NORTHERN NIGERIA INTERNAL SECURITY SITREP- Week Ending 21 November 2015

Situation Friendly Forces

12 November

The EKITI State National Orientation Agency (NOA) Director Dayo FAMOSAYA warned that Boko Haram was planning terrorist attacks in South West Nigeria

16 November

Elements of 21 Bde conducted a fighting patrol in the vicinity of FIRGI, BAMA LGA, BORNO State, engaged suspected enemy gunmen, killing 3, rescued 3 female abductees and captured 1 x vehicle and other item. The remainder of the enemy fled into SAMBISA Forest

Elements of 7 Div detained a suspected Boko Haram terrorist John TRANKIL in KASUWAR SHANU, MAIDUGURI, BORNO State 9 suspected gunmen were arrested in MAIDUGURI, BORNO State with AK 47 and a Toyota Hilux containing 20 x IEDS

28 people were detained at Army checkpoints in BIU, BIU LGA, BORNO State on suspicion of being insurgents.

Op Safe Haven has warned residents of JOS and BUKURU to avoid congregating in crowded places such as bus terminuses, markets, mosques, churches, schools, relaxation spots in the vicinity of WEST OF MINES, NNPC Mega Stations and other petrol stations, HAMAZ Area along AHMADU BELLO Way, JOS

17 November

Friendly forces consolidated their hold on GAMBORU NGALA, NGALA LGA, BORNO State

Elements of 101 Bn, 7 Div Garrison arrested a suspected Boko Haram member named as Abubakar SADIQ on LAGOS Street, MAIDUGURI, BORNO State, who is allegedly No 28 on the 100 most wanted list

The former NSA Col Sambo DASUKI (rtd) has been accused in the preliminary findings of the Investigative Panel on Procurement of signing contracts of up to $2bn for items ether overpriced or not received

The NPF arrested a suspected Boko Haram member in ABUJA TALAKAWA Ward, MAIDUGURI, BORNO State, reportedly number 40 on the 100 most wanted list

Elements of 111 SF Bn, 7 Div Garrison, conducted a strike operation in the vicinity of DELWA,  BORNO State, discovering and destroying an enemy improvised rocket making facility in JAMRARI, BAMA LGA, BORNO State.

Elements of 154 Bn, 29 Bde cleared enemy camps in the vicinity of MATALI, DAMBOA LGA, BORNO State

Friendly forces cleared GONIRI, GUJBA LGA, YOBE State of enemy forces, clearance operations are continuing in the environs

Friendly forces cleared BAMA, KUKAWA LGA, BORNO State

Media reports state up to 6000 troops from 3 Div and 7 Div have begun clearing SAMBISA Forest supported by air, armour and artillery, launching from BITA, KERENOA, MADAGALI and other locations

18 November

BORNO State Police command stated they had arrested a suspected Boko Haram member Mohammed USMAN in ABUJA TALAKAWA Ward, MAIDUGURI, BORNO State

Former NSA Col DASUKI (rtd) responded to accusations, denying accusations and providing details of equipment allegedly procured

YOBE State Police stated they had recovered 159 cows, 266 sheep, 19 goats and a horse allegedly stolen by Boko Haram members in the vicinity of DAMATURU and arrested 3 suspects

ADAMAWA State Governor Bindo JIBRILLA banned night markets in the state, stating all businesses attracting crowds at night to close by 6.00pm

The Fourth NIGERIA-CAMEROUN Trans Border Security Committee Meeting held in ABUJA, FCT, attended by the NSA Maj Gen Babagana MONGUNO (rtd), Minister of State for Foreign Affairs Hajia Khadija Bukar ABBA on behalf of the Minister of Foreign Affairs Geoffrey ONYEAMA, Camerounian Minister of Territorial Administration and Decentralisation Rene Emmanuel SADI

Elements of 21 Bde cleared a enemy IED and improvised rocket making facility outside BAMA, BAMA LGA, BORNO State along BAMA-GONIN KURMI Road capturing gas cylinders, welding machines, pipes, poles, chemicals, incomplete IEDs and other equipment.

19 November

27 Bde detained a suspect in JAKUSKO, JAKUSKO LGA, YOBE STATE and another who is a tailor in DAN ETIEBET HOUSING Estate, DAMATURU and a woman carrying suspicious materials in DAMATURU. The first two suspects were allegedly listed on the top 100 most wanted

27 Bde commander stated that enemy camps named MARKAS, TIMBUKTU and FALLUJAH had been cleared and other smaller camps at SHANGAMARI, NGIRMAI, SHAMKO and JAMTARI in ALAGARNO Forest had been cleared

NAF hit a concentration of enemy forces in the vicinity of WULGE, BORNO State. The NAF also identified and destroyed enemy vehicles in KUNSHE Town as well as enemy logistic, vehicle repair facilities and bomb making facilities in SAMBISA Forest

2 men dressed in the uniforms of the Jama’atu Izalatil Bid’a Wa’iqamitis Sunna (JIBWIS) First Aid Group (Yan Agaji) have been detained and handed over to the police in ZARIA, KADUNA State on suspicion of being Boko Haram members, the first suspect detained in full uniform was named as Hassan MAHAUCI living in MAIGANA, SOBA LGA, KADUNA State

The Nigerien Chief of Defence Staff Gen Seyni GARBA visited the CDS Gen Abayomi OLONISAKIN IN ABUJA, FCT to discuss the MNJTF and its implementation

The CDS Gen OLONISAKIN stated the Chadian government were yet deploy troops to their allocated MNJTF sector

Theatre Command HQ released a statement stating that allegations of 105 men from 157 Bn being missing is untrue.

20 November

The Nigerian Foundation for Support of Victims of Terrorism (victim Support Fund) donated N20m to AMINU KANO Teaching Hospital and N20m to MURTALA MUHAMMAD Specialist Hospital, KANO, KANO State to treat the victims of the GSM Market IED attacks

21 November

Friendly forces began operations in SAMBISA, GUJBA and SASAWA Forests

Situation Enemy Forces

13 November

Gunmen attacked AKILIBU, KACHIA LGA, KADUNA State along ABUJA KADUNA Road with small arms killing one person, abducting 4 Fulani women and stealing several cows

16 November

Gunmen attacked MADA, KALA BALGE LGA, BORNO State using 3 x VBIEDs and small arms. The attack was defeated with 26 enemy killed and 3 soldiers wounded. Friendly forces captured 1 x VBIED, 2 x AK 47, 111 x7.62mm (NATO) rounds and 2 RPG rounds

17 November

A PBSIED detonated in the Fruit and Vegetable Market, JIMETA, YOLA, ADAMAWA State around 8.00pm killing 32 people and wounding 80

18 November

Gunmen attacked MNJTF positions in the vicinity of DAMASAK, MOBBAR LGA and in ABADAM LGA, BORNO State.

Gunmen attacked 152 Bn and 157 Bn in GUDUMBALI, GUZAMALA LGA, BORNO State, HQ Coy, 157 Bn were cut of with 2 officers and 105 soldiers reported missing. Media reports state the enemy captured 1 x T72 MBT, 8 vehicles (type unspecified) 3 x artillery pieces (type unspecified), 60,000 rounds of AAA ammunition. The T 72 was allegedly recovered after a friendly counter attack and other captured equipment destroyed by Attack Helicopter

A PDP Party Youth Leader Saidu ABDULLAHI was strangled to death in TUNRUKU Ward, IGABI LGA, KADUNA State as he went to a meeting in KADUNA City

Gunmen attacked MNJTF position at GERINGIWA, KUKAWA LGA, BORNO State 4km from BAGA

2 x female PBSIEDs detonated at FARM CENTRE GSM Market in KANO, KANO State around 3.00pm killing 14 people and wounding over 100. The first device detonated at the entrance and the second near the centre

19 November

Gunmen attacked GAMBORU NGALA, NGALA LGA, BORNO State but were repulsed

20 November

Gunmen attacked KWANTI Village, FIKA LGA, YOBE State with small arms around 11.40pm killing 7 people

Situation External Forces

14 November

Gunmen disguised in Camerounian style uniform ambushed several vehicles on Route Nationale 1in the vicinity of DOUBLE, LOGONE ET CHARI Department, EXTREME NORD Region, CAMEROUN burning 2 and stealing 2 others carrying foodstuffs. One containing bananas was recovered the next day

Gunmen attacked AFADE, LOGONE ET CHARI Department at night losing 5 enemy killed

15 November

Gunmen ambushed a combined BIR/ vigilante patrol in the vicinity of MASTAFARI, LIMANI Arrondissement, MAYO SAVA Department, EXTREME NORD Region killing the head of TCHAKAMARI Vigilante committee and one other

16 November

Gunmen attacked NIRA, MAYO SAVA Department, EXTREME NORD Region 5km from BONDERI

Camerounian forces supported by attack helicopters attacked enemy positions in the vicinity of KETTA, EXTREME NORD Region around 4.00am.capturing 19 suspects

17 November

Gunmen attacked GOLDAVI, MOZOGO Arrondissement, MAYO TSANAGA Department, EXTREME NORD Region, at night killing 7 and wounding 8 people

18 November

The Chadian National Assembly extended the State of Emergency in LAC Region for another 4 months until 22 March 2016

19 November

The UNHCR stated the IDP population had increased to 2.2m

Vigilantes from AMCHIDE detained 4 suspected Boko Haram members in IGAWA between GANSE and KOURGUI

The Norwegian Ambassador Rolf REE donated $4m on behalf of his Government to the BORNO State Government for the rehabilitation and resettlement of IDPs

20 November

Gunmen attempted to infiltrate KERAWA, MAYO SAVA Department, EXTREME NORD Region at night but were repulsed by vigilantes. 1 suspect was captured and handed over to the Camerounian Army

21 November

2 x IEDs were discovered in an abandoned house in MORA, MAYO SAVA Department, EXTREME NORD Region, 2 female suspects were also arrested.

4 x female PBSIED detonated in NIGUE on the outskirts of FOTOKOL, LOGONE ET CHARI, Department, EXTREME NORD Region around midday killing 5 other people and wounding 12. The first PBSIED detonated at a vigilante checkpoint causing majority of the casualties, the other 3 detonated in the open whilst being pursued.

 

Insurgent Incidents (North East) IED Vehicle IED Suicide IED Small Arms Small arms+IED IDF Other weapons Theft Kidnapping
7 3(1) 0 6 1 0 0 0 0
Insurgent Incidents (North Centre) IED Vehicle IED Suicide IED Small Arms Small arms+IED IDF Other weapons Theft Kidnapping
0 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 1
Insurgent Incidents (North West) IED Vehicle IED Suicide IED Small Arms Small arms+IED IDF Other weapons Theft Kidnapping
0 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0
Insurgent Incidents (Foreign) IED Vehicle IED Suicide IED Small Arms Small arms+IED IDF Other weapons Theft Kidnapping
4(2) 0 4 6 0 0 0 1 0
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About peccavi

A Nigerian with interests in defence, security, geopolitics, the military particularly small unit tactics, COIN, stabilisation and asymmetric warfare
This entry was posted in Counter insurgency, Defence, Geopolitics, Nigeria Defence, Nigeria Strategy, Terrorism and tagged , , , , , , , , , , , , . Bookmark the permalink.

15 Responses to NORTHERN NIGERIA INTERNAL SECURITY SITREP- Week Ending 21 November 2015

  1. Pingback: NORTHERN NIGERIA INTERNAL SECURITY SITREP- Week Ending 21 November 2015 | Rifleman III Journal

  2. lachit says:

    came to know about ur blog from roscoe in beegeagle
    can i post here
    regards
    lachit

  3. lachit says:

    hi since ur informed
    what is ur opinion on the performance and effectiveness of the nigerian military intelligence. plus local police and para-military intelligence units.

    national level intelligence agencies r sometimes not that effective in combat zones / insurgency areas.

    my experiences in kashmir r pointer to this.there the national intelligence units were a major failure.
    but when precedence was given to military , para military intelligence and police intelligence units operational there , things were quickly brought under control. events could be identified and accurately predicted and hence prevented most of the times.
    and national level intelligence was limited to countering foreign interference.

    from ur november data it seems cells of BH r operating or r very mobile. by cells i mean both small medium and large groups depending on mission needs.
    do u think this is because of the NA ‘garrison mentality” . patrols as i know r happening but it seems they r not in the quantity required for complete area domination.

    do u know all this data ur collecting can be put to good use.
    coupling it with BH attacks (no of men , vehicles used , weapons platform used , attrition etc etc ) geographical terrain profile of the area , demograpy , financial status, local economic stats , unemployment data , political / religious profile etc etc will give u a good idea of
    1.recruitment pattern and prospective target zones of bh
    2.bh hot zones among civilian areas
    3.bh sources for finance and local logistics providers (before and after attack)
    4.routes for bh movement
    5.communication both off the air and ground runners
    6. weapon cache and logistics movement
    7.medical facilities plus medical suppliers
    8.predicting and identifying areas of impeding/prospective bh attacks
    etc etc

    data some which will seem meaningless in standalone form, when collected from varied sources in the northern areas and put together will help u get a prediction/analyzing model which will most of the time keep u a step ahead of the bh.
    such models r used by many intelligence agencies for varied purposes.
    can be developed here too. atleast to support the military in the present combat zones and later expanded to cover the entire country.
    u could try making one with help of national intelligence agencies 😀

    ( just too be safe 😀 ) these r my personal opinions

    • peccavi says:

      Hi Lachit,

      The Nigerian intelligence effort in the North East as best I can see it is split between Militay Intelligence, controlled by DMI and the DSS. To be honest I am not sure of the chains of command, but as it’s a military operation I would guess DSS and DMI come under the Divisional Intelligence Cell, reporting to the Thetre Intelligence Cell.

      But to be honest I do not know.

      While the intelligence effort might seem chaotic, it must be emphasised that for every IED that goes off several are stopped, so they are doing something right.

      But I agree with you, intelligence should be localised, down to the Brigade/ Battalion level, with police, informants, prisoner interrogations etc all integrated and analysed there, with intelligence products then passed up the chain, with Div. coordinating within their AO and the Theatre HQ coordinating between the Divs and then the DSS focussing on the broader intelligence battle. But I must be honest there is not enough in the public domain to completely understand how the intelligence is organised.

      I am trying to analyse the situation from April to now, I hope to have it ready before years end but stuff keeps popping up!

      The trend so far seem to indicate heavy enemy concentrations in Cameroun, but now they are not just recruiting, collecting food and supplies but actively trying to define a secured area particularly around Fotokol.

      Their ops in Chad and Niger again are geographically specific.

      To be honest the counter attack in Gudumbali was a surprise. I was expecting a serious attack closer to Lake Chad, but Damasak, Gamboru Ngala and Gwoza are very insecure, allowing BH to move around the resident units.

      Their mobility is greatly reduced in my opinion, notice how they husband their strength to attack military targets mainly, using IEDs on population centres.

      I suspect they no longer have the luxury of numerous vehicles and motorcycles to waste. Their attacks on villages are no longer gratuitous but have a logistical purpose.

      I think they are concentrating their strength and withdrawing behind a screen to a main defended area from Lake Chad to Damasak and Bosso in the West and Gamboru Ngala/ Fotokol in the South.

      Note that many camps that have been cleared were defended by elderly men with dane guns (muzzle loaders) and bows and arrows.

      I believe they will focus on this area and use the IEDs to put pressure on the opposing armies.

      If they do not defend themselves this might be their last Dry season as a standing force, but the dysfunction in Nigeria and the Lake Chad basin is their strongest ally right now

    • lachit says:

      thanks for the explanation,
      i have to download a map , as some of the places u have mentioned i never heard of them before. 😀

      u r saying most of the attacks r due to logistics requirement.

      Cameroon chad niger have active bh presence so in future how does nigeria expect to deal with them?
      even now it is a sizable problem.

      and u side stepped my question on the garrison mode of operation 😀

      it is dry season in nigeria right.
      so is it possible to use the climatic conditions ie its effects to ones advantage militarily?
      against bh.

      • peccavi says:

        Hi
        I’m saying my observation is that attacks oon civilian targets are for logistics reasosn, food, vehicles, slaves forced conscripts etc.
        Attacks on military positions are for military considerations.
        That leads me to deduce that they have taken heavy losses and are struggling to replenish men, food, fuel and equipment so reserve heavy equipment for major attacks.
        However they have left a screen of spies and agents and left some arms and food caches behind.
        The dry season has a significant effect on operations, the fine dust fog hampers air operations, rivers and swamps dry up improving mobility and in normal times crops have been harvested

      • lachit says:

        hi
        actually i never doubted ur conclusions. 😀 (i seem to have a nasty habit of giving the wrong impression)

        infact i agree wth them.
        u sure have a accurate grasp of the things, much better than the nigeria media and other sources 😀

        i wonder why the NA is not exploiting the above conditions.

        these conditions r perfect for special operations ie
        FIGHT THE GUERILLA LIKA A GUERILLA
        FIGHT THE INSURGENT LIKE A INSURGENT
        FIGHT THE TERRORIST LIKE A TERRORIST

        groups of 15 men well armed and well provisioned can be dropped at watering holes , remote villages , grazing areas , routes etc to lay there waiting in cover upto 15-20 days at a stretch while maintaining radio silence.
        take down identifyable targets as quitely as possible , bobby trap their vehicles , routes etc , poison their food source , in-short terrorize them.
        beat them at their own game , use terror, use unpredictable actions to keep the enemy guessing restricting their movement , foring them to make a wrong move. make a example of their supporters , use subterfge to fan rumors of break off splinter group and blame everything on it (elimination of bh supporters).

        such operations have been done i know of israeli, russian and indian ops.
        in fact the indian ops were reasonably successful they started infiltrating into pok to weaken the terrorists there they operated 15-20 days without any contact in groups of 5 -6.in freezing snow.
        untill a leak happened

        but i will give a penny to see the faces of BH shits all pumped up in the hope of 72 virgins in hell only to learn that their vehicles aint in the mood (thanks to the SF ) to start plus one or two vehicles going up in flames might further cheer them up 😀

      • peccavi says:

        The Nigerian military is already doing those things, however I do not know how joined up it all is and how it is sustained. Also there are limited special forces, 72 MF Bn, 111 SF Bn, NN SBS, and other SF units are striking and raiding.

        There is a huge opportunity for SF operations as well as specialised operations but it has to be a joined up continuous operation.
        Disrupting BH in one place only for them to move somewhere else is pointless.
        I would suggest SF is used in a fairly conventional sense, deployed close, far and near. By close I mean into the no mans land where friendly forces have not deployed but BH has only screens and outposts. By far I mean deploying them immediately to the rear of the enemy as friendly forces advance to disrupt their counter attack, take out heavy weapons and commanders and then deep into the rear on long range patrols to identify enemy positions, routes etc

      • lachit says:

        “By far I mean deploying them immediately to the rear of the enemy as friendly forces advance to disrupt their counter attack, take out heavy weapons and commanders and then deep into the rear on long range patrols to identify enemy positions, routes etc”

        bulls eye 😀
        plus battle field damage assesment and real time persistant stalking 😀
        the info they will collect / relay back will be as accurate and actionable as it can get

  4. lachit says:

    on 2nd though i seriously a map
    u should use softwares which allows u to overlap 2 or maps to get a better picture.

  5. lachit says:

    if ur not bothered by my stalking 😀
    how about discussing implementing political/organizational subterfage against bh.

    • lachit says:

      also if u dont mind my asking
      do u have security related background ?

    • peccavi says:

      To do that you would need to know and understand BHs structure and organisation. I have little knowledge of their organisation, some people have knowledge, some have understanding, some have both but I doubt even BH has thorough knowledge of its structure and organisation.
      But there are still peripheral things that can be done, however unlike classic COIN I do not believe BH has a political solution. Its stated political/ ideological objectives are so nonsensical that there is no way a politically acceptable compromise can be sought.
      In my opinion the solutions are purely military exploiting hard and soft methods to defeat and destroy them at the same time rehabilitate abductees and surrendered enemy and use economic measures to prevent the conditions by which BH became popular (before the insurgency)
      I have a military background

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