NORTHERN NIGERIA INTERNAL SECURITY SITREP- Week Ending 02 April 2016

Situation North East (Adamawa, Borno and Yobe States)

18 March

Elements of 3 Div and 7 Div began operations to clear ALAGARNO Forest, KALA BALGE LGA, BORNO State at 9.00am supported by preparatory air strikes by the NAF. The advance moved through YAJIWA, JOBA, MOSA Villages and was delayed by the large number of IEDs planted on the approaches

27 March

CAS Air Marshal Sadiq ABUBAKAR stated it would be expanding its platforms in the North East AO, he did not specify types or quantities

Elements of 151 TF Bn, 21 Bde, cleared 3 villages MBALLERI, SHUARI 1 and SHUARI 2 in the vicinity of IZA, BAMA LGA, BORNO State, killing 25 x enemy and capturing some weapons, 2 men, 7 women and 9 children were rescued and 1 x CJTF vigilante injured

Elements of 114 TF Bn, 28 TF Bde supported by CJTF vigilantes conducted clearance operations in the BITA-MADUBE, CIKIN NJUBUL axis, clearing MADUBE CIKIN, GWOZA(?) LGA, BORNO State killing 4 x enemy, destroying 2 x vehicles, 2 x motorcycles, 1 x AK 47, 3 x boxes of 7.62mm (AK), 2 x bicycles and bags of grain. 2 soldiers were injured by an IED and 54 hostages rescued

28 March

Elements of 3 Div and 7 Div occupied ALAGARNO Forest, KALA BALGE LGA, BORNO State killing 35 enemy, having cleared and held enemy positions in WUMBI, TUNISH and TILEN Villages, killing 15 enemy in the villages as well as 2 x Toyota pickups, 4 x trucks and assorted weapons and equipment. 2 enemy were captured alive and 567 hostages released. 5 soldiers were wounded

The Army states that an unnamed minister will go to CAMEROUN to identify the female PBIEDs claiming to be from CHIBOK

Lt Gen TY BURATAI stated that the Army has a housing scheme allowing soldiers on Operations to get loans from the Federal Mortgage Bank whilst on a familiarisation tour of 82 Div in ENUGU, ENUGU State

Gunmen ambushed a clearance patrol from 154 (?) TF Bn, 29 TF Bde in the vicinity of BOLUNGU Village, near BANKI Junction, BAMA LGA, BORNO State. Friendly forces defeated the ambush killing 3 x attackers, capturing 1 x FN FAL, 1 x G3 and 19 x 7.62mm (NATO) rounds.

Elements of 154 TF Bn, 29 Bde in MAYANTI Village BAMA LGA, BORNO State engaged 2 x suspects fleeing from previously cleared villages, 1 was killed and the other captured leading to a cache with 5 x bicycles, bags of grain and other items

Elements of 155 TF Bn, 21 Bde conducted clearance operations in the vicinity of DIPCHERI, JERE and CHOGOLO Towns, BAMA LGA, BORNO State clearing 3 enemy camps, with no friendly casualties and 2 enemy captured. They recovered abandoned vehicles, motorcycles, a bicycle, a dane gun and double barrel weapon.

29 March

An estimated 10,000 male and female hunters gathered in ADAMAWA State for their annual Salala festival and volunteered to serve in the COIN operation in the North East

The CHIBOK Community in ABUJA, FCT has stated that the girls detained in CAMEROUN are not from their community and appeared to be from BAMA and not formally educated

Media reports state that over 574 people rescued from ZALIDYA Hills, GWOZA LGA, BORNO State are squatting in a primary school and filling station in PULKA, GWOZA LGA, without relief or assistance. 303 were rescued on the 27 March and 274 a week earlier

NEMA presented 9 truckloads of relief items to IDPs in HONG, HONG LGA, ADAMAWA State

30 March

154 TF BN, 29 Bde cleared enemy positions in the vicinity of GARE near SAMBISA Forest, killing 1 suspect armed with a bladed weapon and capturing 4. Hostages (2x men, 9 x women and 26 x children) were rescued and 2 mobile phones recovered

The Minister of Defence Brig Gen Muhammad Mansur DAN ALI stated that 2 LGAs in BORNO State were still under Boko Haram control during an interview with VOA Hausa

The female PBIEDs claiming to be from CHIBOK, have not been identified as being from GSS CHIBOK according to the Murtala Mohammed Foundation who showed photographs of the girl and woman to 3 of the parents

31 March

Media reports state that disgruntled soldiers from 154 and 155 TF Bn briefly impeded the helicopter conveying 7 Div GOC Brig Gen Victor EZUGWU after he came to address the in ALAGARNO, DAMBOA LGA, BORNO State. The soldiers allege that the only means of resupply was by helicopter due to IEDs and were unhappy that the helicopters were used for the GOCs visit and not resupply of food and water

BORNO State Government has begun reconstruction of 825 houses in DALORI Village, JERE LGA

Elements of 155 TF Bn, 21 Bde cleared enemy positions and an IED factory in the vicinity of WULWUTA Village, BAMA LGA, BORNO State near JERE, killing 9 enemy and capturing 1 x laptop, 1 x solar panel, 1 x pair of desert and woodland camouflage uniforms, 1 x set of webbing, 1 x pistol, 6 x pressure plates, 3 x 7.65mm rounds, 13 x 7.62mm (NATO) rounds, medical supplies and combat boots. 8 men, 4 women and 9 children were rescued and 1 soldier wounded. 2 x IEDs contained in artillery shells were made safe by EOD

Boko Haram/ Daesh Faction released an Hausa language (with Arabic subtitles) video TITLED ‘Investigate’ denying there was a truce, negotiation or surrender and stating ‘SHEKAU’ was still their leader. The better produced video featured 5 masked fighters wearing Nigeria Army woodland type uniforms, with webbing and rifles (including a Galil) and PKM, with 4 armed pick ups behind them, including one armed with what appears to be a recoilless rifle and another stripped out vehicle towing a 155mm artillery piece (FH 77B?).

02 April

Defence Chiefs from the Lake CHAD Basin Commission met in YAOUNDE, CAMEROUN to assess the performance of the MNJTF, they also sought to reorganise sectors and agree on intelligence sharing, the meeting was coordinated by Camerounian Minister Delegate at the presidency for Defence Joseph Beti ASSOMO

DHQ denied the allegation that troops prevented 7 Div GOC’s helicopter from leaving ALAGARNO, whilst acknowledging there were logistical issues, it was stated the GOC supplied water and had been with them in their defensive positions throughout the operation

7 Div announced the reopening of MAIDUGURI Mammy Market in barracks

Situation North West (Jigawa, Kaduna, Kano, Katsina, Kebbi, Sokoto and Zamfara States)

27 March

GOC 1 Mech Div Maj Gen Adeniyi OYEBADE offered a reward of N500,000.00 for information on the abduction of Col INUSA

The Kidnappers of the 3 TEKAN/ ECWA Pastors have reduced their ransom to N20m

28 March

GOC 1 Mech Div Maj Gen OYEBADE increased the reward offered to N1m for information on the abduction of Col INUSA

IMN has denied involvement in the kidnapping of Col INUSA in KADUNA

30 March

Col Samaila INUSA’s body was discovered around 6.00pm in the vicinity of AJYAITA Village, CHIKUN LGA off Eastern Bypass, KADUNA, KADUNA State. The body had begun decomposing, indicating he had been dead for several days, no cause of death was released

1 Div has provided an update on Op Sharan Daji: Division Internal Security Force (DISFORCE) in KADUNA State has killed 1 x suspect and recovered 1 x AK 47 and 30 x 7.62mm (AK). 1 Bde in ZAMFARA State arrested 1 x suspected bandit and recovered 419 livestock and 1 x locally made pistol, 3 Bde in KANO and KATSINA States killed 4 suspects, arrested, 14, destroyed 10 camps and recovered 4 x locally made pistols, 7 x dane guns and 677 livestock

31 March

The 3 TEKAN pastors were released in a forest near DUTSE, after SABON GAYA, CHIKUN LGA, KADUNA State. Rev DZIGGAU and Rev DZARMA were released alive whilst Rev ANTO had died, it is unclear if a ransom was paid.

Police arrested 7 suspected armed robbers who operated in the SABON TASHA Area of KADUNA State at their hideout in MARARABA RIDO, KADUNA SOUTH LGA around 2.30pm seizing 1 x locally made rifle

Situation North Centre (Abuja FCT, Bauchi, Benue, Gombe Kogi, Kwara, Nasarawa, Niger, Plateau, Taraba States)

27 March

Paul EDEH of The One Idoma Initiative, Othman NGELZARMA of Miyetti Allah Cattle Breeders Association of Nigeria (MACBAN), Christian ENECHE of AGATU Network Forum and Muhammadu KIRUWA of MACBAN held a peace meeting in ABUJA, FCT releasing a 17 point resolution to resolve the crisis in BENUE and NASARAWA States

29 March

300 Army officers and companies are accused of stealing N48bn through fraudulent defence contracts

30 March

The Vice President’s wife Mrs Dolapo OSINBANJO presented 100 bags of rice and other relief materials to IDPs in WADATA, MAKURDI, BENUE State

31 March

13 gunmen attacked trucks taking relief materials to IDPS in AGATU LGA, BENUE State. 6 were later arrested

01 April

Media reports state the DSS has arrested Khalid AL BARNAWI reputed leader of ANSARU in LOKOJA, KOGI State around 9.00am near a military facility. There has been no official confirmation

The NPF has launched a nationwide recruitment drive to attract 10,000 new officers

02 April

Director Defence Information, Col Rabe ABUBAKAR confirmed the reported arrest of Khalid AL BARNAWI

Situation External (Rest of the World)

16 March

Camerounian forces and the MNJTF launched Operation Tentacle to clear the enemy from DJIBILI and ZAMGA, NIGERA. 20 enemy were reported killed and 12 injured

27 March

US AFRICOM Deputy Commander for Military Operations Vice Adm Michael FRANKEN visited the US 2nd Bde Combat Team, 3rd Infantry Div. Task Force at Contingency Location GAROUA, EXTREME NORD Region

28 March

Camerounian authorities’ state the captured female PBIEDs claiming to be from CHIBOK are undergoing treatment. One is described as 9-12 years old, heavily drugged and bearing injuries

Gunmen attacked SIRADJI, MAYO SAVA Department, EXTREME NORD Region, near MANAWATCHI killing a villager

29 March

Vigilantes detained 2 x suspected Boko Haram members named MALA and HAROUNA in HOMAKA, MAYO SAVA Department

30 March

Gendarmes shot a suspected female PBIED was shot in MOZOGO, MAYO TSANAGA Department, EXTREME NORD Region in the morning, 3 x devices were found on her

Gunmen ambushed a Nigerien patrol 20km from DIFFA, DIFFA Region, NIGER Republic around 6.00am killing 6 and wounding 3. Aircraft were deployed to pursue the attackers

A delegation including Defence Minister Dan ALI, Minister of Foreign Affairs, Geoffrey ONYEAMA met with US Secretary of State John KERRY in WASHINGTON DC, USA on the side-lines of the 4th Nuclear Security Summit, where he reaffirmed support for NIGERIA’s efforts against Boko Haram and stated the US had helped train and equip 2 infantry battalions

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About peccavi

A Nigerian with interests in defence, security, geopolitics, the military particularly small unit tactics, COIN, stabilisation and asymmetric warfare
This entry was posted in Counter insurgency, Defence, Nigeria Defence, Nigeria Strategy, Terrorism, West Africa Defence, West Africa Strategy and tagged , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , . Bookmark the permalink.

7 Responses to NORTHERN NIGERIA INTERNAL SECURITY SITREP- Week Ending 02 April 2016

  1. Pingback: NORTHERN NIGERIA INTERNAL SECURITY SITREP- Week Ending 02 April 2016 | Rifleman III Journal

  2. jimmy says:

    In terms of procurement ,are you hearing anything in terms of Tanks.It is well known that Nigeria will need to buy more the real question is where are they likely to come from Britain or Russia?

    • peccavi says:

      Nothing heard, but I would guess Russia. Britain doesn’t make MBTs anymore really and T 72s, 80s and 90s are already in production and use.
      Not heard any talk about tanks but as usual I come back to my same question of whether we need tanks and if yes, what for?
      We bought T 72s to combat Boko Haram, essentially as mobile armoured fire support. That’s a job that can be done by any number of platforms. Or do we need it for offensive ops? In that case over what terrain and are tanks the best option?
      Personally I’d go through a complete rearmamament, maybe 1.5 or 2 Bdes of T 72 MBT, and 3 Bdes of ERC 90, with another a Bde of Scorpions or another ight tank attached to the Heavy MBT Bdes. The Vickers, T55s etc should all be withdrawn to workshop, the best of them should have engines, transmissions, and other stuff maintained (if not too expensive) and then broken down into Independent Fire support Sqns attached to Infantry Divs

  3. lachit says:

    read your comment above and I guess understand at least some of your thought process or maybe not 😀

    unfortunately I don’t have any idea for the terrain in northern Nigeria.

    many people think that operating tanks is just jumping into it and driving into a battlefield.

    lets share some info on the T72s

    the T72 come equipped with ERA tiles which gives then reasonable protection but puts the accompanying infantry at risk. exploding ERA tiles due to shrapnel’s , fragments or high calibre bullets can seriously injure friendly ground troops near the tank.

    I am not sure of the type of T72 operated by Nigeria I am confused between T72M1 and T72AV
    but in either case the range of the gun is said to be around 5000m.
    however reality is depending on terrain this drops down to less than 1500m for 100% hit probability.
    and less than 500 m in passive night mode and around 800 m in active night mode.

    lack of all-round vision for the T72 hampers operational effectiveness in CT operations.
    decent Situational awareness capability is a must to pick up hidden and low silhouette targets before they let loose a tandem warhead RPG at it to destroy or incapacitate it.

    manufacturers make all kinds of claim but operational reality is something else.

    the logistics trail associated with operating tanks is huge and hogs lots of resources/spares and men.
    plus the turnaround time for routine maintenance is long if you are operating in areas far away from the logistics base.

    tanks are good when you have the enemy armour before you , but when the enemy is light footed and highly mobile it becomes a huge headache , imagine the tank crew inside a tank in hot conditions while criss-crossing the country side in search of the elusive enemy .
    if they come across a group of technicals , the moment the first kill is made the rest of them will be running helter-skelter , then giving the almost non-existent hunter-killer capabilities and moderate static to mobile hit capability and less than moderate mobile to mobile hit capability , the final head count will not as expected by many.
    and the low number of deployable tanks at any given time/place rules out pursuing all the enemy technicals.

    T-72B3M is the latest variant if I am correct and comes equipped with an independent panoramic sight for the tank’s commander, with its own thermal imaging device which in turn allows for respectable hunter killer ability.

    I was inside Indian T72 combat improved vijeya variant , but given the choice I would prefer the arjun MBT any time. having all the ammo under my ass is not really a comforting feeling if you get my gist.

    coming to point,
    better options for CT operations would have been modern light armoured tracked or wheeled vehicles with 40mm or even 105mm guns . fitted with commanders panoramic sight which together with the gunners sight will allow for hunter-killer capability to take out multiple targets in a short span of time.
    to negate the tandem warhead RPG fielded by BH a simple CAGE armour on these vehicles will suffice.

    plus the logistics trail with such vehicles especially the wheeled versions are low to allow their broader deploy ability for a longer time away from their maintenance base.

    also their operational uses are many from fire support to recon missions to patrols to pursuing the enemy etc.

    some of these vehicles have provisions to carry their own troops which again is a huge plus.

    plus quantity is a quality , larger numbers can be procured for the same price of buying a fewer numbers of MBTs.

    infact I would not mind to see the upgraded BMP -2 fitted with better armour together with a CAGE armour inducted if you need to build capacity within a short time.

    maybe NA missed a trick somewhere along the line.

    these are my personal views only

    • peccavi says:

      Exactly, MBTS in COIN to me are a waste, mobility, firepower and protection are the basis of AFVs, in Nigeria I believe our main effort should be mobility and firepower.

  4. lachit says:

    I wrote this for beegeagle blog but if you don’t mind I decide to repost it here , if you want you can remove it no problem I wont mind 😀

    CASE FOR ADOPTION OF LIGHT WHEELED ARMOURED VEHICLES (IFV) FOR THE FIGHT AGAINST BH (coin operations only) BY NIGERIAN ARMY

    1. MOBILITY (OPERATIONAL MOBILITY AND TACTICAL MOBILITY)
    most light wheeled armoured vehicles fall into the category of less than 25 tonne or so, with the exception of a few, which gives them a distinct advantage against the heavier tanks, therefore with respect to operational mobility the lighter wheeled armoured vehicles have way better ability to swiftly allocate and relocate forces within a theatre of operation or inter-theatre of operations.

    On roads the rolling resistance of armoured wheeled vehicles equals only 2 % of their weight. Consequently, wheeled vehicles need less fuel and can cover longer distances by road before they need to be refuelled. This advantage of wheeled vehicles disappears, however, when they move off roads. Then their fuel consumption may be at least as high as that of tracked vehicles of equal weight. Still, if patrolling and area control missions are emphasized, road travel predominates and, thus, the advantage of fuel economy accrues to the wheeled class.
    The fact that wheeled armour can cover longer distances faster than tracked vehicles are complemented by yet another advantage: There is much less fatigue for their occupants because the wheeled platforms do not suffer the vibrations generated by tracks. Wheeled armoured vehicles tend to excel in speed on the road, of course, but also in open terrain, if it is fairly negotiable. When it comes to zigzagging and acceleration, the advantage also seems to go to wheeled armour. It is true that most tracked vehicles can pivot in place, while wheeled vehicles cannot (except for those with brake-steering). Otherwise, however, wheeled vehicles are more easily steered and their running gear is more responsive. Compared to a tracked counterpart of equivalent weight and engine output, we can expect a wheeled platform to have not only higher speed, but also better acceleration.

    Tactical mobility
    Good Tactical mobility is needed when a force is in immediate contact with its adversary. Direct confrontation with an enemy imposes at least two mobility requirements:
    Good off-road mobility is an important precondition of being able to evade enemy action and exploit unexpected avenues of approach.
    Agility a combination of high speed, good acceleration, and the ability to zigzag is also key to being able to respond flexibly to rapidly changing opportunities and challenges.

    2. FIREPOWER VERSALITY
    Depending on the wheeled armoured vehicles tonnage they can be equipped with
    25mm auto cannons,
    30mm auto cannons,
    35mm auto cannons,
    40mm auto cannons,
    57mm auto cannons,
    105 mm rifled or smooth bore guns
    Together with a 7.62mm coaxial machine gun and sometimes anti-tank guided missiles (ATGMs).
    Some come equipped with 30, 40, 76, or 81 mm grenade launchers.
    Almost all IFVs have smoke grenade dischargers for concealment.

    Nowadays RCWS stations are available both hull penetrating and non hull penetrating fitted with most of the above mentioned weapons. Most of the wheeled armoured vehicles comes with latest optronics for the driver and commander.
    Commanders panoramic sight together with the gunners sight provide very good hunter killer capability both in day and night conditions.

    3. VARIANTS VERSALITY
    A wheeled armoured vehicle can be the common base for a large number of specialized variants like
    1. Wheeled armoured ambulance carrier
    2. Wheeled armoured mortar vehicle
    3. Wheeled armoured troop carrier
    4. Wheeled armoured amphibious vehicle
    5. Wheeled armoured command & communication vehicle
    6. Wheeled armoured infantry fighting vehicle (IFV)
    7. Wheeled armoured infantry mobility vehicle (IMV) or protected patrol vehicle (PPV)
    8. wheeled armoured Assault gun (when fitted with 105mm gun)
    9. Wheeled armoured tank destroyer (when fitted with ATGMs and related sensors)
    10. Wheeled armoured recon vehicle fitted with LORROS (long range recon and observation system)

    4. COSTS
    Wheeled armoured vehicles are relatively cheaper than their tracked counterparts. They are simpler and made more use of relatively inexpensive parts or sub-systems (such as engines and tires) from civilian production chain. For the price of 10 MBTs you can buy around 25-30 wheeled armoured vehicles
    After all QUANTITY IS ALSO A QUALITY

    Wheeled armoured vehicles main advantage is low OPERATIONAL COSTS.
    They are less expensive to operate. Wheeled vehicles tend to consume significantly less fuel (and other lubricants) than tracked armoured vehicles of equal weight. Their relative lightness and reduced logistical needs together give the wheeled family an edge over the tracked in strategic mobility and tactical mobility via the cost factor involved in the transportation and operational usage .also maintenance requirements also are less burdensome.

    THE 100 MILLION DOLLAR QUESTION

    1. Can tanks be used for patrolling?
    (Disadvantage: increased cost of operation, increased wear and tear, low operational availability, longer maintenance overhauls etc.)
    2. Can tanks be used for recon missions?
    (Disadvantage: you can hear for miles the racket caused by the tanks)
    3. Can tanks guarantee adequate situational awareness?
    (Disadvantage: present T72 tanks with the army lack the sensors for adequate situational awareness)
    4. Can the tanks guarantee 100% or even 50 % kill probability against a group of highly mobile targets like TECHNICALS?
    (disadvantage : present T72 tanks lack hunter killer capability , by the time the first kill is made , the targets will be all over the place running away from it , target acquisition will be very difficult and even if the next target is acquired moderate static to mobile and even lower mobile to mobile target engagement capacity will result in very few kills. here the number of tanks involved in the operation is a important criteria, considering the larger theatre of operations and low number of tanks available with NA results into a not so favourable operational scenario.)

    NOTE:: tanks are claimed by their manufacturers to engage targets up to 5000m, that claim is true under test conditions only. Most of the time terrain, weather conditions, on board sensor capability etc. limits target engagement range of tanks to less than 2000m only.

    5. Is it worth the cost to fire expensive shells from tanks than use less expensive medium calibre ammo?
    (Disadvantage: T72 tanks firing AT shells at TECHNICALS is overkill , when a burst from 25mm calibre onwards auto cannon will do the same with better results )

    NOTE: 25mm to 40mm calibre auto cannons have ammo belts which contain tracer rounds after every 4-5 armour piercing / high explosive rounds which give the gunner a pretty good idea of the impact point which is not possible with higher calibre guns like 105mm or 125 mm guns.

    Etc etc

    this are my personal views

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