force.

Comment: combatting transnational crime and armed groups will require cooperation with foreign nations. The lack of Nigerian leadership and urgency has hampered efforts significantly

SO WHAT: foreign partnerships will be key to securing Nigeria, not just on the borderlands but in the sub region and the continent. However international collaboration cannot take place in the absence of coherent foreign policy objectives and a competent foreign service (more on this below)

Policy Take away: increased focus on international security collaboration

• Reposition The Police

We shall boost the public confidence in the Nigeria Police Force and other internal security agencies by increasing recruitment and providing high-tech, non-lethal equipment with corresponding manpower development schemes. Police reform will be focused on positioning the institution to better deliver on its primary duties of community policing and maintaining law and order through crime fighting and prevention. Police personnel will be freed from extraneous duties such as VIP security and guard duties. VIP Security and provision of security for government buildings, installations and other critical assets will be transferred to The Nigeria Security and Civil Defence Corps (NSCDC). The NSCDC shall be evaluated and reformed to be better integrated with our internal security apparatus.

Comment: this is another perennial promise by Nigerian politicians along with orders by successive IGPs removing policemen from private guard duties. However, increasing the number of policemen by reducing their duties and recruiting more, with a focus on training (manpower development?) and non lethal equipment would be a good policy. Passing VIP guard duties to the NSCDC simply passes the problem of misusing law enforcement officers to another force.

SO WHAT: police reform is long overdue in Nigeria, recruitment, training and focus on preservation of lives would contribute to that. These are fairly anodyne and obvious solutions but do not address the toxic police culture in which police officers are money making units for their senior officers and the ‘policing by force’ style of policing. Passing some security tasks to the NSCDC could help streamline and focus police tasks, however protection of VIP should not be a matter for the State

Policy Take away: expanded police and civil defence and more security procurement

Judiciary

• Structural Review of the Judiciary

Working with the National Judicial Council, State Governments and stakeholders within the judiciary and the legal profession, a Tinubu administration will establish a committee to review and make recommendations on reforming the structure of our judicial system to better position our courts to function more efficiently and virtuously as the third co-equal arm of government.

Comment: many of the issues of the Nigerian judicial system are self evident, however understanding a problem is the key to solving it. Nigeria does not have a good track record of implementing policy recommendations, so without more concrete goals this could either be the beginning of true judicial reform or a way to kick it into the long grass

SO WHAT: a generous interpretation of this policy would be that there will be an effort to understand the problems of the judicial system in order to reform it. The statement is sufficiently ambiguous to cover root and branch reform and a no change.

Policy Take away:  there will be a committee on judicial reform

• Legislative Review

A fundamental challenge of our current legal system is the continued existence of antiquated or ill-fitting laws and regulations. A Tinubu administration will review and make recommendations to the legislature with a view to amend / repeal outdated laws to be replaced with new laws and regulations, more suitable for 21st century Nigeria

Comment: Nigeria has many outdated and contradictory laws so a judicial review is a positive step

SO WHAT: Nigeria’s contradictory laws exist because they benefit certain special interests, legislators are too lazy to craft laws competently or the government and legislature is not agile enough to respond to changing events. What this means is that while the policy could be good, expectations must be balanced against the reality of vested interests in the status quo, meaning that the criteria by which laws are considered antiquated or ill-fitting laws must be clear, and the laws proposed to replace them must be reviewed carefully before implementation

Policy Take away:there will be a committee on legislative reform

• Judicial Discipline

We shall encourage the judiciary and legal sector to strengthen their disciplinary and integrity monitoring mechanisms such that corrupt and incompetent judicial officials and legal practitioners are identified and adequately disciplined. The mandate and composition of the National Judicial Council (NJC) will be reviewed to make it tougher and more effective in dealing with corruption, malpractice and incompetence in the administration of justice. The scope of the NJC’s mandate will be limited to Federal Courts.

Comment: a curious entry. Encouraging the legal sector and judiciary seems slightly less robust than ensuring there are stiff sanctions for corruption, legal malpractice or malfeasance in public office. Restricting the NJCs mandate to Federal Courts appears (to a layman) to be a license to State Governors to interfere (more than they already do) in the State Judiciary

SO WHAT: this seems like an extremely weak policy, that gives more power to State Governors to interfere with their Judiciaries yet does nothing to actually tackle corruption and malpractice beyond ‘encouragement’

Policy Take away: State Judicial Councils will be created while the NJC will be weakened

• Decongest and Digitalise Trial Courts

We will decongest courts, improving access to speedy and effective justice by implementing the following changes:

Increase the number of trial courts at the federal level and appoint enough judges to staff them. More courts mean faster resolution of disputes. We will also create administrative and financial incentives for States with congested courts to do the same. Create specialised federal courts staffed with well-trained judges. These courts will be focused on niche areas of law and will encourage specialisation among judges. Allocate funds for digitisation of court processes. This will ensure that cases are handled more efficiently by trial courts while also contributing to greater speed and efficiency of the process of appeal. Jurists will be rewarded or disciplined based on their ability to hear and adjudicate matters fairly and effectively. Those judges with histories of excessive delays, improperly or carelessly granting ex parte injunctions and other questionable practices will not be promoted and will be liable for sanction. Lawyers who engage in such practices will face the professional disciplinary process and sanctions as well.

Comment: these are fairly straight forward solutions to common problems in the Nigerian judiciary, increasing the number of courts, judges and simplifying the process at Federal and State should go a long way to improving access to justice in Nigeria

SO WHAT: these would be unarguably good policies in Nigeria

Policy Take away: investment in expanding courts and judiciary at State and Federal level

Foreign policy

• Active diplomacy to end conflict in sub-Saharan Africa, especially the West African sub-region.

Comment: Nigeria has long since abandoned its hegemonic role in West Africa, thus an attempt to resume that position will be welcomed both in Nigeria, West Africa and abroad.

SO WHAT: it is unclear what diplomatic, economic or even military tools Nigeria has to undertake this role. There is little soft power left for Nigeria to deploy and our hard power is tied up in our internal conflicts however the key issue is a lack of political will, thus an active President and/ or Foreign Minister willing to travel round the continent charm, cajole and engage the political, military, economic and cultural class of the continent  could kick start this.

Policy Take away: renewed regional diplomatic effort

• Within the subregion, strengthen the diplomatic and military cooperation in the fight against transnational terrorism. We shall do this by institutionalising more frequent meetings of foreign affairs and defence ministers in the sub-region. Our objective will be to deter cross-border movement of terrorists and to establish measures to keep non-African terrorist organisations out of the West African community.

Comment: Increased diplomatic and military cooperation would be an important tool in tackling transnational crimes and insurgencies

SO WHAT: increased meetings between ministers is of course useful, however the creation and implementation of useful policies requires a dedicated or at least attentive policy eco system, to not only understand and analyse problems but equally implement the solutions that can be ratified by meetings of Foreign and Defence ministers.

Policy Take away: renewed regional diplomatic effort

• Within ECOWAS, work to increase internal sub-regional trade, promote joint industrialisation and joint infrastructural projects.

Comment: improved sub regional trade and combined infrastructural projects would work economically and politically, if correctly financed and executed

SO WHAT: identifying projects that work to improve trade and other connections is a useful tool of soft power and the dividends of improved prosperity are a security benefit

Policy Take away: renewed regional diplomatic effort

• Lead Africa in seeking reforms in the World Trade Organisation and international financial institutions and in our bilateral relationships with the leading economic nations that will promote and protect African industrialisation and obtain fairer deals for our current exports.

Comment: having common African policies and positions in global trade and economic forum would be a good way to ensure a better deal for African countries

SO WHAT: there is a reason trade deals take so long to agree. Bilateral as well as multilateral. Agreeing a common policy or reforms to international institutions by a group of country, some led by people who neither care nor understand international trade, others by extractive resource producers, others service or agriculture based economies will be long and difficult and would need to be based very much on low hanging common denominators.

Policy Take away: renewed continental diplomacy

• Become a voice advocating for a more attentive international policy regarding climate change and how it affects Africa. We need to lend our weight to this important issue so that Africa and Nigeria are not asked to pay a heavy cost for the environmental damage caused by nations on other continents.

Comment: climate change is extremely topical, however Nigeria suffers not just from the effects of climate change but a wide plethora of ecological and environmental disasters, many of which can be solved without recourse to asking other countries for money.

SO WHAT: it is unclear what this policy is advocating beyond advocacy and seeking funds

Policy Take away: Nigeria will ask the west for money to fight climate change

• Improve Nigeria’s international image and improve the consular services provided to Nigerians by our Embassies abroad.

Comment: this can not fail to be a popular policy as the abysmal state of Nigeria diplomatic facilities and the diplomats they contain is a constant embarrassment to all Nigerians.

SO WHAT: acknowledging the woeful state of Nigerian diplomatic facilities is different from improving diplomatic services. As with much in Nigeria, the poor condition of diplomatic facilities and poor behaviour of Nigeria diplomats is a reflection on the Nigerian governments. Thus, while improving facilities will be a positive, the problems Nigerian face at their embassies and high commissions will persist until there is a change in the culture of the Foreign Ministry

Policy Take away:  there may be added investment in Nigeria’s diplomatic facilities

1. Forge a continent-wide cooperative effort to rid Africa of malaria, that ever present scourge to health, economic development, and labour productivity. We will encourage much more collaboration on research into new ways to prevent and treat malaria as well as tackle other tropical and contagious diseases.

Comment: malaria is one of the biggest killers in Africa, thus Nigerian leadership in such research would be welcomed and a good example of soft power

SO WHAT: undertaking research into a problem affecting many Africans will have many benefits from the geopolitical to the scientific

Policy Take away: research into malaria eradication

• Enhance Nigeria’s political leadership on the continent by establishing a G-5 among major African nations in order to develop common positions on issues of continental and global importance. Promote better inter-agency coordination in foreign policy. A Department for Strategic Policy shall be established within the Foreign Ministry to improve the formulation, monitoring and implementation of foreign policy.

Comment: again, re-establishing Nigerian soft power by once more reasserting its leadership role in Africa is good. Questions may be asked as to which countries will constitute this G-5, why they would join or accept Nigerian leadership or if the Foreign Ministry has the intellectual bandwidth to promote such an aspiration

SO WHAT:  inter African cooperation has been sorely lacking and such an initiative could help jump start

Policy Take away:  a new department on inter African cooperation in the Ministry for Foreign Affairs

• Identify and address knowledge and data gaps as well as limitations to the registration of ) Nigerians abroad. We will improve the government’s quantitative and qualitative knowledge of our Diaspora through more regular and vigorous public engagement with our diaspora communities supported by our diplomatic missions and international agencies. We shall also work with the National Assembly to explore the amendment of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria to allow greater Diaspora representation and participation in all aspects of the democratic process.

Comment: collecting accurate data on Nigerians in the diaspora would be extremely useful tool of engagement with Nigeria’s vast diaspora

SO WHAT: the Nigerian diaspora are an underused resource. I would posit a more important resource than oil to Nigeria, thus any efforts to engage them would be useful, however Nigeria politicians are not fans of the diaspora and would not seek to bring them into Nigerian politics in a meaningful way

Policy Take away:  a committee on counting Nigerians in the diaspora and maybe, possibly allowing them to vote

Conclusion

The manifesto does a good job of correctly identifying many problems in Nigeria’s security sector, judiciary and foreign policy and identifies several solutions but none of the solutions are particularly innovative or dramatic but most are workable.

The two key issues with this manifesto are its shallowness and a lack of a unifying narrative. It touches each problem very much in general. Any details (such as ABATTs) raise even more questions.

If this was meant to be a high level grand strategic view, it lacked the unifying narrative that would have tied together all the elements of a National Security Strategy and/ or a Policing/ Justice Strategy or Foreign Policy objectives.

This incoherence can be found in the preamble to the Foreign Policy Chapter which states the administrations foreign policy objectives are to: “(i) protect against all forms of external aggression; (ii) promote the best possible outcomes for Nigeria in all engagements with other nations; and (iii) improve Nigeria’s standing and dignity among the comity of Nations.”. it could be argued that these are not goals specific to Nigeria and do not in any way define Nigeria’s unique role in West Africa, Africa or the role and outsize influence of its economy, people and culture. They are statements that could apply to any country from Liechtenstein to China

Another example is from the National Security chapter in which the paragraph: ‘Redefine Military Doctrine and Practice’, in which of the 6 proposals there are only two which vaguely touch on doctrine and practice (Exploit Aerial and Technological Superiority and Win Hearts and Minds) none of these address the core doctrinal issues that plague the Nigerian security forces such as incoherent organisation of combat units, poor logistics, poor leadership, focus on ‘Oga at the Top’ regime protection to the detriment of efficiency.

In conclusion, the manifesto does a reasonable job of highlighting high level problems in Nigeria’s security, justice and foreign policy sectors and giving solutions but without the depth or rigour that can give one confidence that the problems are not just identified but understood.